{"title":"Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control","authors":"Geoffrey A. Manne, Sam Bowman, Dirk Auer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3899524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3899524","url":null,"abstract":"A growing number of policymakers and scholars are calling for tougher rules to curb corporate acquisitions. But these appeals are premature. There is currently little evidence to suggest that mergers systematically harm consumer welfare. More importantly, scholars fail to identify alternative institutional arrangements that would capture the anticompetitive mergers that evade prosecution without disproportionate false positives and administrative costs. Their proposals thus fail to meet the requirements of the error-cost framework. Several high-profile academic articles and reports claim to have identified important gaps in current merger enforcement rules, particularly with respect to tech and pharma acquisitions involving nascent and potential competitors—so-called “killer acquisitions” and “kill zones.” As a result of these perceived deficiencies, scholars and enforcers have called for tougher rules, including the introduction of lower merger filing thresholds and substantive changes, such as the inversion of the burden of proof when authorities review mergers and acquisitions in the digital platform industry. Meanwhile, and seemingly in response to the increased political and advocacy pressures around the issue, U.S. antitrust enforcers have recently undertaken several enforcement actions directly targeting such acquisitions. As this paper discusses, however, these proposals tend to overlook the important tradeoffs that would ensue from attempts to decrease the number of false positives under existing merger rules and thresholds. While merger enforcement ought to be mindful of these possible theories of harm, the theories and evidence are not nearly as robust as many proponents suggest. Most importantly, there is insufficient basis to conclude that the costs of permitting the behavior they identify is greater than the costs would be of increasing enforcement to prohibit it. Our work draws from two key strands of economic literature that are routinely overlooked (or summarily dismissed) by critics of the status quo. For a start, as Frank Easterbrook argued in his pioneering work on The Limits of Antitrust, antitrust enforcement is anything but costless. In the case of merger enforcement, not only is it expensive for agencies to detect anticompetitive deals, but overbearing rules may deter beneficial merger activity that creates value for consumers. Indeed, not only are most mergers welfare-enhancing, but barriers to merger activity have been shown to significantly, and negatively, affect early company investment. Second, critics mistake the nature of causality. Scholars routinely surmise that incumbents use mergers to shield themselves from competition. Acquisitions are thus seen as a means of eliminating competition. But this overlooks an important alternative: It is at least plausible that incumbents’ superior managerial or other capabilities make them the ideal purchasers for entrepreneurs and startup investors who are looking to sell. This","PeriodicalId":327488,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Antitrust Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128043602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Growing Convergence: The Limited Role of Antitrust in Standard Essential Patent Disputes","authors":"D. Ginsburg, Joshua D. Wright, Camila Ringeling","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3904073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3904073","url":null,"abstract":"In the last couple of years, the United States Department of Justice and several European countries have reversed previous interventionist decisions and limited the role of antitrust in the resolution of disputes concerning Standard Essential Patent (“SEPs”). These jurisdictions recognize the need to protect intellectual property rights by making available injunctions against infringers. Courts have realized that hold-up by a patent holder demanding excessive royalties is not a widespread problem and that patent implementers may hold-out against paying any royalties whilst they continue to practice a patent. They have accordingly adopted new standards for granting injunctions in disputes involving SEPs with the goal of increasing efficiency and legal certainty. We discuss this shift and its implications for competition policy and innovation.","PeriodicalId":327488,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Antitrust Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131673929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Critical Antitrust Theory. Biased Disruption and Antitrust's Biased Consumer Approach","authors":"Roberto Domingos Taufick","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3769456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3769456","url":null,"abstract":"We learn that scientific progress is inherently good, that it has improved the living conditions of all humans and that the digital revolution is progressively helping level the playing field for all. But empirical evidence related to the effects of technological disruptions on the living conditions of minorities tells another story. Technological changes have always addressed a certain profile of consumer, identified as the 'standard model citizen', who looked like the average man ahead of businesses and was also the core consumer of strategic goods and the man who made politics. Technology, like politics, healthcare and almost everything else one can consume has been created or adapted to fit the particular interest of a certain profile who controls the economic life, even though is not numerically as representative in society as the others. As a consequence of bias, the more distant one falls from the tree of the 'standard model citizen', the less one feels contemplated by corporate decisions and public policies. Bringing compelling evidence that the past, the present and the future have been designed to perpetuate the minority gap, I present alternatives for inclusive public policies that have been conceived by important economists in areas like public spending an intellectual property and show how antitrust policy has also been a victim of a biased understanding of consumers and how that mistake has affected decisions in antitrust cases in the past. Finally, I draft adaptations that might be needed to correct the biased consumer approach and create inclusive decision-making.","PeriodicalId":327488,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Antitrust Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116893754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"You Must Roll 18 or Higher for Your Claims to Succeed: Common Law Trademarks, Unauthorized Merchandise, and the Podcast 'The Adventure Zone'","authors":"M. Reida","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3684935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3684935","url":null,"abstract":"Justin, Travis, and Griffin McElroy are among the people who found notoriety and fame during the podcast boom of the 2010s. In addition to their main podcast, “My Brother, My Brother and Me,” thousands of people listen to their tabletop role playing game podcast, “The Adventure Zone,” which they make with their father, Clint. “The Adventure Zone” has been adapted into a graphic novel and a streaming television adaptation is in development. \u0000 \u0000With this comes fans who show their love for the podcast through fan art, some of which is sold online. The McElroys have stated they do not want fans selling items based on their podcasts, although presently have not taken any legal action against fans. The McElroys are one example of people who have become extraordinarily successful because of their podcasts and have reason to protect their creation. \u0000 \u0000Using trademark law, I examine if the McElroys have any legal recourse for infringement. As they do not have any registered trademarks, all possible issues are examined as common law trademarks. The McElroys’ ability to protect characters, as well as items appearing in the podcast, as marks varies depending on the storyline of “The Adventure Zone.” \u0000 \u0000The McElroys and other podcast creators have varying levels of protection for elements of podcasts used as marks. The idea there is broad legal recourse seems like an empty threat made against fan artists. Further, the idea of “bad faith” appears both in trademark infringement and unfair competition. With the statements made by the McElroys, they have presented all people selling unlicensed merchandise as acting in bad faith. This runs contrary to the very roots of artistic expression and courts indiscriminately finding for podcast hosts could harm the delicate relationship between podcast hosts and fans, as well as the ability for fans to interpret and share their love of a property.","PeriodicalId":327488,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Antitrust Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131966611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Objectivity of the Concept of Presumed State Aid and The Problem of Deficient Circumstantial Interpretation","authors":"C. Gouvêa","doi":"10.21552/estal/2020/1/8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21552/estal/2020/1/8","url":null,"abstract":"In its judgment in Case T-791/16 Real Madrid Club de Fútbol v European Commission, the Court of Justice annulled the Commission Decision on aid measure SA.33754. The judgment allowed the rekindling, from the perspective of political science, of the discussions surrounding what represents the semantic definition of State aid, granted by the States or coming from State resources. The innovation brought by the European Commission was to establish a new subcategory for the term - presumed State aid. We discuss whether this type of aid can be fitted into the control by and decisional standards of the European Commission from a purely objective standpoint. The judgment leads us to reflect on the role played by the Commission regarding the evolution of the concept of State aid. However, this evolution, as an update of the directions of Article 107(1) TFEU, must take into consideration a methodology that necessarily goes through a path aimed at the market analysis based on the economic and social context of the State in question. The answer must be in accordance with the objectives and purposes of Community law and this does not represent a literal exegesis of the legal text.","PeriodicalId":327488,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Antitrust Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"689 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131927638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taking It With You: Platform Barriers to Entry and the Limits of Data Portability","authors":"Gabriel Nicholas","doi":"10.36645/mtlr.27.2.taking","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36645/mtlr.27.2.taking","url":null,"abstract":"Policymakers are faced with a vexing problem: how to increase competition in a tech sector dominated by a few giants. One answer proposed and adopted by regulators in the United States and abroad is to require large platforms to allow consumers to move their data from one platform to another, an approach known as data portability. Facebook, Google, Apple, and other major tech companies have enthusiastically supported data portability through their own technical and political initiatives. Today, data portability has taken hold as one of the go-to solutions to address the tech industry’s competition concerns.\u0000\u0000This Article argues that despite the regulatory and industry alliance around data portability, today’s public and private data portability efforts are unlikely to meaningfully improve competition. This is because current portability efforts focus solely on mitigating switching costs, ignoring other barriers to entry that may preclude new platforms from entering the market. The technical implementations of data portability encouraged by existing regulation—namely one-off exports and API interoperability—address switching costs but not the barriers of network effects, unique data access, and economies of scale. This Article proposes a new approach to better alleviate these other barriers called collective portability, which would allow groups of users to coordinate to transfer data they share to a new platform, all at once. Although not a panacea, collective portability would provide a meaningful alternative to existing approaches while avoiding both the privacy/competitive utility trade off of one-off exports and the hard-to regulate power dynamics of APIs.","PeriodicalId":327488,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Antitrust Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130016400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Record of Weak U.S. Merger Enforcement in Big Tech","authors":"Diana L. Moss","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3417978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3417978","url":null,"abstract":"The term “Big Tech” is often used to describe the five largest multinational online service or computer hardware and software companies: Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. These companies hold five of the top six slots, by market value, for publicly traded firms. The growth of Big Tech over the past three decades is a function of numerous forces. These range from economic phenomena such as network effects and winner-take-all markets, organic growth resulting from innovative business models and technologies, to expansion through a series of acquisitions of smaller, potential, or nascent rivals. \u0000 \u0000While Big Tech has undoubtedly produced benefits, significant concerns have coalesced around it. The growth of Big Tech has created controversy over the companies’ role in our society and raised a suite of competition issues that are attracting attention from Congress and enforcers. These include effects on innovation and market entry; incentives to compete on price and non-price dimensions of competition such as privacy; and the potential for artificial intelligence-driven algorithmic pricing to facilitate coordinated conduct. The debate over the size and alleged dominance of Big Tech companies has promoted wideranging proposals to use the antitrust laws to break them up. But few of these proposals are driven by a methodological, fact-based analysis. Such analysis would explore the strategic competitive abilities and incentives that are specific to different Big Tech business models, how the companies compete in a variety of individual markets and clusters of related markets, and how alleged conduct potentially runs afoul of the U.S. antitrust laws. Breakup proposals therefore “put the cart before the horse” and fail to provide needed support for more vigorous antitrust enforcement and beneficial reform proposals. \u0000 \u0000This American Antitrust Institute (AAI) White Paper offers a fact-based analysis of one important component of a broader assessment of the competitive issues surrounding Big Tech. It focuses on Big Tech’s acquisition of over 720 smaller, potential, and nascent rivals over almost the last three decades. \u0000 \u0000As is typical of M&A activity, only a portion of these transactions were reportable to the U.S. antitrust agencies under the Hart Scott Rodino Act (HSR) federal premerger reporting requirements.8 A closer look at enforcement data for one major Big Tech industry category reveals that while the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) appear to have subjected a higher than average number of transactions to more extensive agency investigation, only one deal has been challenged in federal court. It does not come as a surprise therefore that the record of U.S. merger enforcement in an important Big Tech industry category is far lower than the record across all sectors, as defined by the rate of merger challenges in federal court. This statistic warrants further inquiry. This White Paper does not investiga","PeriodicalId":327488,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Antitrust Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115525793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Losing the ‘One-Stop-Shop’: The Real Cost of a Dual UK/EU Merger Process Post Brexit","authors":"Sarah Long, G. Robert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3299017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3299017","url":null,"abstract":"Following Brexit, if the UK is no longer a member of the European Economic Area, then there will be no ‘one stop shop’ for mergers at the EU level and a separate merger review may need to be carried out in the UK. This means merger notifications may be required in both the EU and the UK. This would result in a significant increase in transaction costs, time and administration, in addition to the risk of potential uncertainty as companies face possibly divergent or inconsistent decisions.","PeriodicalId":327488,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Antitrust Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132343043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Innovation Theory of Harm: An Appraisal","authors":"V. Denicoló, Michele Polo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3146731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3146731","url":null,"abstract":"In its recent decision on the Dow-DuPont case, the European Commission has adopted an innovation theory of harm (IToH), which holds that even horizontal mergers whose static effects are benign may be regarded as anticompetitive in a dynamic perspective, as mergers generally stifle innovation. This paper critically assesses the IToH, arguing that its theoretical foundations are too fragile to be the basis for radical policy changes. Antitrust authorities and the courts should continue to consider the impact of horizontal mergers on innovation, bearing in mind that the effect can go either way.","PeriodicalId":327488,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Antitrust Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128143850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Enquiry Meet for the Case: Decision Theory, Presumptions, and Evidentiary Burdens in Formulating Antitrust Legal Standards","authors":"S. Salop","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3068157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3068157","url":null,"abstract":"Presumptions have an important role in antitrust jurisprudence. This article suggests that a careful formulation of the relevant presumptions and associated evidentiary rebuttal burdens can provide the “enquiry meet for the case” across a large array of narrow categories of conduct confronted in antitrust to create a type of “meta” rule of reason. The article begins this project by using decision theory to analyze the types and properties of antitrust presumptions and evidentiary rebuttal burdens and the relationship between them. Depending on the category of conduct and market structure conditions, antitrust presumptions lie along a continuum from conclusive (irrebuttable) anticompetitive, to rebuttable anticompetitive, to competitively neutral, and on to rebuttable procompetitive and conclusive (irrebuttable) procompetitive presumptions. A key source of these presumptions is the likely competitive effects inferred from market conditions. Other sources are policy-based - deterrence policy concerns and overarching policies involving the goals and premises of antitrust jurisprudence. Rebuttal evidence can either undermine the facts on which the presumptions are based or can provide other evidence to offset the competitive effects likely implied by the presumption. The evidentiary burden to rebut a presumption depends on the strength of the presumption and the availability and reliability of further case-specific evidence. These twin determinants can be combined and understood through the lens of Bayesian decision theory to explain how “the quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances.” The stronger the presumption and less reliable the case-specific evidence in signaling whether the conduct is anticompetitive versus procompetitive, the more difficult it will be for the disfavored party to satisfy the evidentiary burden to rebut the presumption. The evidentiary rebuttal burden generally is a burden of production, but also can involve the burden of persuasion, as with the original Philadelphia National Bank structural presumption, or typical procompetitive presumptions. If a presumption is rebutted with sufficient offsetting evidence to avoid an initial judgment, the presumption generally continues to carry some weakened weight in the post-rebuttal phase of the decision process. That is, a thumb remains on the scale. However, if the presumption is undermined, it is discredited and it carries no weight in the post-rebuttal decision process. The article uses this methodology to analyze various antitrust presumptions. It also analyzes the, burden-shifting rule of reason and suggests that the elements should not be rigidly sequenced in the decision process. The article also begins the project of reviewing, revising and refining existing antitrust presumptions with proposed revisions and refinements in a number of areas. The article invites other commentators to join the project by criticizing these proposals and suggesting others. These ","PeriodicalId":327488,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Antitrust Law & Policy (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129009255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}