Berkeley Business Law Journal最新文献_第4页

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 消费者金融保护局:2010年多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案的第十章

Berkeley Business Law Journal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.15779/Z38J57B

Gail Hillebrand

引用次数: 9

Prime Property Institutions for Subprime Era: Towards Innovative Models of Homeownership 次贷时代的主要房地产机构:对房屋所有权的创新模式

Berkeley Business Law Journal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.15779/Z38BP39

Benito Arruñada, Amnon Lehavi

{"title":"Prime Property Institutions for Subprime Era: Towards Innovative Models of Homeownership","authors":"Benito Arruñada, Amnon Lehavi","doi":"10.15779/Z38BP39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38BP39","url":null,"abstract":"This Article breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and other types of public financing schemes, we suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such as timeand place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the economic and legal institution of homeownership: a forprofit shared equity scheme led by local governments alongside a private market shared equity model, one of \"bootstrapping home buying with purchase options. \" t Benito Arruiada is a professor at the Department of Economics and Business, Pompeu Fabra University and Barcelona GSE. Amnon Lehavi is Chair, Real Estate Studies, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, and a visiting professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. For most helpful information and advice, we are indebted to Michael Brown, John Davis, Robert Ellickson, Lee Fennell, Allison Handler, Roz Greenstein, Fernando P. Mdndez Gonzilez, Steven Shavell, and participants of the 2010 annual meeting of the Canadian Law and Economics Association held at the University of Toronto. Arrufiada acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant EC02008-01116. Berkeley Business Law Journal","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122120533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Klein and the Contradictions of Corporations Law 克莱因与公司法的矛盾

Berkeley Business Law Journal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.15779/Z38XG5Q

Stewart Macaulay

引用次数: 1

The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It 我们所知的证券欺诈集体诉讼的终结

Berkeley Business Law Journal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.15779/Z38700F

R. Booth

{"title":"The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It","authors":"R. Booth","doi":"10.15779/Z38700F","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38700F","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I argue that securities fraud class actions (\"SFCAs \") should not be treated as class actions but rather should be treated as derivative actions. In addition, I argue that such actions should be dismissed unless it appears that insiders (including the company itselj have gained from trading during the fraud period. Both of these conclusions are based on the fundamental argument that (1) securities law seeks to protect the interests of reasonable investors, (2) reasonable investors diversify, and (3) diversified investors are effectively protected against the supposed financial harms of securities fraud by virtue of being diversified, except in cases in which insiders have extracted gains by trading during the fraud period. Only those actions that involve insider trading or the equivalent by directors, officers, or agents of the defendant company (or the company itselJ) cause genuine financial harm to the plaintiff class, because only those actions involve an extraction of wealth from the public market. SFCAs visit serious collateral damage on defendant companies, ultimately reducing investor return. In an action based on failure to disclose bad news, the prospect of payout will cause stock price to fall by more than it otherwise would-even in a perfectly efficient market-and will trigger a positive feedback mechanism that will magnify the potential payout. It is easy to fix the feedback problem. If the case does not involve insider extraction of gains, it should be dismissed. If the case does involve insider extraction of gains, it should be litigated in the name of the corporation, and the corporation should recover any gain extracted by insiders. Treating a securities fraud action as an action by the corporation will make stockholders whole and will avoid collateral damage to the issuer corporation. t Marbury Research Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Berkeley Business Law Journal Vol. 4.1, 2007","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121663921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

The Effect of Mandatory Disclosure on Open-Market Repurchases 强制性信息披露对公开市场回购的影响

Berkeley Business Law Journal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.15779/Z384W08

M. Simkovic

{"title":"The Effect of Mandatory Disclosure on Open-Market Repurchases","authors":"M. Simkovic","doi":"10.15779/Z384W08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z384W08","url":null,"abstract":"Publicly traded companies distribute cash to shareholders either through dividends or through anonymous repurchases of the companies' own stock on the open market. Companies must announce a repurchase authorization but do not actually have to repurchase any stock, and until recently companies did not have to disclose whether or not they were in fact repurchasing any stock. Scholars and regulators noticed that companies frequently announced repurchases but then appeared not to complete them. They feared that such announcements might be used by insiders to exploit public investors. To reduce opportunities for exploitive behavior, the SEC required that companies disclose their repurchase activity in their quarterly filings beginning in January 2004. This Article tracks 365 repurchase programs announced in 2004 and finds that, since the SEC disclosure requirement went into effect, companies are more likely to complete their announced repurchases and do so within a shorter time period after the repurchase announcement. Michael Simkovic will be a professor at Seton Hall Law School starting in Fall 2010. He authored this article as a John M. Olin Fellow in Law and Economics at Harvard Law School. He thanks the School's John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business for its generous support. He also thanks his faculty advisor, Guhan Subramanian, for his guidance. Finally, he thanks his research assistants, Victoria Salisbury, Laura Dauban, Ian J. Pohl, Yifei Chen, Joshua Reilly, and Winnie Nip for their assistance gathering and coding data. The views expressed are those of Michael Simkovic and do not reflect the views of Harvard Law School, the Olin Center, or any other organization. Email: msimkovic@gmail.com. Mobile Phone: 516-423-9187. Effect of Mandatory Disclosure on Open-Market Stock Repurchases","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115742797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 14

Money Market Funds - Preserving Systemic Benefits, Minimizing Systemic Risks 货币市场基金——保持系统收益，降低系统风险

Berkeley Business Law Journal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.15779/Z38FG32

M. Perlow

引用次数: 0

Shareholder Proposals: A Catalyst for Climate Change-Related Disclosure, Analysis, and Action 股东提案:气候变化相关信息披露、分析和行动的催化剂

Berkeley Business Law Journal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.15779/Z386003

Elise N. Rindfleisch

引用次数: 8

The New World of Risk for Corporate Attorneys and Their Boards Post-Sarbanes-Oxley: An Assessment of Impact and a Prescription for Action 萨班斯-奥克斯利法案后公司律师及其董事会的风险新世界:影响评估和行动处方

Berkeley Business Law Journal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.15779/Z38587P

Beverley H. Earle, G. A. Madek

{"title":"The New World of Risk for Corporate Attorneys and Their Boards Post-Sarbanes-Oxley: An Assessment of Impact and a Prescription for Action","authors":"Beverley H. Earle, G. A. Madek","doi":"10.15779/Z38587P","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38587P","url":null,"abstract":"This Article develops a theory that sheds light on recent evidence that shows that high-quality issuers antitakeover adopt defenses during an IPO, and keys this behavior to the existing literature on private benefits of control. The Article then analyzes the decision of the pre-IPO owners concerning takeover defenses. Their decision is shown to be influenced by the quality of the venture that goes public. High quality in firms that go public often means an abundance of growth and business opportunities, rather than sizeable existing assets. In such ventures, managers are unlikely to consume many harmful control benefits. Nevertheless, managers derive a great deal of non-monetary control benefits from their stint in the promising entity. Consequently, takeover defenses help the pre-IPO owners to preserve their non-monetary control benefits without causing too much harm to the value of the enterprise. This Article also shows that even if we take as given the conventional assumption that antitakeover defenses are harmful to shareholders, the inimical influence of takeover defenses is hard to trace since the issuers that adopt them are those whose antitakeover charter provisions' influence is the least harmful. Finding a matching sample for the adopting issuers, as some have tried before, may therefore be an impossible task. This Article thus considers possible extensions that result from complications of asymmetric information, and concludes with the perils of federal intervention.","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130953257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

The Impact of Regulatory Initiatives on Liquidity for Venture-Backed Companies 监管举措对风险投资公司流动性的影响

Berkeley Business Law Journal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.15779/Z389K47

S. Bochner

引用次数: 1

In Re Qwest Communications International, Inc.: The Tenth Circuit Hangs up the Phone on Qwest's Petition for Selective Waiver, but the Line Is Not Dead 在奎斯特国际通信公司案中:第十巡回法院挂断了奎斯特的选择性豁免申请，但电话并没有挂断

Berkeley Business Law Journal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.15779/Z38FC65

S. Gomm

引用次数: 0