{"title":"Moral Intuitions and Heuristics","authors":"Piotr M. Patrzyk","doi":"10.4324/9781315719696-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719696-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338404,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129419944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Methods, Goals, and Data in Moral Theorizing","authors":"John Bengson, T. Cuneo, R. Shafer‐Landau","doi":"10.4324/9781315719696-24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719696-24","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338404,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130060408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Knowledge as Know-How","authors":"J. Wright","doi":"10.4324/9781315719696-25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719696-25","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338404,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127684088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Denial of Moral Knowledge","authors":"R. Joyce","doi":"10.4324/9781315719696-15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719696-15","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338404,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132606554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Group Moral Knowledge 1","authors":"Deborah Tollefsen, Christopher Lucibella","doi":"10.4324/9781315719696-26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719696-26","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338404,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133087737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nihilism and the Epistemic Profile of Moral Judgment","authors":"Jonas Olson","doi":"10.4324/9781315719696-16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719696-16","url":null,"abstract":"Moral nihilism is the view that there are no moral facts or moral truths. It is the ontological component of moral error theory, which is the best-known and most comprehensive metaethical theory th ...","PeriodicalId":338404,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology","volume":"159 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123100249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Expertise","authors":"A. Hills","doi":"10.4324/9781315719696-28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719696-28","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338404,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124634103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Science","authors":"A. Zimmerman","doi":"10.4324/9781315719696-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719696-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338404,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122299013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Theory and Its Role in Everyday Moral Thought and Action","authors":"B. Hooker","doi":"10.4324/9781315719696-22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719696-22","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter juxtaposes the fairly quick and automatic thinking and decision making that constitutes everyday moral thought and action with the slower, more complicated, and more reflective thinking that steps beyond everyday moral thought. Various difficulties that can slow down everyday moral thought are catalogued in this paper. The paper explains how dealing with many of these difficulties leads to thinking about moral principles. And, even where there are not such difficulties, everyday moral thought can be challenged by repeated “why?” questions. Pushed far enough, such questions have to be answered by admitting ignorance or by pointing to theses about whatever ultimately makes acts morally required, permissible, or prohibited. Such theses are moral theories. As a point about moral theories, the paper ends by pointing out a respect in which everyday moral thought is more like rule-consequentialism, contractualism, foundational pluralism, and virtue ethics than everyday moral thought is like traditional act-consequentialism.","PeriodicalId":338404,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128386557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Reasoning and Emotion","authors":"Joshua May, Victor Kumar","doi":"10.4324/9781315719696-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719696-8","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses contemporary scientific research on the role of reason and emotion in moral judgment. The literature suggests that moral judgment is influenced by both reasoning and emotion separately, but there is also emerging evidence of the interaction between the two. While there are clear implications for the rationalism-sentimentalism debate, we conclude that important questions remain open about how central emotion is to moral judgment. We also suggest ways in which moral philosophy is not only guided by empirical research but continues to guide it. Word count: 9,310 (all inclusive)","PeriodicalId":338404,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121222557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}