ERN: Incidence (Topic)最新文献

Taxation and Market Power in the Legal Marijuana Industry 合法大麻产业的税收和市场力量

ERN: Incidence (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-03-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3237729

Brett Hollenbeck, Kosuke Uetake

{"title":"Taxation and Market Power in the Legal Marijuana Industry","authors":"Brett Hollenbeck, Kosuke Uetake","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3237729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3237729","url":null,"abstract":"In 2012 the state of Washington created a legal framework for production and retail sales of marijuana. Nine other U.S. states and Canada have followed. These states hope to generate tax revenue for their state budgets while limiting harms associated with marijuana consumption. We use a unique administrative dataset containing all transactions in the history of the industry in Washington to evaluate the effectiveness of different tax and regulatory policies under consideration by policymakers and study the role of imperfect competition in determining these results. We examine 3 main research questions. First, how effective is Washington’s excise tax at raising revenue? With the nation’s highest tax rate on marijuana, is Washington maximizing revenue or potentially overtaxing, leading to reduced legal sales and lower tax revenue. Second, what is the incidence of taxes in this industry? Finally, most states have restricted entry, resulting in firms with substantial market power. What is the role of imperfect competition in studying these basic questions on tax policy? We combine structural methods and a reduced form sufficient statistic approach to show a number of results. First, Washington’s 37% excise tax is still on the upward sloping portion of the Laffer curve and state revenue could be substantially higher with a higher tax rate. The amount of revenue generated by a tax increase is significantly larger due to retailer market power than it would be under perfect competition. In addition, these taxes are primarily borne by consumers and not by firms, and there is a large social cost associated with each dollar raised.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128590856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 31

How to Use One Instrument to Identify Two Elasticities 如何用一种仪器识别两种弹性

ERN: Incidence (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-02-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2933598

E. Gavrilova, F. Zoutman, Arnt O. Hopland

引用次数: 1

Incidence and Distributional Effects of Value Added Taxes 增值税的发生与分配效应

ERN: Incidence (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2784559

Ingvil Gaarder

{"title":"Incidence and Distributional Effects of Value Added Taxes","authors":"Ingvil Gaarder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2784559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2784559","url":null,"abstract":"Much of the controversy surrounding recent policy proposals to broaden the base for value added taxes (VAT) revolves around who ultimately bears the burden of these taxes. The typical assumption is that consumer prices fully reflect taxes, so that the main empirical question is how the tax induced price changes affect members of different income groups. However, the evidence base is scarce and market imperfections could generate both over and under-shifting of VAT to consumer prices. In this paper, we examine the incidence and distributional effects of VAT in a setting with plausibly exogenous variation in tax rates. The context of our study is a sharp change in the VAT policy on food items in Norway. Using a regression discontinuity design, we examine the direct impact of the policy change on the consumer prices of food items as well as any cross-price effects on other goods. Our estimates suggest that taxes levied on food items are completely shifted to consumer prices, whereas the pricing of other goods is not materially affected. To understand the distributional effects of the VAT reform, we use expenditure data and estimate the compensating variation of the tax induced price changes. We find that lowering the VAT on food attenuates inequality in consumer welfare, in part because households adjust their spending patterns in response to the price changes. By comparison, the usual first order approximation of the distributional effects, which ignores behavioral responses, seriously understates the redistributive nature of the VAT reform.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127394397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 34

Household Heterogeneity, Aggregation, and the Distributional Impacts of Environmental Taxes 家庭异质性、聚集性和环境税的分配影响

ERN: Incidence (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-01-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2714879

S. Rausch, S. Giacomo

引用次数: 83

Taxation, Redistribution and the Social Contract in Brazil 巴西的税收、再分配和社会契约

ERN: Incidence (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2501433

M. Melo, A. Barrientos, A. Coelho

{"title":"Taxation, Redistribution and the Social Contract in Brazil","authors":"M. Melo, A. Barrientos, A. Coelho","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2501433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2501433","url":null,"abstract":"The paper explores theoretically and empirically Brazil’s tax revenue from a political and political economy perspective. The absence of ‘big bang’ reforms to the tax code and tax administration suggests that policy models are less directly relevant to explaining the rise in the tax/GDP ratio. The paper makes the argument that public consent to the hike in taxes is explained by a combination of democratisation, strong preferences for redistribution, fiscally responsible centre-left coalitions, and bureaucratic capacity. New political incentives under democracy combined with high state capacity and a powerful presidency with the political resource necessary to pass an agenda of social reforms to sustain this new equilibrium of high taxation and high redistribution. The current level of taxation and spending in the country in a context in which poverty and inequality is high (although declining rapidly) has prompted concerns about the fiscal sustainability of this equilibrium. The paper argues against pessimistic accounts of this dilemma - such as the arguments based on the concepts of fiscal illusion and inequality traps - and advances an optimistic perspective based on the notion that a new fiscal contract seems to be emerging.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116888170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Propagation and Smoothing of Shocks in Alternative Social Security Systems 另类社会保障制度中冲击的传播与平滑

ERN: Incidence (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2018.05.012

A. Auerbach, Lorenz Kueng, Ronald D. Lee

引用次数: 5

Inclusive Growth and the Incidence of Fiscal Policy in Mauritius — Much Progress, But More Could Be Done 毛里求斯的包容性增长和财政政策的变化——取得了很大进展，但还有更多工作要做

ERN: Incidence (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-05-01 DOI: 10.5089/9781484323335.001.A001

Antonio C. David, Martin Petri

引用次数: 20

Business Taxation and Wages: Evidence from Individual Panel Data 企业税收和工资:来自个人面板数据的证据

ERN: Incidence (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2122520

T. Bauer, Tanja Kasten, Lars H.R. Siemers

引用次数: 20

The Finnish Payroll Tax Cut Experiment Revisited 芬兰削减工资税的实验重新审视

ERN: Incidence (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-04-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1926644

Ossi Korkeamäki

引用次数: 18

The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare 奖金税对经理人薪酬和福利的影响

ERN: Incidence (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-04-01 DOI: 10.1628/001522112X631998

Doina Radulescu

{"title":"The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare","authors":"Doina Radulescu","doi":"10.1628/001522112X631998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/001522112X631998","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the implications of a currently publicly debated issue, namely the introduction of a bonus tax. We shed light on the effects of the bonus tax on compensation components and study its incidence. We use the Principal Agent model within a two-country framework and consider two main scenarios. In the first scenario the firm cannot relocate managers between countries whereas in the second scenario relocation possibilities exist. Our findings show that the effort based compensation component always rises in the country introducing the tax such that the optimal contracts are tilted towards more effort based pay. Moreover, the bonus tax negatively affects profits and dividends and thus the incidence falls on the firm’s shareholders. With no relocation possibilities, the country that does not introduce such a tax will be worse off in terms of welfare, as the dividend income accruing to its residents declines. Accordingly, the bonus tax can be interpreted as a transfer from the worldwide shareholders to the government levying the tax. However, the welfare results may be reversed when manager relocation is an alternative. In this case, welfare in the country introducing the tax is lower than in the no relocation scenario, while the country that does not levy a bonus tax might even gain in welfare terms.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121553226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 88