Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language最新文献

筛选

英文中文

Animal Consciousness – A Limit of Language? 动物意识——语言的极限?

Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language Pub Date : 2019-11-25 DOI: 10.4324/9781351202671-10

H. Glock, H. Appelqvist

引用次数: 0

“We Can Go No Further”: Meaning, Use, and the Limits of Language 《我们不能再走了》:语言的意义、使用和局限

Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language Pub Date : 2019-11-25 DOI: 10.4324/9781351202671-5

William Child

{"title":"“We Can Go No Further”: Meaning, Use, and the Limits of Language","authors":"William Child","doi":"10.4324/9781351202671-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351202671-5","url":null,"abstract":"Is it possible to give a substantive, non-circular account of meaning and rule-following: an account that explains what it is for someone to use a word with a particular meaning, or to follow a particular rule, in terms that do not employ the concept of meaning or the concept of following a rule? Naturalists and reductionists about meaning and rules think it is possible to give such an account. Anti-reductionists, by contrast, hold that facts about meaning and rules are basic and sui generis; they cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, non-semantic, non-rule-involving facts. Where does Wittgenstein stand in this debate? And is he right? I shall argue that Wittgenstein is an antireductionist about meaning and rule-following, and that anti-reductionism is the correct view to take. Section 1 shows how the issue of reductionism and anti-reductionism about meaning and rules relates to the idea of the limits of language as it figures in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus writings. Section 2 presents a framework for assessing the interpretative debate between reductionist and anti-reductionist readings of Wittgenstein. Section 3 argues that we cannot settle that debate on the basis of Wittgenstein’s general, methodological opposition to reductionism. Section 4 presents an important argument for anti-reductionism from Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Section 5 considers some putative evidence of reductionism about meaning in the Brown Book and offers an alternative, anti-reductionist interpretation. Section 6 explores the nature of Wittgenstein’s anti-reductionism. It argues, first, that Wittgenstein accepts that semantic and normative facts supervene on non-semantic, non-normative facts and, second, that at many points his treatment of meaning and rules is not confined to the kind of pleonastic claims that are often taken to define non-reductionist, or quietist, positions.","PeriodicalId":345387,"journal":{"name":"Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134457728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Bounds of Nonsense 废话的界限

Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language Pub Date : 2019-07-02 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198823643.003.0004

A. W. Moore

引用次数: 2