Research in Experimental Economics最新文献

Laboratory Experiments of Land Assembly Without Eminent Domain 无征地征地的实验室实验

Research in Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2022-02-28 DOI: 10.1108/s0193-230620220000021004

M. Desantis, M. McCarter, Abel M. Winn

{"title":"Laboratory Experiments of Land Assembly Without Eminent Domain","authors":"M. Desantis, M. McCarter, Abel M. Winn","doi":"10.1108/s0193-230620220000021004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/s0193-230620220000021004","url":null,"abstract":"We use laboratory experiments to test two self-assessment tax mechanisms for facilitating land assembly. One mechanism is incentive compatible with a complex tax function, while the other uses a flat tax rate to mitigate implementation concerns. Sellers publicly declare a price for their land. Overstating its true value is penalized by using the declared price to assess a property tax; understating its value is penalized by allowing developers to buy the property at the declared price. We find that both mechanisms increase the rate of land assembly and gains from trade relative to a control in which sellers’ price declarations have no effect on their taxes. However, these effects are statistically insignificant or transitory. The assembly rates in our selfassessment treatments are markedly higher than those of prior experimental studies in which the buyer faces bargaining frictions, such as costly delay or capital constraints. 1 Authors listed alphabetically. The current research was supported by the Mercatus Center, a private donation by Douglas and Marion Lee, and the University of Texas at San Antonio Office of the Vice President for Research.","PeriodicalId":330367,"journal":{"name":"Research in Experimental Economics","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134106425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Not as I Do: Hypocrisy Aversion and Optimal Punishment of Common Offenses 不像我做的:伪善、厌恶和常见犯罪的最佳惩罚

Research in Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2022-02-28 DOI: 10.1108/s0193-230620220000021007

Gregory J. DeAngelo, M. Makowsky, Bryan C. McCannon

引用次数: 0

Multi-Offer Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Alternative Mechanisms 多要约诉讼:替代机制的实证分析

Research in Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2022-02-28 DOI: 10.1108/s0193-230620220000021006

Alexandros Vasios Sivvopoulos, Mark van Boening

{"title":"Multi-Offer Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Alternative Mechanisms","authors":"Alexandros Vasios Sivvopoulos, Mark van Boening","doi":"10.1108/s0193-230620220000021006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/s0193-230620220000021006","url":null,"abstract":"This experiment analyzes multi-offer versions of the single-offer signaling and screening litigation games, as well as a bilateral multi-offer game. A plaintiff has either a low or a high claim on an uninformed defendant, and the two negotiate in an attempt to reach a pre-trial settlement. Trial is costly, and settlement generates surplus over which the two parties can bargain. In previous experiments, excess disputes occur even though offers contain surplus not predicted under the theory, and fairness appears to be important in explaining deviations from theory. This experiment examines whether renegotiation in the form of successive sequential offers can yield efficiency gains. There are four main findings. One, under the multi-offer structure the excess dispute rate is 23 percentage points lower in the screening game and the high-offer dispute rate is 31 percentage points lower in signaling game. The bilateral game yields an additional 15 percentage point reduction in the high-offer dispute rate, but excess disputes persist. Two, players take advantage of the multi-offer opportunity and make around 3 to 4 offers per negotiation. Three, across games the surplus in a fair offer remains constant at about onesixth of the surplus, but the benchmark from which this is measured varies according to which player has the power to make the offer. Fourth, dynamic behavior in the multi-offer games play an important but complex role in observed outcomes. Multi-offer mechanisms may be alternatives to costly information transmission like disclosure or discovery.","PeriodicalId":330367,"journal":{"name":"Research in Experimental Economics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116449475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Land-Assembly Experiments: A Survey 土地组合实验:综述

Research in Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2022-02-28 DOI: 10.1108/s0193-230620220000021002

Javier E. Portillo

引用次数: 0

Prelims 预备考试

Research in Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2018-11-23 DOI: 10.1108/s0193-230620180000020012

引用次数: 0

Cultural Values and Behavior in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games: An Experimental Study 独裁者、最后通牒和信任游戏中的文化价值和行为:一项实验研究

Research in Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2018-11-23 DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620180000020005

Sun-Ki Chai, Dolgorsuren Dorj, Katerina Sherstyuk

引用次数: 0

Culture as a Configuration of Values: An Archetypal Perspective 文化作为一种价值配置:一个原型视角

Research in Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2018-11-23 DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620180000020004

D. Midgley, S. Venaik, D. Christopoulos

{"title":"Culture as a Configuration of Values: An Archetypal Perspective","authors":"D. Midgley, S. Venaik, D. Christopoulos","doi":"10.1108/S0193-230620180000020004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-230620180000020004","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this chapter is to: (1) model culture as a configuration of multiple values, (2) identify different culture archetypes across the globe, and (3) empirically demonstrate heterogeneity in culture archetypes within and across 52 countries. We use Schwartz values from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the archetypal analysis (AA) method to identify diverse culture archetypes within and across countries. We find significant heterogeneity in culture values archetypes within countries and homogeneity across countries, calling into question the assumption of uniform national culture values in economics and other fields. We show how the heterogeneity in culture values across the globe can be represented with a small number of distinctive archetypes. The study could be extended to include a larger set of countries, and/or cover a broader range of theoretically grounded values than those available in the Schwartz values model in the WVS. Research and practice often assume cultural homogeneity within nations and cultural diversity across nations. Our finding of different culture archetypes within countries and similar archetypes across countries demonstrates the important role of culture sharing and exchange as a source of reducing cultural conflicts between nations and enhancing creativity and innovation through interaction and integration in novel ways. We examine culture as a configuration of multiple values, and use a novel AA method to capture heterogeneity in culture values within and across countries.","PeriodicalId":330367,"journal":{"name":"Research in Experimental Economics","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127769775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Index 指数

Research in Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2018-11-23 DOI: 10.1108/s0193-230620180000020011

引用次数: 0

Group Identity in Intermediated Interactions: Lessons from a Trust Game with Delegation in South Africa 中介互动中的群体认同:来自南非代表团信任博弈的经验教训

Research in Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2018-11-23 DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620180000020008

Hanjo Hamann, N. Nicholls

引用次数: 1

Why Use Qualitative Methods to Study Culture in Economic Life? 为什么要用定性方法研究经济生活中的文化?

Research in Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2018-11-23 DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620180000020002

V. Storr, Arielle John

引用次数: 3