{"title":"Deterrence Using Peer Information","authors":"Zhengyang Bao, Lata Gangadharan, C. Leister","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3725400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3725400","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a mechanism for crime deterrence that utilizes insider information contained in social networks. Regulators may possess limited information regarding a crime but happen to identify a suspect. Under our mechanism, this suspect can re-direct the penalty to another person from the network who is deemed to be more responsible for the crime. The regulator examines the criminal activities of both and obtains two noisy signals regarding their actions. The one with the higher signal is punished and the other goes free. We show theoretically that, for a given probability and magnitude of the penalty, crime levels are lower with this mechanism than in the case where the first suspect is automatically punished. In equilibrium, crime levels depend on the given criminal's position in the network and the network structure. Our experiment confirms that this mechanism effectively deters crime but the magnitude is above the Nash equilibrium predictions and is less sensitive to changes in the network structure than theory predicts. Level-k reasoning helps to explain these patterns.","PeriodicalId":339016,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: Criminological Theory (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133692454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joseph J. Sabia, Taylor Mackay, Thanh Tam Nguyen, Dhaval M. Dave
{"title":"Do Ban the Box Laws Increase Crime?","authors":"Joseph J. Sabia, Taylor Mackay, Thanh Tam Nguyen, Dhaval M. Dave","doi":"10.3386/W24381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W24381","url":null,"abstract":"Ban-the-box (BTB) laws, which prevent employers from asking prospective employees about their criminal histories at initial job screenings, are intended to increase employment opportunities and reduce economic incentives for crime. This study is the first to explore the relationship between BTB laws and crime. Using agency-by-month data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), we find that BTB laws are associated with a 10 percent increase in criminal incidents involving Hispanic male arrestees. This finding is supported by parallel analysis using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) and is consistent with BTB law-induced job loss due to employer-based statistical discrimination. We find no evidence that BTB laws increase property crime among African American men despite their also facing statistical discrimination. Supplemental analyses from the American Community Survey (ACS) suggest that barriers to welfare participation among Hispanic men may explain this result. Our estimates suggest that BTB laws generate $401 million in annual crime costs.","PeriodicalId":339016,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: Criminological Theory (Topic)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115164493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"More Graduates, Less Criminals? The Economic Impacts of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program","authors":"Will Flanders, Corey A. DeAngelis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2911282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2911282","url":null,"abstract":"Although an abundance of research indicates that private schooling can benefit individual children through higher test scores, the effects on society are less clear. We monetize and forecast the social impacts of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) in the United States. We use existing literature on the impacts of the MPCP on criminal activity and graduation rates. Between 2016 and 2035, students who use a voucher in the MPCP will generate additional economic benefits of $473 million associated with higher graduation rates, and $26 million associated with fewer felonies and misdemeanors, relative to their traditional public school peers.","PeriodicalId":339016,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: Criminological Theory (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114524407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Judicial Errors, Crime Deterrence and Appeals: Evidence from U.S. Federal Courts","authors":"Roee Sarel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2739674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2739674","url":null,"abstract":"This paper seeks to empirically examine how the accuracy of a multi-tier adjudication system affects crime deterrence. An ongoing scholarly debate regarding the effects of judicial errors on deterrence provides mixed arguments, but the role of a multi-tier system - where errors can be corrected on appeal - has been mostly overlooked. Analyzing appeal results from U.S federal courts and corresponding crime rates, I find that error occurrence, reflected by affirmance rates, decreases deterrence. Error correction, conversely, entails a complex effect: reversals increase deterrence, but remands decrease deterrence; which implies a need for theoretical adjustment and judicial caution.","PeriodicalId":339016,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: Criminological Theory (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131212245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tax Evasion and Economic Crime. Empirical Evidence for Italy","authors":"A. Argentiero, B. Chiarini, E. Marzano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2669363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2669363","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the impact of tax evasion on criminal activities in Italy. Precisely, we consider three types of crime particularly related to economic determinants: property crimes (including robberies, thefts and car thefts), frauds and usury. By using annual data for the Italian provinces (NUTS-3) over the period 2006 to 2010 to estimate a dynamic panel, we show that tax evasion substitutes both, frauds and usury, whereas crimes against the property are positively affected by tax evasion. Interestingly, the degree of substitution for fraud and usury is related to the size of tax burden. Moreover, the estimates indicate that these crimes show a different persistency over time, reflecting different adjustment costs. Finally, we find statistical significance and the expected sign for deterrence only for property crimes whereas frauds and usury are not influenced by any deterrence or clearing-up variable.","PeriodicalId":339016,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: Criminological Theory (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115335726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Low Priority Laws on Criminal Activity: Evidence from California","authors":"Amanda Ross, A. Walker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2648342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2648342","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of low priority initiatives on criminal behavior. Low priority initiatives mandate that minor marijuana possession offenses be the lowest enforcement priority for police officers. Localities pass these laws because they believe if officers devote fewer resources towards minor marijuana crimes, more resources will be available to deter more serious crimes. Using data from California, we find that jurisdictions that adopted low priority laws experienced a reduction in arrests for misdemeanor marijuana offenses. However, we do not find a significant effect of enacting a low priority initiative on the crime rate or clearance rate of felony offenses.","PeriodicalId":339016,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: Criminological Theory (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129647307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Criminal Specialization as a Corollary of Rational Choice","authors":"C. Wright","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3461064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3461064","url":null,"abstract":"Organized criminal groups can be modeled using rational choice theory. Criminal groups act as profit seeking enterprises, and the ability to shift the economic returns away from this activity results in a lower amount of crime. Criminal behavior does not need to rely on social deviance, but is moving towards the greatest financial rewards. As a consequence, as criminal groups face few financial disincentives, a growing class of criminal specialists has resulted. The course of action to best minimize the online criminal threat can be linked to minimization of economic returns from cybercrime.","PeriodicalId":339016,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: Criminological Theory (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130099612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}