{"title":"Wage Elasticity and the Short-Run Productivity Puzzle","authors":"Robert James","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2765072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2765072","url":null,"abstract":"Perfect competition implies stage two production for labor, where increased employment lowers productivity and decreased employment increases productivity. In contrast, empirical studies of individual firms and macroeconomic studies of the business cycle have document pro-cyclical productivity. This paper explains this productivity puzzle. Specifically, it is shown that recent estimates of the wage elasticity of labor supply to a firm (Manning, 2003, Booth and Katic, 2010, Depew and Sorensen, 2013, and others) are consistent with stage one production for labor with pro-cyclical productivity. It is also shown that in a two resource economy, pro-cyclical productivity implies stage three production for capital and a negative marginal product of capital. It is argued that both stage one production for labor and stage three production for capital have important policy implications.","PeriodicalId":321011,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Perfect Competition (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123767255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"New Firm Entry in the Presence of Network Effects","authors":"Zhiyuan Chen, Xiaoying Liang, Lei Xie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2571178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2571178","url":null,"abstract":"We show that in the presence of network effects, the effect of new firm entry on the equilibrium prices and demands of incumbent firms is not clear. In contrast to conventional thinking, we find that incumbent firms could use a higher price, have a larger demand, and earn a higher profit in the new Nash equilibrium. These perverse results arise from the fact that in the event of new firm entry, network effects can create unbalanced demand transfers between incumbent firms, and some incumbent firms can actually benefit from new entry.","PeriodicalId":321011,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Perfect Competition (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125326791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Perfect Competition and Sustainability – A Brief Note","authors":"Dodo J. Thampapillai","doi":"10.1108/03068291011038963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/03068291011038963","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose - Perfect competition (PC), despite its abstract nature, is central to the literature on shadow prices and remains an important benchmark in economic policy analysis. Adding sustainability to the conditions of PC, results in a meaningful benchmark, especially in the context of pursuing sustainability as a policy goal. On this basis, some standard explanations involving the comparisons with imperfect competition can be questioned. But, importantly the recognition of sustainability besides the standard conditions of PC provides the basis for expositing voluntary environmental stewardship. This paper aims to address these issues. Design/methodology/approach - The paper focuses on PC and sustainability (PCS) and PC and PCS vs monopoly. Findings - The implications of this simple analysis are at least three-fold. First, in the sphere of applied economics and policy analysis, PC has served as an important benchmark – especially in the shadow pricing literature dealing with project appraisal and cost-benefit analysis. The main argument in this paper is that PCS would prove to be a better benchmark because it would facilitate the choice of decisions that would satisfy the criteria for sustainability. Second, the recognition PCS prompts the reassessment of comparisons with imperfect market organizations such as monopoly. Within an unregulated context, monopolies, if able to exploit economies of scale, can expand output beyond the limits dictated by PC and PCS and hence compromise the possibilities of sustainability. Finally, and more importantly, the introduction of PCS as a benchmark enables the exposition of voluntary stewardship as a potential measure towards sustainability. Originality/value - The paper offers insights into PCS.","PeriodicalId":321011,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Perfect Competition (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130232877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}