Wharton School: Finance (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"The Benefits of Volume-Conditional Order-Crossing","authors":"Dean Phillips Foster, Simon Gervais, K. Ramaswamy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.924410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.924410","url":null,"abstract":"We assess the role and viability of an order-crossing or market-clearing mechanism that is automatically triggered only when a minimum number of shares can be crossed. Such a mechanism is naturally more attractive to traders who do not require much immediacy for their trades, as liquidity is cheaper in this market than in a continuous-auction market. The volume condition that we propose is crucial to the effectiveness with which this market complements the continuous-auction market in two important ways. First, when appropriately set, the volume condition endogenously adjusts the probability that market-clearing is triggered and so keeps impatient traders and highly informed traders away. Second, because market-clearing with a large volume condition reduces the effects of adverse selection in this market, patient traders are more willing to place orders in it. As we show, these effects often combine into a Pareto-dominating equilibrium when the continuous-auction market and the crossing mechanism with the right volume condition are both open.","PeriodicalId":351720,"journal":{"name":"Wharton School: Finance (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131463390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Long Run Risks and Equity Returns","authors":"Ravi Bansal, Robert F. Dittmar, Dana Kiku","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.891477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.891477","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that investor concerns about the exposure of asset returns to permanent movements in consumption levels are a key determinant of the risk and return relation in asset markets. We show that as the investment horizon increases, (i) the return's systematic risk exposure (consumption beta) almost converges to the long-run relation between dividends and consumption, (ii) return volatility is increasingly dominated by dividend shocks. We find that most of the differences in risk premia, at short and long horizons, is due to the heterogeneity in the exposure to permanent risks in consumption. The long-run cross-sectional relation between risk and return provides a measure of the compensation for permanent risks in consumption. We find that the market compensation for these risks is large relative to that for transitory movements in consumption.","PeriodicalId":351720,"journal":{"name":"Wharton School: Finance (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132122167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Investing in Socially Responsible Mutual Funds","authors":"Christopher Geczy, R. Stambaugh, David Levin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.416380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.416380","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We construct optimal portfolios of mutual funds whose objectives include socially responsible investment (SRI). Comparing portfolios of these funds to those constructed from the broader fund universe reveals the cost of imposing the SRI constraint on investors seeking the highest Sharpe ratio. This SRI cost crucially depends on the investor’s views about asset pricing models and stock-picking skill by fund managers. To an investor who strongly believes in the CAPM and rules out managerial skill, that is, a market index investor, the cost of the SRI constraint is typically just a few basis points per month, measured in certainty-equivalent loss. To an investor who still disallows skill but instead believes to some degree in pricing models that associate higher returns with exposures to size, value, and momentum factors, the SRI constraint is much costlier, typically by at least 30 basis points per month. The SRI constraint imposes large costs on investors whose beliefs allow a substantial amount of fund-manager skill, that is, investors who heavily rely on individual funds’ track records to predict future performance. ( JEL G11, G12, C11)\u0000 In 2005, when we released what ultimately proved to be the final version of this study, socially responsible investment (SRI) had already become a major presence on the investment landscape. In the years since, this approach, now often called “sustainable” investment, has grown even more rapidly and often encompasses a broad set of “ESG” (environmental, social, and governance) criteria. As evidence of the rapid growth, Morningstar (2020) notes, “one need look no further than the nearly fourfold increase in assets that flowed into sustainable funds in the United States in 2019.”\u0000 Sustainable investing has also received increased attention in the academic literature, in subsequent studies too numerous to list. Some of the studies are especially related to ours in that they also examine mutual funds. In our study, mutual funds constitute an asset universe faced by an investor imposing an SRI/ESG constraint. A number of the subsequent studies use mutual funds to address other dimensions of sustainable investing. For example, Bollen (2007), Benson and Humphrey (2008), Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2011), Bialkowski and Starks (2016) and Hartzmark and Sussman (2019) investigate determinants of mutual fund flows into sustainable funds versus other funds. Riedl and Smeets (2017) use survey and experimental data to explore investors’ preferences for sustainable funds. Madhavan et al. (2020) examine sustainable active equity mutual funds, relating factor loadings and residual returns to ESG characteristics. While we focus on mutual funds, our study also intends that the basic aspects of the SRI setting extend to other institutional investors. That intent is supported, for example, by the recent evidence of Bolton and Kacperczyk (forthcoming, 2020) providing broader perspectives on the SRI portfolio tilts of various t","PeriodicalId":351720,"journal":{"name":"Wharton School: Finance (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127826046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Comparing China's Financial System","authors":"Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, Meijun Qian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.439820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.439820","url":null,"abstract":"We compare China's financial system to those of the developed countries, in particular, the US system dominated by financial markets, and the German system dominated by the banking sector. We examine financial systems' properties, including risk sharing, information provision, funding new and mature industries, financial crisis, corporate governance, and the relation between the financial and legal systems and economic growth. We find that there are many fundamental differences between China's financial system and the US system, and simply adopting the US system is not optimal. Understanding the German system and reform China's banking system should be as important as developing US-style financial markets. Our findings also suggest that China differs from most countries studied in the law, finance, and growth and comparative financial systems literature: Despite its poor legal and financial systems, it has the largest, and one of the fastest growing economies in the world. We find that there are effective, informal financing channels and governance mechanisms to support the growth of various firms in the economy. Therefore, it may be best for China to develop its existing financial system, and to ensure that the informal financing channels and governance mechanisms continue to work along with the development of the legal and financial systems.","PeriodicalId":351720,"journal":{"name":"Wharton School: Finance (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129904576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Packaging Liquidity: Blind Auctions and Transaction Cost Efficiencies","authors":"Donald B. Keim, Kenneth A. Kavajecz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.324240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.324240","url":null,"abstract":"The costs of implementing investment strategies represent a significant drag on the performance of mutual funds and other institutional investors. It is the responsibility of institutional investors, and in the interests of the individual investors they represent, to seek market mechanisms that mitigate trading costs. We investigate one such liquidity provision mechanism whereby liquidity demanders auction a set of trades as a package directly to potential liquidity providers. A critical feature of the auction is that the identities of the securities in the package are not revealed to the bidder. We demonstrate that this mechanism provides a transactions cost savings relative to more traditional trading mechanisms for the liquidity demander as well as an efficient way for liquidity suppliers to obtain order flow. We argue that the cost savings afforded this new mechanism are due to the potential for low-cost crosses with the bidder's existing inventory positions and through the longer trading horizon, and superior trading ability, of the bidders. This research suggests that the ability to innovate via new liquidity provision mechanisms can provide market participants with transaction cost savings that cannot be easily duplicated on more traditional exchanges.","PeriodicalId":351720,"journal":{"name":"Wharton School: Finance (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126094842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Post-Merger Performance Puzzle","authors":"Anup Agrawal, J. Jaffe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.199671","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.199671","url":null,"abstract":"While the bulk of the research on the financial performance of mergers and acquisitions has focused on stock returns around the merger announcement, a surprisingly, large set of papers has also examined long-run stock returns following acquisitions. We review this literature, concluding that long-run performance is negative following mergers, though performance is non-negative (and perhaps even positive) following tender offers. However, the effects of both methodology (see Lyon, Barber & Tsai, 1999) and chance (see Fama, 1998) may modify this conclusion. Two explanations of under performance (speed of price-adjustment and EPS myopia) are not supported by the data, while two other explanations (method of payment and performance extrapolation) receive greater support.","PeriodicalId":351720,"journal":{"name":"Wharton School: Finance (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121865327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Liquidity and Market Structure","authors":"Sanford J. Grossman, Merton H. Miller","doi":"10.1111/J.1540-6261.1988.TB04594.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1540-6261.1988.TB04594.X","url":null,"abstract":"Market liquidity is modeled as being determined by the demand and supply of immediacy. Exogenous liquidity events coupled with the risk of delayed trade create a demand for immediacy. Market makers supply immediacy by their continuous presence. and willingness to bear risk during the time period between the arrival of final buyers and sellers. In the long run the number of market makers adjusts to equate the supply and demand for immediacy. This determine the equilibrium level of liquidity in the market. The lower is the autocorrelation in rates of return, the higher is the equilibrium level of liquidity.","PeriodicalId":351720,"journal":{"name":"Wharton School: Finance (Topic)","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"118769048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Asset Pricing and Optimal Portfolio Choice in the Presence of Illiquid Durable Consumption Goods","authors":"Sanford J. Grossman, G. Laroque","doi":"10.3386/W2369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W2369","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a model of optimal consumption and portfolio selection in which consumption services are generated by holding a durable good. The durable good is illiquid in that a transaction cost must be paid when the good is sold. It is shown that optimal consumption is not a smooth function of wealth; it is optimal for the consumer to wait until a large change in wealth occurs before adjusting his consumption. As a consequence, the consumption based capital asset pricing model fails to hold. Nevertheless, it is shown that the standard, one factor, market portfolio based capital asset pricing model does hold in this environment. It is shown that the optimal durable level is characterized by three numbers (not random variables), say x, y, and z (where x","PeriodicalId":351720,"journal":{"name":"Wharton School: Finance (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114293552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}