{"title":"EVERYTHING COMES WITH A COST:","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv8pz9ts.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv8pz9ts.13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":343496,"journal":{"name":"Subordinating Intelligence","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132167247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“IT’S THE ECONOMY, STUPID”:","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv8pz9ts.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv8pz9ts.10","url":null,"abstract":"As Libya’s struggle for post-Qadhafi succession enters its ninth year, international peace-making efforts remain doomed, so long as they fail to address the root causes of the country’s malaise: flawed economic institutions and the lack of a social contract. The economic structures established during the Qadhafi period deliberately incorporated inefficiencies, redundancies and a lack of transparency. Not only has this system survived unreformed, but paradoxically, the ensuing political vacuum after Qadhafi’s ouster has helped it become more entrenched. Benefiting from this vacuum of oversight and ringfenced by international policymakers, various economic entities can now be considered semi-sovereign institutions, arguably more critical to resolving the drivers of conflict than even the competing political factions. The way forward, therefore, requires developing a deep understanding of these structures. The international community should pivot towards an economic-focused approach to peace-making. The first step is to commission a mapping of Libya’s economic structures.","PeriodicalId":343496,"journal":{"name":"Subordinating Intelligence","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130190545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"9/11 AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM","authors":"David P. Oakley","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv8pz9ts.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv8pz9ts.12","url":null,"abstract":"After 9/11, the DoD sought to sever its perceived reliance on national intelligence. These changes were in part motivated by previous reviews of intelligence and in part by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s desire to consolidate power and capability within the DoD. The enacted changes resulted in a significant transformation of defense intelligence and influenced how the DoD interacted with the CIA and the broader Intelligence Community. For better or worse, individual leaders shaped the DoD/CIA relationship immediately following 9/11. These leaders’ influence highlights how parochial and nonparochial personalities affected the DoD/CIA relationship during the global war on terror. Fortunately, the influence of nonparochial leaders shaped the relationship in a more positive direction.","PeriodicalId":343496,"journal":{"name":"Subordinating Intelligence","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130546208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A NEW ADMINISTRATION","authors":"David P. Oakley","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv8pz9ts.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv8pz9ts.11","url":null,"abstract":"Many former Republican hands returned to positions of influence with the election of George W. Bush. These individuals had been involved in previous Intelligence Community reform efforts and returned to power with the intent of furthering these efforts. Believing the Clinton administration had reduced intelligence funding too far, the Bush team looked for ways to increase spending and rebuild the Intelligence Community. Within months of taking office, the administration initiated reviews to identify where to rebuild. The necessities of war would soon influence these reviews and the direction of the DoD/CIA relationship.","PeriodicalId":343496,"journal":{"name":"Subordinating Intelligence","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132868349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE GULF WAR","authors":"David P. Oakley","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv8pz9ts.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv8pz9ts.7","url":null,"abstract":"The attention given General Norman Schwarzkopf’s comments on intelligence shortfalls and the concepts developed to support military operations resulted in Operation Desert Storm being a catalyst for changes in the DoD/CIA relationship. Although similar critiques of intelligence were heard following Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause, the Desert Storm critiques received more attention and resulted in significant policy and organizational changes. Desert Storm also introduced technologies and concepts that became prominent following 9/11. Concepts such as “fusion center” and “operationalization of intelligence” surfaced during Desert Storm. These concepts matured following 9/11, when the length and type of operations made them necessary and technology made them possible. Desert Storm–era professionals deserve credit for strengthening the intelligence and operations link while also weakening service and interagency parochialism. Intelligence support to military operations during Desert Storm was not error free, but intelligence professionals deserve credit for their effort, ingenuity, teamwork, and support.","PeriodicalId":343496,"journal":{"name":"Subordinating Intelligence","volume":"123 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128335215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Everything Comes with a Cost","authors":"David P. Oakley","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813176703.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813176703.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"The final chapter summarizes the evolution of the DoD/CIA partnership and considers the contemporary implications of the CIA and DoD partnership on policy, strategy, and operations. One implication is the quasi-subordination of CIA capabilities to military operations and the resources this support role takes from analytical support to policy makers. Policy makers need to appreciate the costs incurred by increasing the intelligence support to military operations and the implications of that increased support for the militarization of foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":343496,"journal":{"name":"Subordinating Intelligence","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114555859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}