{"title":"Free Banking and Credit Market Competition","authors":"John Thanassoulis, Tamas Vadasz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3859667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3859667","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some countries (e.g. US/UK) have free banking and expensive overdrafts, while others (e.g. France/Germany) do not? Existing models point to naivety amongst consumers – but without evidence that such naivety differs across countries. This paper offers a different explanation. We model the two stages of competition between banks for accounts and then to supply credit. We allow for banks to compete to poach customers in the credit market. We show that free banking results when a country has greater numbers of high credit-risk borrowers. We predict that this leads to borrowers switching less yet paying higher prices for credit.","PeriodicalId":331807,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130896259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Impact of Universal Banking on Investment Decisions of Bank-Dependent Firms","authors":"Xiaoling Liu, Shusen Qi, Yuhui Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3859082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3859082","url":null,"abstract":"The advantages and disadvantages of universal banking have long been debated. Using the successive granting of lead underwriter qualifications to commercial banks in China as a quasi-natural experiment, we study the impact of universal banking on non-financial firms’ investment decisions. We find that after a firm’s main lending banks qualify as lead underwriters, the firm’s investment increases by 7.7 to 8.3 percent on a gross or net basis. The underlying mechanism is that universal banking can generate informational economies of scope and relax constraints on the provision of external finance. In contrast, we find no evidence on the conflict of interest between universal banks and their customers. Our study, therefore, sheds light on the potential gains from universal banking.","PeriodicalId":331807,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126964745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
V. Vacca, F. Bichlmeier, Paolo Biraschi, Natalie Boschi, Antonio Bravo, Luciano Di Primio, Andrea Ebner, Silvia Hoeretzeder, Elisa Llorente Ballesteros, Claudia Miani, Giacomo Ricci, R. Santioni, Stefan Schellerer, Hanna Westman
{"title":"Measuring the Impact of a Bank Failure on the Real Economy: An EU-Wide Analytical Framework","authors":"V. Vacca, F. Bichlmeier, Paolo Biraschi, Natalie Boschi, Antonio Bravo, Luciano Di Primio, Andrea Ebner, Silvia Hoeretzeder, Elisa Llorente Ballesteros, Claudia Miani, Giacomo Ricci, R. Santioni, Stefan Schellerer, Hanna Westman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3891642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3891642","url":null,"abstract":"The crisis management framework for banks in the European Union (EU) requires the resolution authorities to identify the existence of a public interest to resolve an ailing bank, rather than to open normal insolvency proceedings (NIPs). The Public Interest Assessment (PIA) determines whether resolution objectives, including the safeguard of financial stability, can be better preserved using resolution tools than NIPs .This paper provides a contribution to the ongoing discussion on the implementation of the PIA, by presenting an analytical framework to quantify the potential impact on the real economy stemming from a bank’s failure under NIPs through the interruption of the lending activity (“credit channel”). The framework is harmonized across the jurisdictions belonging to the Banking Union and aims to improve the quantitative leg of the PIA, to be coupled with qualitative elements. In a first step, we quantify the potential credit shortfall faced by firms and households due to the abrupt closure of a bank. In a second step, the impact of the credit shortfall on real outcomes is estimated via a FAVAR model and via a micro-econometric model. Reference values are provided to assess the relevance of the estimated outcomes. The illustrative results show that such a harmonized approach can be applied across the Banking Union and to banks of heterogeneous size. In case of mid-sized banks, this common analytical framework could reduce the uncertainty regarding the extent to which the failure of the institution could have a negative impact to the real economy if the lending activity is interrupted as possibly the case under NIPs.","PeriodicalId":331807,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129625038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Economics of Non-bank Financial Intermediation: Why Do We Need to Fill the Regulation Gap?","authors":"Maurizio Trapanese","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3891639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3891639","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an overall analysis of the economics of non-bank financial intermediation, and argues that the financial stability concerns stemming from this sector support the need to fill the regulation gap that exists with respect to other segments. It examines the structure of markets, the economic incentives of the agents involved, and the institutional aspects characterizing this form of intermediation as compared with that performed by banks. The policy framework developed so far has been based mainly on micro-prudential tools, looking at individual institutions and activities. The focus of the regulatory actions should not be (or should not only be) the stability of individual entities. Financial regulators should pay more attention to the effects that the collective actions and activities of non-bank financial entities may have on the financial system as a whole and on the real economy. I find that the effectiveness of micro-prudential tools is strengthened if they are accompanied by a framework containing policy measures to address systemic risk.","PeriodicalId":331807,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131782243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Triumvirate Investment Paradigm : Strategic Asset Allocation in Property, Business, and Country Assets","authors":"Taher Khan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3858852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3858852","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this document is to outline the triumvirate investment paradigm as a strategic asset allocation blueprint for portfolio construction by categorizing assets into three distinct groups: Property, Business, and Country.<br><br>This triumvirate taxonomy fits better within the economic context of the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model, where we detail the macroeconomy in terms of its constituents of Consumption, Business Investment, and Government Expenditures. This segments into broadly equal market capitalization for these groups as well, with an equal importance for each part of the whole. For asset pricing, this leads to the development of Investment Selection within a particular group based on risk and reward characteristics, and the development of Investment Risk as an integral part of the investment process for Portfolio Construction in determining the diversification benefits across each group, where each group is a distinct correlation cluster.<br><br>In a zero rate economy, adoption of a triumvirate taxonomy in risk budgeting will lead to a shift of sovereign assets towards more equity-like participation in Infrastructure, which fits under the Country asset class. Equally, it will lead to less investment exposure in Private Equity. For ALM providers, it will involve a shift towards more illiquid assets, such as Property, Infrastructure and Private Credit, by recognition that the long-term liabilities are equally illiquid and well matched.","PeriodicalId":331807,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123685936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Shariah Compliant Macaulay’s Duration Model Testing: Evidence from Islamic banks in Indonesia","authors":"S. Shah, R. Sukmana, B. A. Fianto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3855063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3855063","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this research is to test Shariah compliant duration models on Islamic banks in Indonesia. This will be achieved using data of earning assets and risk bearing liabilities of Indonesian Islamic banks from 2009 to 2019. Using multiple regressions the results suggest that Shariah compliant duration models are robust to calculate duration of earning assets, return bearing liabilities and Islamic banks. This research adds to the previous research of testing Shariah compliant duration model. Ultimately, it will improve profitability, risk efficiency and Shariah efficiency by improved Shariah compliant measures of risk management. This will ultimately improve market capitalization and returns stability in the long run. A major limitation of the study is very short length of data of Islamic banks. Still another limitation is difference in commencement of business of various Islamic banks that makes length of data unequal.","PeriodicalId":331807,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115509756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Gounopoulos, Kaisheng Luo, Anamaria Nicolae, Nikos Paltalidis
{"title":"Banks' Liquidity Management During the COVID-19 Pandemic","authors":"D. Gounopoulos, Kaisheng Luo, Anamaria Nicolae, Nikos Paltalidis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3853985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853985","url":null,"abstract":"How banks managed the COVID-19 pandemic shock? The eruption of the financial crisis in 2007 evolved to a crisis of banks as liquidity providers (Acharya and Mora, 2015). The COVID-19 pandemic shock was associated with a surge in households’ deposits and a subsequent liquidity injection by the Federal Reserve. We show how the pandemic affected banks’ liquidity management and therefore by extension, the creation of new loans. We empirically evaluate the creation and management of banks’ liquidity through three well established mechanisms: market discipline (supply-side), internal capital markets (demand-side), and the balance-sheet mechanism which captures banks’ exposure to liquidity demand risk. We provide novel empirical evidence showing that households increased savings as a precaution against future declines in their income. Also, depositors did not discipline riskier banks, and the internal capital market mechanism was not in work during the pandemic. Hence, weakly-capitalized banks were not forced to offer higher deposit rates to stem deposit outflows. Furthermore, weakly-capitalized banks increased lending in the first phase of the pandemic, while in the midst of the pandemic, they cut back new lending origination and increased their exposure to Fed’s liquidity facilities. Well-capitalized banks on the other hand, increased lending in line with the increase in their deposits. Banks with higher exposure to liquidity risk were vulnerable to deposit outflows and increased their exposure in Fed’s liquidity facilities significantly more than low-commitments exposed banks.","PeriodicalId":331807,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128486937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economic Policy Uncertainty and Bank Stability","authors":"G. Danisman, Amine Tarazi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3855469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3855469","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the influence of economic policy uncertainty on bank stability post-2007-2008 global financial crisis. We rely on the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index introduced by Baker et al. (2016). We use 176,477 quarterly observations for US commercial banks over the period from 2011Q1 to 2020Q3 and find consistent and robust evidence that bank stability decreases as the level of economic policy uncertainty increases. We specifically control for demand-side effects which indicates that the decrease in bank stability not only originates from borrowers’ and customers’ conditions but also from a change in bank behavior. A deeper investigation shows that the negative impact of policy uncertainty on bank stability is stronger for larger banks, and weaker for highly capitalized banks as well as for more liquid banks. Our findings have important implications particularly for the COVID-19 policy implementations.","PeriodicalId":331807,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130479419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Do Global Systemically Important Banks Lower Capital Surcharges?","authors":"Jared Berry, Akber Khan, Marcelo Rezende","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3764965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3764965","url":null,"abstract":"Global systemically important banks (GSIBs) are subject to capital surcharges that increase with systemic importance indicators. We show that U.S. GSIBs lower their surcharges to a large extent by reducing one indicator---the notional amount of over-the-counter derivatives---in the fourth quarter of each year, the quarter that determines surcharges. This seasonal drop is stronger at GSIBs than at other banks; it increased after GSIB surcharges were introduced; and it is largely driven by interest rate swaps. We discuss implications of these results for the design of systemic importance indicators.","PeriodicalId":331807,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125545957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank Stress Test Disclosures, Private Information Production, and Price Informativeness","authors":"A. Heitz, Barrett Wheeler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3850954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3850954","url":null,"abstract":"Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, from 2015-2017, banks holding assets between $10 - $50 billion were required to disclose a portion of their company-run stress test results. We find that these disclosures are associated with a 5.9% reduction in analyst following, driven by more experienced analysts. Analysts that continue to follow these banks issue forecasts that are less dispersed and contain less firm-specific information. Furthermore, post-disclosure, bank equity returns become more synchronous with the entire stock market, indicating that returns contain less firm-specific information. While disclosure of stress test results was intended to enhance market monitoring, our results do not support an increase in market monitoring. Instead, they are consistent with recent theory models suggesting that increased regulatory disclosures may have unintended consequences.","PeriodicalId":331807,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116316916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}