{"title":"Understanding Flash-Loan-based Wash Trading","authors":"Rundong Gan, Le Wang, Xiangyu Ruan, Xiaodong Lin","doi":"10.1145/3558535.3559793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559793","url":null,"abstract":"Flash Loan, a popular lending service in the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem, allows users to borrow a large number of virtual assets without any collateral. It can be leveraged to support many financial activities (such as arbitrage, collateral swap, self-liquidation, etc.), but unfortunately, it is often abused for malicious intent. One example of abusing flash loan servicing is to simultaneously sell and buy the same crypto currency on the same exchange to mislead the market, aka wash trading. It can manipulate the crypto currency market at a very low cost (anecdotally average around 0.033 ETH gas fee for each transaction on Ethereum mainnet), thereby dramatically damaging the stability and fairness of the market. More seriously, attackers can amplify the market impact by borrowing more assets from Flash Loan platforms. Until now, there has been little attention paid to Flash-Loan-based wash trading, but meanwhile, we have started to witness significant wash trading activities using Flash Loan. In this research, we analyze the properties of Flash-Loan-based wash trading in detail and propose a heuristic-based detection method. The real-world Flash Loan transaction data from Ethereum is used to verify our proposed detection method and more than 6,000 wash transactions were found. Moreover, we analyze the relationship between wash transactions and fluctuations in the price and volume of targeted assets. Finally, we evaluate the cost difference between traditional wash trading and Flash-Loan-based wash trading to reveal the attackers' motivation. Our work reveals that some metrics, like trading volume, widely used by investors when buying assets in traditional finance, become less believable in today's DeFi market largely since there exist low-risk ways of amplifying the effects of market manipulation activities. This research has shed light on the urgency of regulating the emerging DeFi market and provides insight into how to formulate more effective regulations for the DeFi market.","PeriodicalId":333471,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130492740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Analysing and Improving Shard Allocation Protocols for Sharded Blockchains","authors":"Runchao Han, Jiangshan Yu, Ren Zhang","doi":"10.1145/3558535.3559783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559783","url":null,"abstract":"Sharding is a promising approach to scale permissionless blockchains. In a sharded blockchain, participants are split into groups, called shards, and each shard only executes part of the workloads. Despite its wide adoption in permissioned systems, transferring such success to permissionless blockchains is still an open problem. In permissionless networks, participants may join and leave the system at any time, making load balancing challenging. In addition, the adversary in such networks can launch the single-shard takeover attack by compromising a single shard's consensus. To address these issues, participants should be securely and dynamically allocated into different shards. However, the protocol capturing such functionality - which we call shard allocation - is overlooked. In this paper, we study shard allocation protocols for permission-less blockchains. We formally define the shard allocation protocol and propose an evaluation framework. We apply the framework to evaluate the shard allocation subprotocols of seven state-of-the-art sharded blockchains, and show that none of them is fully correct or achieves satisfactory performance. We attribute these deficiencies to their extreme choices between two performance metrics: self-balance and operability. We observe and prove the fundamental trade-off between these two metrics, and identify a new property memory-dependency that enables parameterisation over this trade-off. Based on these insights, we propose Wormhole, a correct and efficient shard allocation protocol with minimal security assumptions and parameterisable self-balance and operability. We implement Wormhole and evaluate its overhead and performance metrics in a network with 128 shards and 32768 nodes. The results show that Wormhole introduces little overhead, achieves consistent self-balance and operability with our theoretical analysis, and allows the system to recover quickly from load imbalance.","PeriodicalId":333471,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130904967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"D-KODE: Distributed Mechanism to Manage a Billion Discrete-log Keys","authors":"Easwar Vivek Mangipudi, Aniket Kate","doi":"10.1145/3558535.3559788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559788","url":null,"abstract":"We focus on two emerging key-management issues in the blockchain space: (i) allowing a blockchain system to airdrop/send tokens to a potential client Bob, who is yet to set up the required cryptographic key, and (ii) creating a cross-chain bridge that allows users to securely send tokens from one blockchain to another. The existing solutions for the first problem need Bob to either generate and maintain public-private key pairs locally for the first time in his life---a usability bottleneck---or place trust in third-party custodial services---a privacy and censorship nightmare. Whereas, most existing solutions for the second require the users to trust a custodial service to realize the bridge with their keys. Towards solving this issue of trust via decentralization, distributed key generation (DKG) based solutions are being actively considered; here, a set of servers generate the discrete log keys in a distributed manner and link them to the users/accounts. Nevertheless, these solutions introduce computation and communication overhead that is linear in the number of generated account keys and do not scale well even for a million keys, especially as the set of DKG servers evolves. We present a Keys-On-Demand (D-KODE)1 distributed protocol suite that lets a set of servers compute discrete-log private/public keys on the fly through distributed pseudo-random function (PRF) evaluations on the queried public string/tag. Using the key homo-morphic properties of the employed PRF function and black-box secret-sharing based DKG, D-KODE also introduces a proactive security mechanism against a mobile adversary towards maintaining the system's longitudinal security. D-KODE scales well for a high number of account-keys as its communication and computation complexity is independent of the number of account-keys. Our experimental analysis demonstrates that, for a 20-node network with 2/3 honest majority, D-KODE starts to outperform the state of the art as the number of keys reaches 94K. D-KODE is practical as it takes less than 100msec to generate a secret key for a single-threaded server in a 20-node setup and can generate ~ 20 threshold BLS signatures per second. As the number of blockchain accounts/wallets sprints to a billion, D-KODE addresses the crucial scalability problem.","PeriodicalId":333471,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127184411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Blockchain Mining: Optimal Resource Allocation","authors":"Yunming Xiao, Sarit Markovich, A. Kuzmanovic","doi":"10.1145/3558535.3559792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559792","url":null,"abstract":"Having enabled numerous applications, blockchains have attracted not only much attention, in the past decade, but also huge amount of resources: talent, capital, energy, etc. Focusing on the mining side of the market, in this paper, we aim at understanding how to efficiently use the resources mining and staking pools attract. We start with developing predictions about factors that increase the efficient allocation of pools' resources. We then test our predictions based on a general model for optimal resource allocation that we develop, as well as data we collected on pools' actual resource allocations. We find that pools can increase resource efficiency by mining for more blockchains as well as by increasing the frequency of resource re-allocation. Further, we enroll to mining pools as a miner to understand and comment on how pools can encourage their miners to increase the efficiency of their allocation. While our empirical investigation mostly focuses on the BTC family, we show that our theory and results are general and applicable to the Ethereum family as well as other proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS) chains.","PeriodicalId":333471,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125711078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Block Double-Submission Attack: Block Withholding Can Be Self-Destructive","authors":"Suhyeon Lee, Dong-hwan Lee, Seung-Jun Kim","doi":"10.1145/3558535.3559787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559787","url":null,"abstract":"Proof-of-Work (PoW) is a Sybil control mechanism adopted in blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. It prevents the attempt of malicious actors to manipulate distributed ledgers. Bitcoin has successfully suppressed double-spending by accepting the longest PoW chain. Nevertheless, PoW encountered several major security issues surrounding mining competition. One of them is a Block WithHolding (BWH) attack that can exploit a widespread and cooperative environment called a mining pool. This attack takes advantage of untrustworthy relationships between mining pools and participating agents. Moreover, detecting or responding to attacks is challenging due to the nature of mining pools. In this paper, however, we suggest that BWH attacks also have a comparable trust problem. Because a BWH attacker cannot have complete control over BWH agents, they can betray the belonging mining pool and seek further benefits by trading with victims. We prove that this betrayal is not only valid in all attack parameters but also provides double benefits; finally, it is the best strategy for BWH agents. Furthermore, our study implies that BWH attacks may encounter self-destruction of their own revenue, contrary to their intention.","PeriodicalId":333471,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129007261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"SyncPCN/PSyncPCN: Payment Channel Networks without Blockchain Synchrony","authors":"Ouguzhan Ersoy, Jérémie Decouchant, Satwik Prabhu Kimble, Stefanie Roos","doi":"10.1145/3558535.3559779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559779","url":null,"abstract":"Payment channel networks (PCNs) enhance the scalability of block-chains by allowing parties to conduct transactions off-chain, i.e, without broadcasting every transaction to all blockchain participants. To conduct transactions, a sender and a receiver can either establish a direct payment channel with a funding blockchain transaction or leverage existing channels in a multi-hop payment. The security of PCNs usually relies on the synchrony of the underlying blockchain, i.e., evidence of misbehavior needs to be published on the blockchain within a time limit. Alternative payment channel proposals that do not require blockchain synchrony rely on quorum certificates and use a committee to register the transactions of a channel. However, these proposals do not support multi-hop payments, a limitation we aim to overcome. In this paper, we demonstrate that it is in fact impossible to design a multi-hop payment protocol with both network asynchrony and faulty channels, i.e., channels that may not correctly follow the protocol. We then detail two committee-based multi-hop payment protocols that respectively assume synchronous communications and possibly faulty channels, or asynchronous communication and correct channels. The first protocol relies on possibly faulty committees instead of the blockchain to resolve channel disputes, and enforces privacy properties within a synchronous network. The second one relies on committees that contain at most f faulty members out of 3f +1 and successively delegate to each other the role of eventually completing a multi-hop payment. We show that both protocols satisfy the security requirements of a multi-hop payment and compare their communication complexity and latency.","PeriodicalId":333471,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115836665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Economics of Automated Market Makers","authors":"Robin Fritsch, Samuel Käser, Roger Wattenhofer","doi":"10.1145/3558535.3559790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559790","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the question whether automated market maker protocols such as Uniswap can sustainably retain a portion of their trading fees for the protocol. We approach the problem by modelling how to optimally choose a pool's take rate, i.e the fraction of fee revenue that remains with the protocol, in order to maximize the protocol's revenue. The model suggest that if AMMs have a portion of loyal trade volume, they can sustainably set a non-zero take rate, even without losing liquidity to competitors with a zero take rate. Furthermore, we determine the optimal take rate depending on a number of model parameters including how much loyal trade volume pools have and how high the competitors' take rates are.","PeriodicalId":333471,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130875904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Samarth Tiwari, Michelle Yeo, Zeta Avarikioti, Iosif Salem, Krzysztof Pietrzak, S. Schmid
{"title":"Wiser: Increasing Throughput in Payment Channel Networks with Transaction Aggregation","authors":"Samarth Tiwari, Michelle Yeo, Zeta Avarikioti, Iosif Salem, Krzysztof Pietrzak, S. Schmid","doi":"10.1145/3558535.3559775","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559775","url":null,"abstract":"Payment channel networks (PCNs) are one of the most prominent solutions to the limited transaction throughput of blockchains. Nevertheless, PCNs suffer themselves from a throughput limitation due to the capital constraints of their channels. A similar dependence on high capital is also found in inter-bank payment settlements, where the so-called netting technique is used to mitigate liquidity demands. In this work, we alleviate this limitation by introducing the notion of transaction aggregation: instead of executing transactions sequentially through a PCN, we enable senders to aggregate multiple transactions and execute them simultaneously to benefit from several amounts that may \"cancel out\". Two direct advantages of our proposal is the decrease in intermediary fees paid by senders as well as the obfuscation of the transaction data from the intermediaries. We formulate the transaction aggregation as a computational problem, a generalization of the Bank Clearing Problem. We present a generic framework for the transaction aggregation execution, and thereafter we propose Wiser as an implementation of this framework in a specific hub-based setting. To overcome the NP-hardness of the transaction aggregation problem, in Wiser we propose a fixed-parameter linear algorithm for a special case of transaction aggregation as well as the Bank Clearing Problem. Wiser can also be seen as a modern variant of the Hawala money transfer system, as well as a decentralized implementation of the overseas remittance service of Wise.","PeriodicalId":333471,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127549282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lioba Heimbach, Eric Schertenleib, Roger Wattenhofer
{"title":"Risks and Returns of Uniswap V3 Liquidity Providers","authors":"Lioba Heimbach, Eric Schertenleib, Roger Wattenhofer","doi":"10.1145/3558535.3559772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559772","url":null,"abstract":"Trade execution on Decentralized Exchanges (DEXes) is automatic and does not require individual buy and sell orders to be matched. Instead, liquidity aggregated in pools from individual liquidity providers enables trading between cryptocurrencies. The largest DEX measured by trading volume, Uniswap V3, promises a DEX design optimized for capital efficiency. However, Uniswap V3 requires far more decisions from liquidity providers than previous DEX designs. In this work, we develop a theoretical model to illustrate the choices faced by Uniswap V3 liquidity providers and their implications. Our model suggests that providing liquidity on Uniswap V3 is highly complex and requires many considerations from a user. Our supporting data analysis of the risks and returns of real Uniswap V3 liquidity providers underlines that liquidity providing in Uniswap V3 is incredibly complicated, and performances can vary wildly. While there are simple and profitable strategies for liquidity providers in liquidity pools characterized by negligible price volatilities, these strategies only yield modest returns. Instead, significant returns can only be obtained by accepting increased financial risks and at the cost of active management. Thus, providing liquidity has become a game reserved for sophisticated players with the introduction of Uniswap V3, where retail traders do not stand a chance.","PeriodicalId":333471,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126323588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transferable Cross-Chain Options","authors":"D. Engel, Yingjie Xue","doi":"10.1145/3558535.3559774","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559774","url":null,"abstract":"An option is a financial agreement between two parties to trade two assets. One party is given the right, but not the obligation, to complete the swap before a specified termination time. In today's financial markets, an option is considered an asset which can itself be transferred: while an option is active, one party can sell its rights (or obligations) to another. Today's blockchains support simple options in the form of cross-chain atomic swap protocols where one party has the choice whether to complete the swap. The options implemented by these cross-chain protocols, are not, however, transferable. This paper proposes novel distributed protocols for transferable cross-chain options, where both option owners and providers can sell their positions to third parties. The protocol ensures that none of the parties can be cheated, that no unauthorized party can interfere, and that the transfer succeeds if the buyer and seller faithfully follow the protocol.","PeriodicalId":333471,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115931115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}