IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-03-17 DOI: 10.3390/g14020027

Theofanis Tsoulouhas

引用次数: 0

Efficient Decentralized Leadership under Hybrid Work and Attachment to Regions 混合工作和区域依恋下的高效分权领导

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-03-16 DOI: 10.3390/g14020026

Naoto Aoyama, E. Silva

{"title":"Efficient Decentralized Leadership under Hybrid Work and Attachment to Regions","authors":"Naoto Aoyama, E. Silva","doi":"10.3390/g14020026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020026","url":null,"abstract":"Under the ‘new normal’ in the labor market, individuals can work remotely or in person, a hybrid work mode that became ubiquitous during the pandemic. This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations in which hybrid work is the modus operandi. Self-interested regional governments and a benevolent central government interact strategically in dynamic games in which there are provisions of federal and regional public goods and interregional income and fiscal transfers, the population is attached to regions and hybrid work creates a common labor market in the federation. In this setting, we first show that decentralized leadership is inefficient if the center controls income transfers only. This result provides an efficiency enhancing motivation for the center to additionally control earmarked transfers: we demonstrate that decentralized leadership is efficient whenever the center controls both income and earmarked transfers. However, this is not the only federal regime in which decentralized leadership is efficient. It is efficient in the absence of earmarked transfers if it is appropriately selective: when the regional governments commit to the provision of the federal public only and the center redistributes income across regions.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45717627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Price Competition with Differentiated Products on a Two-Dimensional Plane: The Impact of Partial Cartel on Firms' Profits and Behavior 二维平面上差异化产品的价格竞争：部分卡特尔对企业利润和行为的影响

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.3390/g14020024

S. Stoykov, I. Kostov

{"title":"Price Competition with Differentiated Products on a Two-Dimensional Plane: The Impact of Partial Cartel on Firms' Profits and Behavior","authors":"S. Stoykov, I. Kostov","doi":"10.3390/g14020024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020024","url":null,"abstract":"A numerical procedure capable of obtaining the equilibrium states of oligopoly markets under several assumptions is presented. Horizontal and vertical product differentiation were included by taking into account Euclidean distance in a two-dimensional space and quality characteristics of the product. Different quality preferences of consumers were included in the model. Firms implement two strategies in the market: profit maximization and market share maximization. Numerical discretization of a two-dimensional area was performed for computing the equilibrium prices which allows one to consider any market area and any location of the firms. Four scenarios of oligopoly markets were developed by combining both strategies from one side and competitive behavior and a partial cartel agreement from another side. The main differences between the scenarios are outlined. Profits, market shares and equilibrium prices are presented and compared. The influence of collusion, the existence of participants with a market share maximization strategy and consumer preferences on the firm’s profits and equilibrium prices were examined. Cases whereby firms prefer to leave the cartel were investigated. Best locations for the setting of a new store for profit maximization are shown and discussed.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47235022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The "Black Box" Method for Experimental Economics 实验经济学的“黑匣子”方法

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.3390/g14020023

H. Nax

引用次数: 0

Matrix-Based Method for the Analysis and Control of Networked Evolutionary Games: A Survey 基于矩阵的网络进化博弈分析与控制方法综述

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-02-28 DOI: 10.3390/g14020022

Xinrong Yang, Zhenping Geng, Haitao Li

引用次数: 0

The Impact of Order Effects on the Framing of Trust and Reciprocity Behaviors 秩序效应对信任互惠行为框架的影响

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-02-27 DOI: 10.3390/g14020021

Davood Bayat, Hadi Mohamadpour, Huihua Fang, Pengfei Xu, F. Krueger

{"title":"The Impact of Order Effects on the Framing of Trust and Reciprocity Behaviors","authors":"Davood Bayat, Hadi Mohamadpour, Huihua Fang, Pengfei Xu, F. Krueger","doi":"10.3390/g14020021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020021","url":null,"abstract":"Trust and reciprocity have paramount importance in cooperative relationships. The influence of psychological effects such as framing and anchoring on trust and reciprocity has been investigated; however, the impact of an order effect on them is still unexplored. The goal of our study was to examine how order impacts the framing of trust and reciprocity by manipulating framing and order as within- and between-subjects factors, respectively. Different groups of participants first completed two framings of the one-shot trust game (give vs. take frame) in a counterbalanced order (give first and then take second vs. take first then give second) in the role of trustors or trustees and rated the expectations of their counterparts’ decisions afterward. Our results revealed higher trust in the take than give frame in the first decision and a reverse outcome in the second decision due to strong anchoring. Reciprocity was higher in the give than take frame in the first decisions, and no difference in the second decisions was observed due to weak anchoring. Anchoring also caused an order effect in trust and reciprocity, with higher trust when the take frame was played first, and higher reciprocity when the give frame was played first. Our results contribute to our knowledge about situational factors that shape trust and reciprocity, highlighting the impact of the context of the decision environment in terms of the impact of the order on framing.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49496952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Deterrence, Backup, or Insurance: Game-Theoretic Modeling of Ransomware 威慑，备份，还是保险:勒索软件的博弈论建模

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-02-23 DOI: 10.3390/g14020020

Tongxin Yin, Armin Sarabi, Mingyan Liu

{"title":"Deterrence, Backup, or Insurance: Game-Theoretic Modeling of Ransomware","authors":"Tongxin Yin, Armin Sarabi, Mingyan Liu","doi":"10.3390/g14020020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020020","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present a game-theoretic analysis of ransomware. To this end, we provide theoretical and empirical analysis of a two-player Attacker-Defender (A-D) game, as well as a Defender-Insurer (D-I) game; in the latter, the attacker is assumed to be a non-strategic third party. Our model assumes that the defender can invest in two types of protection against ransomware attacks: (1) general protection through a deterrence effort, making attacks less likely to succeed, and (2) a backup effort serving the purpose of recourse, allowing the defender to recover from successful attacks. The attacker then decides on a ransom amount in the event of a successful attack, with the defender choosing to pay ransom immediately, or to try to recover their data first while bearing a recovery cost for this recovery attempt. Note that recovery is not guaranteed to be successful, which may eventually lead to the defender paying the demanded ransom. Our analysis of the A-D game shows that the equilibrium falls into one of three scenarios: (1) the defender will pay the ransom immediately without having invested any effort in backup, (2) the defender will pay the ransom while leveraging backups as a credible threat to force a lower ransom demand, and (3) the defender will try to recover data, only paying the ransom when recovery fails. We observe that the backup effort will be entirely abandoned when recovery is too expensive, leading to the (worst-case) first scenario which rules out recovery. Furthermore, our analysis of the D-I game suggests that the introduction of insurance leads to moral hazard as expected, with the defender reducing their efforts; less obvious is the interesting observation that this reduction is mostly in their backup effort.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46029062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Representation for Many Player Generalized Divide the Dollar Games 多人广义分钱博弈的一种表现形式

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-02-23 DOI: 10.3390/g14020019

G. Greenwood, Daniel A. Ashlock

引用次数: 0

Global Innovation Contests 全球创新大赛

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-02-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4338248

E. Dinopoulos, Constantinos Syropoulos, Theofanis Tsoulouhas

引用次数: 3

Global Innovation Contests 全球创新大赛