{"title":"Dynamic Resource Management Under Weak Property Rights: A Tale of Thieves and Trespassers","authors":"M. Rodríguez, S. Smulders","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2829262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2829262","url":null,"abstract":"Using a dynamic framework with strategic interactions, we study the management of a non-renewable natural resource when property rights are generally weak. Under generally weak property rights both the resource stock and the revenues from exploiting it are imperfectly protected, due to trespassing and theft respectively. Trespassing and theft affect the legitimate owner’s extraction decision: extracting the resource today protects the stock against trespassing but exposes the revenues to theft. Moreover, in an evolving institutional setting, the anticipation of a change in the strength of property rights further distorts the extraction decision: e.g., if the owner anticipates stronger property rights in the future, extraction is delayed. Our results indicate that the depletion of the resource is decreasing in the intensity of theft. In addition, when the owner and the trespassers are affected by theft, the depletion of the resource is below (above) the social optimal level if the intensity of theft is high (low).","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129546469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incentives and Institutions in Accounting: Thinking Beyond Standards","authors":"Brian Singleton-Green","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2902044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2902044","url":null,"abstract":"The report explains why accounting is not a purely mechanical activity, but is affected by the incentives of those involved in the accounting process and by surrounding institutions, which help shape incentives and facilitate and constrain managers' actions. It looks at the principal factors that affect financial reporting outcomes, considers some of the institutional changes involved in globalisation and how they affect accounting, and reports some of the key findings of research on how differences in incentives and institutions affect financial reporting outcomes. An appendix to the report includes a discussion of the relevance of new institutional economics to accounting research and notes that 'institution' in this context has a wide and variable range of meanings.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"9 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124291518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Knowledge, Institution, Power, and Economic Growth: Toward a Unified Economics of Growth","authors":"Shiping Tang, Zhanping Hu, Yun Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2766052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2766052","url":null,"abstract":"The economics of growth centered on technological knowledge in endogenous growth models and the new institutional economics of growth centered on institutions have largely chartered their separate courses so far. In this paper, we construct a new growth model that brings the two economics of growth together by first bringing the quality of the stock of knowledge and the quality of economic institutions into an endogenous growth model and then making the model an evolutionary one via competition and selection of agents with different institutions. Our new model, illustrated with historical data and agent-based modeling (ABM) simulations, nicely accounts for two key stylized facts of economic growth: the coming of the Industrial Revolution and the “Great Divergences” thereafter. Our new model also makes it clear that the most critical factor shaping economic performance across time and space is the (mis-)allocation of production factors by political decisions: Who, under what institutions and power relationship, decides to deploy what knowledge and other production factors to make what. As such, the science of economic growth must be political economy with power/politics rather than neoclassical economics without power/politics.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"515 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133158725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
L. Alston, M. Melo, Bernardo Mueller, Carlos Pereira
{"title":"A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Critical Transitions","authors":"L. Alston, M. Melo, Bernardo Mueller, Carlos Pereira","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2763105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2763105","url":null,"abstract":"Critical transitions for a country are historical periods when the powerful organizations in a country shift from one set of beliefs about how institutions (the formal and informal rules of the game) will affect outcomes to a new set of beliefs. Critical transitions can lead a country toward more openness politically and economically or toward a more exclusionary society. Economic and political development is contextual; that is, there is no recipe. Periods of relative persistence are the norm with changes in institutions at the margin. We develop a framework consisting of several interconnected relatively unexplored concepts that we first define in a static context and then utilize to show how they produce a dynamic of institutional change or persistence. The key concepts include: windows of opportunity, beliefs, and leadership. Our major contribution is wedding the concepts of windows of opportunity, beliefs, and leadership to the dominant network, institutions, and economic and political outcomes to form a dynamic. We apply the framework illustratively to understand economic and political development in Argentina over the past 100 years.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122872485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economists Have No Defense: A Critical Review of National Defense in Economics Textbooks","authors":"Christopher J. Coyne, D. Lucas","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2742391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2742391","url":null,"abstract":"National defense is the textbook example of a public good. In order to understand how economists present public goods to undergraduates, we analyze 50 texts from across three widely taught undergraduate economics courses: principles of economics, intermediate microeconomics, and public finance. We find that textbooks overwhelmingly present national defense as a public good and rarely mention the possibility of government failure. This leaves students with an incomplete and biased exposure to the government provision of public goods. We reconsider some of the main assumptions associated with the standard treatment of national defense as the quintessential public good and discuss opportunities for educators to better prepare students as economists and citizens.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125227303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reasons for the Institutional Failure in Pakistan","authors":"A. Rizvi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2736199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2736199","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of this research report is to highlight institutional failure in Pakistan due to inefficient and corrupt Governance, working for their own benefits and cause. Pakistan is amongst the poorest nations. Instead of giving priority to primary social institution to make them strong, stable and productive, finances are allocated in other projects. Common man has been suffering, due to non-accessibility of basic needs. Primary social institutions family, education, government, business, religious and other institutions founded for a specific purpose to bring social development. This report particularly put focus on the reasons of institutional failure and their impact on the society.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124885195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Finance and the Common Good","authors":"E. Weyl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2271832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2271832","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past fifty years, (financial) capitalism has brought about an enormous growth in wealth. Millions around the world have been lifted out of poverty. However, the downsides of the present global economic constitution are rapidly becoming evident as well. Rising inequality, soaring debt levels, and repeated cycles of boom and bust have proven to be some of its key characteristics. After the 2008 crisis brought the financial system to the brink of collapse, new regulations, stricter supervision, higher capital requirements, and ethical codes were introduced to the sector. Today we find ourselves in the middle of another economic boom. Yet one pressing question remains: has anything changed? Have the (necessary) repairs fixed the flaws in the system? Or do we require even more fundamental reforms? \u0000 This volume builds on the observation that society has co-evolved with the financial sector. We cannot simply claim that 'finance' was the sole instigator of the 2008 crisis. Society itself has become financialized; the process of replacing relations, structures of trust and reciprocity, by anonymous and systemic transactions. The volume poses vital questions with regard to this societal development. How did this happen? And more importantly: is change possible? If yes, how? \u0000 This volume contains 21 essays on the themes mentioned above. Authors include Jan Peter Balkenende, Wouter Bos, Lans Bovenberg, Govert Buijs, and Herman Van Rompuy. A recommendation by Dutch Minister of Finance Wopke Hoekstra is also included.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"187 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134208042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Institutions and Preference Evolution","authors":"Jiabin Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2734556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2734556","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that political institutions play an important role in shaping the evolutionary trajectory of preferences. We consider a population with two preference groups. A political institution provides the platform and a set of rules for the two groups to battle over the relative representativeness of their preference traits for the high positions in the social hierarchy. This political process affects the economic outcomes of the two groups, subsequently the intergenerational transmission of preferences. We study how conducive different political institutions are to spreading preference traits that induce better economic outcomes. We find that any preference trait can be prevalent under \"exclusive\" political institutions. Therefore, a society can be trapped in a state in which preference traits associated with unfavorable economic outcomes persist. On the other hand, preference evolution under \"inclusive\" political institutions has stronger selection power and only the preference traits that result in the largest comparative advantage in holding a high position can be prevalent.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134106535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutionalizing Countercyclical Investment: A Framework for Long-Term Asset Owners","authors":"Bradley Jones","doi":"10.5089/9781513512495.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513512495.001","url":null,"abstract":"Do portfolio shifts by the world's largest asset owners respond procyclically to past returns, or countercyclically to valuations? And if countercyclical investment (with both market-stabilizing and return-generating properties) is a public and private good, how might asset owners be empowered to do more of it? These two questions motivate this study. Based on analysis of representative portfolios (totaling $24 trillion) for a range of asset owners (central banks, pension funds, insurers and endowments), portfolio changes typically appear procyclical. In response, I suggest a framework aimed at jointly bolstering long-term returns and financial stability should: (i) embed governance practices to mitigate ‘multi-year return chasing;' (ii) rebalance to benchmarks with factor exposures best suited to long-term investors; (iii) minimize principal-agent frictions; (iv) calibrate risk management to minimize long-term shortfall risk (not short-term price volatility); and (v) ensure regulatory conventions do not amplify procyclicality at the worst possible times.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121745517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial Constraints and Exports","authors":"Xiao Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2698358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2698358","url":null,"abstract":"How do firms' financial constraints, which restrict their borrowing, dynamically impact exports? This paper finds that after controlling for the endogeneity of financial constraints, constrained firms are less likely to export, and relaxing financial constraints leads to an increase in exports. In the model, imperfect contract enforceability restricts firms' borrowing. Firms use retained earnings to accumulate capital, relax financial constraints, and start exporting. Variations in firm age and financial environments can be used to solve the endogeneity problem of financial constraints. Using a firm-level data set in 26 developing countries between 2001 and 2013, we empirically find that constrained firms are 61.5% less likely to export, constrained exporters export 74.2% less, and relaxing financial constraints increases firms' exports. These results suggest that developing countries need to improve financial environments in ways besides currently used export-stimulating policies.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116811805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}