{"title":"Corrective Justice","authors":"Gregory C. Keating","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190919665.013.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190919665.013.3","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the concept of corrective justice, which has been at the heart of much recent scholarship on the law of torts in particular and private law more generally. Notwithstanding its familiarity, ancient origin, and apparent universal acceptance, the concept of corrective justice has produced a remarkable number of distinct conceptions and has stirred up major controversies. For at least a generation, corrective justice stood at the center of the argument between contending conceptions of tort. For legal economists, corrective justice was an aspect of the institution of tort law. It was part of the data that needed to be explained and justified in economic terms. Corrective justice was subordinate. It was a feature of—not a justification for—the institution of tort law. For legal philosophers Ernest Weinrib and Jules Coleman—who championed corrective justice as the countertheory to economic analysis—corrective justice was sovereign. It was both instantiated in the institution of tort law and the justification for the institution. It was incipiently normative. And the justification it supplied was formal, not instrumental. The chapter explains and analyzes corrective justice in light of this history, in the hope that this will set the stage for tort theory to move forward.","PeriodicalId":337737,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of the New Private Law","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126288070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trust Law","authors":"J. Morley, Robert H. Sitkoff","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190919665.013.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190919665.013.19","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter identifies the principal ways in which the common law trust has been used as an instrument of private ordering in American practice. It argues that in both law and function, contemporary American trust law has divided into two distinct branches. In the chapter’s taxonomy, one branch involves donative trusts and the other involves commercial trusts. The donative branch divides further to include three separate sub-branches for revocable and irrevocable private trusts plus charitable trusts. The different branches of contemporary American trust law have distinctive functional purposes rooted in freedom of disposition for donative trusts and freedom of contract for commercial trusts. The chapter explains the logic of this branching in both practical function and doctrinal form.","PeriodicalId":337737,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of the New Private Law","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125627366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}