Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献

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Session details: Session 10A: TOR 会话详情:会话10A: TOR
Esfandiar Mohammadi
{"title":"Session details: Session 10A: TOR","authors":"Esfandiar Mohammadi","doi":"10.1145/3285897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3285897","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":322687,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"196 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132747182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Session details: Session 3D: ML 2 会话详细信息:会话3D: ML
N. Gong
{"title":"Session details: Session 3D: ML 2","authors":"N. Gong","doi":"10.1145/3285872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3285872","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":322687,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127637218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Security of the PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Scheme pkcs# 1 v1.5签名方案的安全性研究
Tibor Jager, Saqib A. Kakvi, Alexander May
{"title":"On the Security of the PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Scheme","authors":"Tibor Jager, Saqib A. Kakvi, Alexander May","doi":"10.1145/3243734.3243798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243798","url":null,"abstract":"The RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm is the most widely used digital signature scheme in practice. Its two main strengths are its extreme simplicity, which makes it very easy to implement, and that verification of signatures is significantly faster than for DSA or ECDSA. Despite the huge practical importance of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, providing formal evidence for their security based on plausible cryptographic hardness assumptions has turned out to be very difficult. Therefore the most recent version of PKCS#1 (RFC 8017) even recommends a replacement the more complex and less efficient scheme RSA-PSS, as it is provably secure and therefore considered more robust. The main obstacle is that RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures use a deterministic padding scheme, which makes standard proof techniques not applicable. We introduce a new technique that enables the first security proof for RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures. We prove full existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA) under the standard RSA assumption. Furthermore, we give a tight proof under the Phi-Hiding assumption. These proofs are in the random oracle model and the parameters deviate slightly from the standard use, because we require a larger output length of the hash function. However, we also show how RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures can be instantiated in practice such that our security proofs apply. In order to draw a more complete picture of the precise security of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, we also give security proofs in the standard model, but with respect to weaker attacker models (key-only attacks) and based on known complexity assumptions. The main conclusion of our work is that from a provable security perspective RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 can be safely used, if the output length of the hash function is chosen appropriately.","PeriodicalId":322687,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125643100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Session details: Session 1D: ML for Deanonymization 会话详细信息:会话1D: ML用于去匿名化
N. Borisov
{"title":"Session details: Session 1D: ML for Deanonymization","authors":"N. Borisov","doi":"10.1145/3285864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3285864","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":322687,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116352068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
11th International Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (AISec 2018) 第十一届人工智能与安全国际研讨会(AISec 2018)
Sadia Afroz, B. Biggio, Y. Elovici, D. Freeman, A. Shabtai
{"title":"11th International Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (AISec 2018)","authors":"Sadia Afroz, B. Biggio, Y. Elovici, D. Freeman, A. Shabtai","doi":"10.1145/3243734.3243872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243872","url":null,"abstract":"BACKGROUND Artificial Intelligence (AI), and Machine Learning (ML) in particular, provide a set of useful analytic and decision-making techniques that are being leveraged by an ever-growing community of practitioners, including applications with security-sensitive elements. However, while security researchers often utilize such techniques to address problems and AI/ML researchers develop techniques for big-data analytics applications, neither community devotes much attention to the other. Within security research, AI/ML components are often regarded as black-box solvers. Conversely, the learning community seldom considers the security/privacy implications entailed in the application of their algorithms when designing them. While these two communities generally focus on different issues, where these two fields do meet, interesting problems appear. Researchers working in the intersection have already raised many novel questions for both communities and created a new branch of research known as secure learning. The past few years have particularly seen increasing interest within the AISec / Secure Learning community. There are several reasons for this surge. Firstly, machine learning, data mining, and other artificial intelligence technologies play a key role in extracting knowledge, situational awareness, and security intelligence from Big Data. Secondly, companies like Google, Amazon and Splunk are increasingly exploring and deploying learning technologies to address Big Data problems for their customers. Finally, these trends are increasingly exposing companies and their customers/users to","PeriodicalId":322687,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115358006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Privacy-Preserving Dynamic Learning of Tor Network Traffic Tor网络流量的隐私保护动态学习
Rob Jansen, Matthew Traudt, Nicholas Hopper
{"title":"Privacy-Preserving Dynamic Learning of Tor Network Traffic","authors":"Rob Jansen, Matthew Traudt, Nicholas Hopper","doi":"10.1145/3243734.3243815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243815","url":null,"abstract":"Experimentation tools facilitate exploration of Tor performance and security research problems and allow researchers to safely and privately conduct Tor experiments without risking harm to real Tor users. However, researchers using these tools configure them to generate network traffic based on simplifying assumptions and outdated measurements and without understanding the efficacy of their configuration choices. In this work, we design a novel technique for dynamically learning Tor network traffic models using hidden Markov modeling and privacy-preserving measurement techniques. We conduct a safe but detailed measurement study of Tor using 17 relays (~2% of Tor bandwidth) over the course of 6 months, measuring general statistics and models that can be used to generate a sequence of streams and packets. We show how our measurement results and traffic models can be used to generate traffic flows in private Tor networks and how our models are more realistic than standard and alternative network traffic generation~methods.","PeriodicalId":322687,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133561513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
An End-to-End System for Large Scale P2P MPC-as-a-Service and Low-Bandwidth MPC for Weak Participants 大规模P2P MPC-as-a- service和弱参与者低带宽MPC的端到端系统
A. Barak, M. Hirt, Lior Koskas, Yehuda Lindell
{"title":"An End-to-End System for Large Scale P2P MPC-as-a-Service and Low-Bandwidth MPC for Weak Participants","authors":"A. Barak, M. Hirt, Lior Koskas, Yehuda Lindell","doi":"10.1145/3243734.3243801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243801","url":null,"abstract":"Protocols for secure multiparty computation enable a set of parties to compute a joint function of their inputs, while preserving privacy, correctness and more. In theory, secure computation has broad applicability and can be used to solve many of the modern concerns around utilization of data and privacy. Huge steps have been made towards this vision in the past few years, and we now have protocols that can carry out large computations extremely efficiently, especially in the setting of an honest majority. However, in practice, there are still major barriers to widely deploying secure computation, especially in a decentralized manner. In this paper, we present the first end-to-end automated system for deploying large-scale MPC protocols between end users, called MPSaaS (for MPC system-as-a-service ). Our system enables parties to pre-enroll in an upcoming MPC computation, and then participate by either running software on a VM instance (e.g., in Amazon), or by running the protocol on a mobile app, in Javascript in their browser, or even on an IoT device. Our system includes an automation system for deploying MPC protocols, an administration component for setting up an MPC computation and inviting participants, and an end-user component for running the MPC protocol in realistic end-user environments. We demonstrate our system for a specific application of running secure polls and surveys, where the secure computation is run end-to-end with each party actually running the protocol (i.e., without relying on a set of servers to run the protocol for them). This is the first such system constructed, and is a big step forward to the goal of commoditizing MPC. One of the cryptographic difficulties that arise in this type of setting is due to the fact that end users may have low bandwidth connections, making it a challenge to run an MPC protocol with high bandwidth. We therefore present a protocol based on Beerliova-Trubiniova and Hirt (TCC 2008) with many optimizations, that has very low concrete communication, and the lowest published for small fields. Our protocol is secure as long as less than a third of the parties are malicious, and is well suited for computing both arithmetic and Boolean circuits. We call our protocol HyperMPC and show that it has impressive performance. In particular, 150 parties can compute statistics---mean, standard deviation and regression---on 4,000,000 inputs (with a circuit of size 16,000,000 gates of which 6,000,000 are multiplication) in just 45 seconds, and 150 parties can compute a circuit over GF[28] (which can be used for a Boolean computation) with 1,000,000 multiplication gates and depth-20 in just 2 seconds. Although our end-to-end system can be used to run any MPC protocol (and we have incorporated numerous protocols already), we demonstrate it for our new protocol that is optimized for end-users without~high~bandwidth.","PeriodicalId":322687,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"430 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115273390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 37
Compressing Vector OLE 压缩向量OLE
Elette Boyle, Geoffroy Couteau, N. Gilboa, Y. Ishai
{"title":"Compressing Vector OLE","authors":"Elette Boyle, Geoffroy Couteau, N. Gilboa, Y. Ishai","doi":"10.1145/3243734.3243868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243868","url":null,"abstract":"Oblivious linear-function evaluation (OLE) is a secure two-party protocol allowing a receiver to learn any linear combination of a pair of field elements held by a sender. OLE serves as a common building block for secure computation of arithmetic circuits, analogously to the role of oblivious transfer (OT) for boolean circuits. A useful extension of OLE is vector OLE (VOLE), allowing the receiver to learn any linear combination of two vectors held by the sender. In several applications of OLE, one can replace a large number of instances of OLE by a smaller number of instances of VOLE. This motivates the goal of amortizing the cost of generating long instances of VOLE. We suggest a new approach for fast generation of pseudo-random instances of VOLE via a deterministic local expansion of a pair of short correlated seeds and no interaction. This provides the first example of compressing a non-trivial and cryptographically useful correlation with good concrete efficiency. Our VOLE generators can be used to enhance the efficiency of a host of cryptographic applications. These include secure arithmetic computation and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs with reusable preprocessing. Our VOLE generators are based on a novel combination of function secret sharing (FSS) for multi-point functions and linear codes in which decoding is intractable. Their security can be based on variants of the learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption over large fields that resist known attacks. We provide several constructions that offer tradeoffs between different efficiency measures and the underlying intractability assumptions.","PeriodicalId":322687,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127110404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 114
Pride and Prejudice in Progressive Web Apps: Abusing Native App-like Features in Web Applications 渐进式Web应用中的傲慢与偏见:在Web应用中滥用类似原生应用的功能
Jiyeon Lee, Hayeon Kim, Junghwan Park, I. Shin, Sooel Son
{"title":"Pride and Prejudice in Progressive Web Apps: Abusing Native App-like Features in Web Applications","authors":"Jiyeon Lee, Hayeon Kim, Junghwan Park, I. Shin, Sooel Son","doi":"10.1145/3243734.3243867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243867","url":null,"abstract":"Progressive Web App (PWA) is a new generation of Web application designed to provide native app-like browsing experiences even when a browser is offline. PWAs make full use of new HTML5 features which include push notification, cache, and service worker to provide short-latency and rich Web browsing experiences. We conduct the first systematic study of the security and privacy aspects unique to PWAs. We identify security flaws in main browsers as well as design flaws in popular third-party push services, that exacerbate the phishing risk. We introduce a new side-channel attack that infers the victim's history of visited PWAs. The proposed attack exploits the offline browsing feature of PWAs using a cache. We demonstrate a cryptocurrency mining attack which abuses service workers. Defenses and recommendations to mitigate the identified security and privacy risks are suggested with in-depth understanding.","PeriodicalId":322687,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126061473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 32
AIM-SDN: Attacking Information Mismanagement in SDN-datastores AIM-SDN:攻击sdn数据存储中的信息管理不当
V. Dixit, Adam Doupé, Yan Shoshitaishvili, Ziming Zhao, Gail-Joon Ahn
{"title":"AIM-SDN: Attacking Information Mismanagement in SDN-datastores","authors":"V. Dixit, Adam Doupé, Yan Shoshitaishvili, Ziming Zhao, Gail-Joon Ahn","doi":"10.1145/3243734.3243799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243799","url":null,"abstract":"Network Management is a critical process for an enterprise to configure and monitor the network devices using cost effective methods. It is imperative for it to be robust and free from adversarial or accidental security flaws. With the advent of cloud computing and increasing demands for centralized network control, conventional management protocols like SNMP appear inadequate and newer techniques like NMDA and NETCONF have been invented. However, unlike SNMP which underwent improvements concentrating on security, the new data management and storage techniques have not been scrutinized for the inherent security flaws. In this paper, we identify several vulnerabilities in the widely used critical infrastructures which leverage the Network Management Datastore Architecture design (NMDA). Software Defined Networking (SDN), a proponent of NMDA, heavily relies on its datastores to program and manage the network. We base our research on the security challenges put forth by the existing datastore's design as implemented by the SDN controllers. The vulnerabilities identified in this work have a direct impact on the controllers like OpenDayLight, Open Network Operating System and their proprietary implementations (by CISCO, Ericsson, RedHat, Brocade, Juniper, etc). Using our threat detection methodology, we demonstrate how the NMDA-based implementations are vulnerable to attacks which compromise availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the network. We finally propose defense measures to address the security threats in the existing design and discuss the challenges faced while employing these countermeasures.","PeriodicalId":322687,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125377242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22
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