{"title":"Fichte’s Practical Response to the Problem of Other Minds","authors":"Matthew C. Altman","doi":"10.4000/REF.859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REF.859","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper examines the problem of attributing mental predicates to anyone but myself. Traditionally, this has been a major issue at the intersection of epistemology and ethics, because whether we should consider someone in our moral deliberations is often thought to depend on their cognitive abilities or their capacity for consciousness. For both Kant and Fichte, we have direct moral duties only to other rational beings. The fact that the other is present to us as a representation (for Kant) or as a Not-I that is posited in opposition to the I (for Fichte) threatens our supposed moral obligations to them and risks a form of metaphysical solipsism and moral egoism. The bindingness of interpersonal obligations depends on overcoming the separation between me and other persons. It will be shown that in order to establish the other as a morally considerable being, Fichte reverses the direction of implication: I do not derive my moral duties from others’ personhood; rather, others’ personhood follows from my immediate sense of moral obligation toward them. The way that the problem of other minds is posed presupposes that the only appropriate answer would be a series of propositions that establishes the existence of other morally considerable beings outside of myself. The immediate moral feeling of considerability, however, is not a proposition. It will be argued that Fichte thus provides a radically different alternative to Kant’s approach. The problem of other minds is not answered or solved but is rather dispelled in Fichte’s philosophy by the feeling of moral obligation and the recognition of others as the object of our obligations.","PeriodicalId":337059,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126561046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Biology and ontology: Kant, Fichte, and the uses of natural history","authors":"M. Steinberg","doi":"10.4000/ref.878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.878","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the similarities and differences between Kant and Fichte that are wound around a single, seemingly tangential subject: their arguments from biology. The most extensive discussions of biology in their work both came in the last decade of the eighteenth century, in Kant’s Critique of Judgment and in Fichte’s System of Ethics and Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. On first reading the accounts appear extraordinarily similar. But the two philosophers begin to diverge as they move forward. Both invoke the notion of a formative drive that guides and impels self-organization, the Bildungstrieb that features prominently in the writing of Blumenbach. Kant, though, praises Blumenbach not so much for his ideas as for his caution in applying them, and interprets the drive as nothing more than the “ability of an organized body to take on … organization.” Fichte, on the other hand, characterizes the Bildungstrieb as “a drive to form or shape or to cultivate and ... a drive to allow oneself to be formed or shaped or cultivated.” There is a far more obvious way in which the two philosophers differ, though. Hardly anything seems less Kantian than a discussion of biology, and biological drives at that, in a System of Ethics. The moral law flies in the face of all inclination, and what are those inclinations but the promptings of our nature as physical organisms? From a Kantian perspective it is hard to see how biology could help us comprehend or comply with a law that is grounded in something utterly apart from our physical being. By incorporating it into his ethical treatise, though, Fichte seems to be moving in just that direction.","PeriodicalId":337059,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130088345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reason and Agency in Kant and Fichte","authors":"Michael Vater","doi":"10.4000/REF.845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REF.845","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the question of the unity of Transcendental Idealism at the end of Eighteenth Century German philosophy, given that it circulated in different versions, Kant’s Critique [of humans’ rational powers] and Fichte’ System of Science [Wissenschaftslehre]. Both thinkers take the transcendental turn. They base conceptual investigations not on facts or empirical evidence, but on the possibility of a situation; they are idealists since they look inward to the spontaneity of the agent/knower for explanation, not the environment, stimulus, or sensory given. Reason can fathom only what it has constructed.","PeriodicalId":337059,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte","volume":"429 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123050025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fichte and Kant on Reason’s Final Ends and Highest Ideas","authors":"Steven H. Hoeltzel","doi":"10.4000/REF.827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REF.827","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue that Fichte’s account of pure reason and its supreme self-wrought Idea is, in its transcendental essentials, very much modeled on Kant’s. The key difference between their positions, I suggest, is simply that Fichte operates with a more abstract understanding of the transcendentally basic elements of finite rationality; consequently, he arrives at a conceptually more concentrated understanding of pure reason’s preeminent Idea. In section one, I supply some context for that comparison. In section two, I recount Fichte’s depiction of “the I as an Idea” and note some importantly related concepts and claims. In section three, I examine a pair of interestingly different approaches taken by Kant to understanding and identifying the Ideas engendered by reason’s basic aims and operations. Finally, in section four, I suggest that the Jena Wissenschaftslehre reflects Fichte’s tacit appropriation of the transcendentally more fundamental of those two Kantian approaches.","PeriodicalId":337059,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127535870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Félix Duque, Remnants of Hegel. Remains of Ontology, Religion, and Community","authors":"E. Acosta","doi":"10.4000/ref.965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.965","url":null,"abstract":"En su ultimo libro Remnants of Hegel Felix Duque, sin duda alguna uno de los mas prestigiosos, creativos e interesantes comentadores de Hegel y la filosofia moderna en lengua espanola, profesor emerito de la Universidad Autonoma de Madrid e inspiracion de mas de una generacion de especialistas en la filosofia clasica alemana en el mundo iberoamericano, nos ofrece una vision de conjunto actualizada del corazon mismo del proyecto hegeliano. No se trata, en este sentido de otro libro mas sobre H...","PeriodicalId":337059,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte","volume":"159 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134170460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Freedom and Matter: From Kant to Fichte","authors":"Aaron Wells","doi":"10.4000/ref.812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.812","url":null,"abstract":"Fichte's mature conception of transcendental freedom is the subject of some controversy. This paper hopes to shed light on Fichte's later conception by examining his earliest thoughts on the matter. The focus is on three pivotal years of Fichte's development between 1791 and 1793: A. 1791: Fichte’s Earliest Account of Freedom; B. 1792: Two Reviews and Fichte’s Doubts; C. 1793: Fichte’s Revised Account of Freedom. The paper begins with a discussion of Fichte's reflections on how a broadly Kantian conception of transcendental freedom can be manifest in the empirical world. Then the paper examines several short works from 1792 in which Fichte's views become significantly more sophisticated. It will be shown that Fichte confronts in these works the worry that neither a metaphysical account of the natural world, nor a mere appeal to ‘facts of consciousness,’ can be sufficient to establish autonomy in the positive sense. It will be argued that Fichte responds to these worries in two ways. One, relatively well known, is his attempt to prove the existence of practical reason from features of self-consciousness. The paper will focus instead on Fichte's account of moral motivation added to the 1793 second edition of the Attempt at a Critique of all Revelation. There, Fichte sketches an account of pure practical motivation that does not depend on direct appeal to features of self-consciousness, but is more in line with Kant's own appeal to the moral law.","PeriodicalId":337059,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132567104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}