Fordham Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series最新文献

{"title":"For Execution Methods Challenges, the Road to Abolition is Paved with Paradox","authors":"D. Denno","doi":"10.18574/nyu/9780814762172.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9780814762172.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"The death penalty’s popularity has waned appreciably in recent years. Riding high on the momentum of this snowballing development are challenges to lethal injection under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. This Chapter contends that despite the contributions that lethal injection challenges, such as the 2008 Supreme Court case of Baze v. Rees, have made toward decreasing the number of executions in the United States, the oft-perceived link between execution methods litigation and the potential abolition of the death penalty is a double-edged sword. The presumed tie between successful lethal injection challenges and abolition can distract legislatures, courts, and prison personnel from examining the actual issue under consideration – the constitutionality of states’ execution protocols. While litigation over execution methods furthers abolitionist goals through the resultant decline in the number of executions, states continue to cling to troublesome execution methods in order to cloak the death penalty’s flaws.","PeriodicalId":330395,"journal":{"name":"Fordham Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133166586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Prejudgment Interest in International Arbitration","authors":"Jeffrey M. Colon, Michael S. Knoll","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1029710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1029710","url":null,"abstract":"Tribunals in international arbitration are regularly asked by claimants to award prejudgment interest. Unless foreclosed by an agreement between the parties, there is widespread agreement prejudgment interest should put the claimant in the same position as it would have been had it not been injured by the respondent. However, there is little consensus how to calculate prejudgment interest in order to accomplish that purpose. In this Essay, we describe the proper method of calculating prejudgment interest based on sound financial principles. Using the paradigm that the respondent has forced the claimant to make an involuntary loan to the respondent, we argue that prejudgment interest should be computed using the respondent's borrowing rate. Furthermore, we argue that tribunals should use a series of short-term, floating interest rates rather than a single long-term rate at the commencement of the dispute in order to provide the parties with the proper incentive to settle their dispute. We also discuss how the calculations are different when the parties are individuals and closely held corporations as opposed to corporations and governments, and we address complications that arise when a tribunal calculates damages in one currency and makes a final award in another currency.","PeriodicalId":330395,"journal":{"name":"Fordham Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132063635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Decisions about Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Problem","authors":"D. Richman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.968469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.968469","url":null,"abstract":"This symposium essay explores the contestable empirical and normative assumptions that underlie criticisms of the Justice Department's policies with respect to the waiver of corporate attorney-client and work-product privileges. And it considers how authority with respect to prosecutorial decisionmaking in this area ought to be allocated.","PeriodicalId":330395,"journal":{"name":"Fordham Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131468421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Stranger Among Us","authors":"S. Safdar","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.955455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.955455","url":null,"abstract":"The Vilification of Muslims in The War on Terror.","PeriodicalId":330395,"journal":{"name":"Fordham Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124903414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporate Lawmaking Influence and the Role of Political Capital: The Fedex Story","authors":"Jill E. Fisch","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.467347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.467347","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate political contributions have been extensively regulated out of a concern that they provide corporations with undue influence over political decisionmaking. Campaign contributions, however, are not the main way that corporations influence public policy. Instead, corporate political activity consists of the development and deployment of political capital. This Article develops a theory of political capital to describe corporate investments in political experience, reputation and relationships. The conception of political capital offers a richer explanation for corporate political behavior than the portrayal of corporations buying political favors in a spot market. The argument that political capital is properly understood as a firm asset is further supported by empirical work demonstrating a relationship between political capital and firm value. The Article then illustrates the operation of political capital through a case study of the FedEx experience. By examining FedEx's involvement in a series of regulatory reforms, the Article demonstrates how FedEx has cultivated its political capital and used that capital to secure favorable regulatory changes. In so doing, the Article highlights the contributions of the political capital theory in explaining FedEx's success. The Article goes on to consider the extent to which the FedEx experience is typical, both by comparing FedEx to its commercial competitors and by identifying several factors that are likely to be key components in explaining FedEx's decision to invest in political capital. Finally, the Article explores the implications of the political capital theory for differences among firms. The political capital theory suggests that these differences may reflect efficient specialization and economies of scale. Moreover, the theory offers an alternative perspective on special interest legislation by positing that such legislation may reflect efficient subsidization of politically active leader firms to reduce the cost of free riding. Although this Article offers merely a modest starting point for future research, the political capital theory identifies key components of the political process that are outside the scope of existing research on corporate political activity. In addition, the Article suggests an agenda for future empirical research to develop the concept and role of political capital.","PeriodicalId":330395,"journal":{"name":"Fordham Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115145511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"When is Property Intellectual? The Leveraging Problem","authors":"M. Patterson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.223313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.223313","url":null,"abstract":"Patents and copyrights protect inventions and expression; they do not protect products. This distinction, I argue in this essay, is a key to the antitrust problem of the \"leveraging\" of intellectual property. In a typical leveraging case, the manufacturer of a durable good, like a copier or computer, refuses to sell replacement parts for its equipment unless the purchaser also hires the manufacturer to service the equipment. Such a practice can be illegal under antitrust law, but when the leveraging products-in this example, replacement parts-are protected by patent or copyright, the manufacturer will often claim that the leveraging is a permissible use of its intellectual property. I argue in this essay that intellectual property rights should provide special protection from the antitrust laws only when the owner of the rights is truly denying access to the intellectual aspect of its property. That will never be the case when the owner's property is denied to one who will not use the intellectual property. In the recent Kodak and Xerox cases, independent service organizations sought access to the defendants' patented parts only in order to install them in the equipment of others. It was the equipment owners, not the service organizations, that benefitted from any inventions embodied in those parts. Hence, the defendants' patents should not have allowed them to deny the parts to the service organizations. Somewhat more broadly, intellectual property also should not allow owners of the property to discriminate among potential buyers or licensees if those buyers or licensees do not differ in their uses of the intellectual element of the property. That is, not only should a patent or copyright not give its owner the right to deny a product to one who would not use the invention or expression, but it also should not give the owner the right to deny the product to one who would use the protected work if the owner at the same time grants access to others who use it in the same way. Such discrimination where there is no difference in the use of the protected aspect of the property does not rest on a denial of access to the owner's intellectual property. A similar conclusion was in fact reached, though on somewhat different reasoning, in the Federal Trade Commission's recent case challenging Intel Corporation's licensing practices.","PeriodicalId":330395,"journal":{"name":"Fordham Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121215863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}