{"title":"A Theory of Private vs. Public Placements in Public Firms","authors":"Marc Martos-Vila","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1360389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1360389","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies a public firm's investment decision and whether to raise the equity capital needed using the public market (SEO, Secondary Equity Offering) or a private channel (PIPE, Private Investment in Public Equity). Issuing a PIPE allows the firm to enjoy more financial flexibility. This is modeled in two dimensions: First, funds can be raised faster. Second, dilution costs caused by asymmetric information can be alleviated endogenously. However PIPEs are costly because new shares are temporarily illiquid. The model explains what firms use one market or the other and the optimal timing of investments to better use financial flexibility. For instance, market illiquidity makes the firm less likely to issue a PIPE, asymmetric information makes it more likely. The paper then considers private debt contracts and shows that the pecking order need not hold. The model explains empirical regularities, for instance, why do SEOs have negative abnormal returns around its announcement whereas abnormal returns for PIPEs are positive.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"54 9-10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120897843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Determinants of Public Sector Bank's Profitability in India: An Empirical Study","authors":"Gurmeet Singh","doi":"10.5958/2231-0657.2015.00017.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5958/2231-0657.2015.00017.8","url":null,"abstract":"The economic development of country depends on the effective banking system. In recent years, there have been considerable pressures on the profitability of banks. The study investigates the long run equilibrium relationship between the return on assets (ROA) and nine variables over the period 2005 to 2014. Johansen’s co-integration test and vector error correction model have been applied to explore the long-run equilibrium relationship. The analysis reveals that the returns on assets of the Indian public sector banks are positively co-integrated with all the nine variables under the study and hence, a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between them. The results of VECM revels that secured advances to total advances, burden to total assets, burden to interest income, operating profits to total assets, non-interest income to total assets and profit per employee causes return on asset in long run and short run. While, non performing assets, deposits to total liabilities and net interest margins causes return on assets in short run only. The findings from Granger causality based on the VECM indicate bidirectional causality exists between all the variables tested and return on assets except non-performing assets. Non-performing assets granger causes return on assets but not the other way round.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131542564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unbundling Australia's Utility Regulation","authors":"S. Labson","doi":"10.22459/AG.04.03.1997.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22459/AG.04.03.1997.04","url":null,"abstract":"The separation of governments' role as regulator and owner of state owned enterprises has been a significant feature of industry reform initiatives in Australia and globally. This structural 'unbundling' of utility regulation is seen by its proponents as promoting competitive neutrality between public and private sector, and maintaining transparency in implementation of government policy choices. These matters are examined within the context of Australian reform initiatives of the 1990 which remain relevant in design of systems of governance applying to regulation of state owned enterprises.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115915832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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