Naturalism in Question最新文献

Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind 心灵哲学中的自然主义

Naturalism in Question Pub Date : 2008-12-15 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv22jnrf5.8

J. Mcdowell

{"title":"Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind","authors":"J. Mcdowell","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv22jnrf5.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv22jnrf5.8","url":null,"abstract":"The contrast between the space of reasons and the realm of law to which Sellars implicitly appeals was not available before modern times. Ancient philosophers didn't feel a tension between the idea that knowledge is a normative status and the idea of an exercise of natural powers. Therefore the contrast Sellars draws can set an agenda for philosophy nowadays. I want to distinguish two ways of undertaking such a project. The idea is that the organization of the space of reasons is not, as Sellars suggests, alien to the kind of structure natural science discovers in the world. Thinking and knowing are part of our way of being animals. To show that, I will distinguish between two kinds of naturalism: a restrictive naturalism and liberal naturalism. I want to suggest that Millikan's argument in favor of a restrictive naturalism when criticizing Frege's semantic is vitiated by adherence to a residual Cartesianism. This is the result of a familiar trade-off; the price of discarding Cartesian immaterialism, while staying within restrictive naturalism, is that one's singled-out part of nature is no longer special enough to be credited with powers of thought. I will argue that the proper home of the idea of \"grasping senses\" is in describing patterns in our lives - our mental lives in this case - that are intelligible only in terms of the relations that structure the space of reasons. This patterning involves genuine rationality, not just \"mechanical rationality\" (so called). Liberal naturalism needs no more, to make the idea of \"grasping senses\" unproblematic, than a perfectly reasonable insistence that such patterns really do shape our lives.","PeriodicalId":351177,"journal":{"name":"Naturalism in Question","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127325945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 55

Is Freedom Really a Mystery? 自由真的是个谜吗?

Naturalism in Question Pub Date : 2008-12-15 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv22jnrf5.13

Mario De Caro

引用次数: 0

Naturalism and Skepticism 自然主义与怀疑主义

Naturalism in Question Pub Date : 2008-12-15 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv22jnrf5.9

D. MacArthur

引用次数: 5

Index 指数

Naturalism in Question Pub Date : 2008-12-15 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv22jnrf5.21

引用次数: 0

A Nonnaturalist Account of Personal Identity 个人同一性的非自然主义解释

Naturalism in Question Pub Date : 2008-12-15 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv22jnrf5.15

Carol Rovane

引用次数: 2

Naturalism Without Representationalism 没有表征主义的自然主义

Naturalism in Question Pub Date : 2008-12-15 DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511842498.003

H. Price, S. Blackburn, R. Brandom, P. Horwich, Michael A. Williams

{"title":"Naturalism Without Representationalism","authors":"H. Price, S. Blackburn, R. Brandom, P. Horwich, Michael A. Williams","doi":"10.1017/CBO9780511842498.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511842498.003","url":null,"abstract":"1. The relevance of science to philosophy What is philosophical naturalism? Most fundamentally, presumably, it is the view that natural science constrains philosophy, in the following sense. The concerns of the two disciplines are not simply disjoint, and science takes the lead where the two overlap. At the very least, then, to be a philosophical naturalist is to believe that philosophy is not simply a different enterprise from science, and that philosophy properly defers to science, where the concerns of the two disciplines coincide. Naturalism as spare as this is by no means platitudinous. However, most opposition to naturalism in contemporary philosophy is not opposition to naturalism in this basic sense, but to a more specific view of the relevance of science to philosophy. Similarly on the pro-naturalistic side. What most self-styled naturalists have in mind is the more specific view. As a result, I think, both sides of the contemporary debate pay insufficient attention to a different kind of philosophical naturalism — a different view of the impact of science on philosophy. This different view is certainly not new — it has been with us at least since Hume — but nor is it prominent in many contemporary debates. In this paper I try to do something to remedy this deficit. I begin by making good the claim that the position commonly called naturalism is not a necessary corollary of naturalism in the basic sense outlined above. There are two very different ways of taking science to be relevant to philosophy. And contrary, perhaps, to first appearances, the major implications of these two views for philosophy arise from a common starting point. There is a single kind of core problem, to which the two kinds of naturalism recommend very different sorts of answer.","PeriodicalId":351177,"journal":{"name":"Naturalism in Question","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130600639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 70

Agency and Alienation 代理与转让

Naturalism in Question Pub Date : 2008-12-15 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv22jnrf5.12

Jennifer Hornsby

引用次数: 17

Subjectivity and the Agential Perspective 主体性与代理视角

Naturalism in Question Pub Date : 2008-12-15 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv22jnrf5.14

S. White

引用次数: 7

Introduction: 作品简介:

Naturalism in Question Pub Date : 2008-12-15 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv22jnrf5.3

Mario De Caro, David Macarthur