{"title":"Relational Egalitarianism","authors":"K. Lippert‐Rasmussen","doi":"10.1017/9781316675847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316675847","url":null,"abstract":"Derek Parfit famously introduced a now commonly adopted distinction between telic and deontic distributive egalitarianism. This chapter argues that we can draw a similar distinction between telic and deontic relational egalitarianism. Interestingly, telic relational egalitarianism might be less vulnerable to the levelling-down objection than telic distributive egalitarianism. However, while some relational egalitarian concerns are best captured by telic relational egalitarianism, other concerns are better captured by deontic relational egalitarianism and yet others relating to intergenerational justice are better captured by telic distributive egalitarianism. Accordingly, insofar as we are egalitarians, we should be pluralist egalitarians in a more thoroughgoing way than Parfit entertained.","PeriodicalId":314931,"journal":{"name":"Principles and Persons","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132114717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nonlegislative Justification","authors":"L. Murphy","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192893994.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893994.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"If moral theorists who otherwise disagree, all approach moral theorizing as a search for a set of desirable moral principles for the general regulation of behavior, then there is a sense in which they are all, as Parfit says, climbing the same mountain. But it is the wrong mountain. Morality should not be understood as hypothetical legislation; it is a mistake to set about constructing morality as if we were making law. Real legislators evaluate possible legal rules by considering the effects they would have. They can do this because enforcement and acceptance of law ensure a high level of compliance. Moral legislators have no reason to assume any particular level of acceptance; the effects of counterfactual acceptance of a principle are not morally relevant. The argument targets rule consequentialism and Scanlon’s official version of contractualism. The paper begins in a positive mode by arguing that a nonlegislative version of Scanlon’s approach, that seeks justification for conduct of such-and-such a kind in such-and-such circumstances by comparing the reasons in favor and the reasons others have to object, is a very attractive way to think about what we owe to each other.","PeriodicalId":314931,"journal":{"name":"Principles and Persons","volume":"33 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125852327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Separating Persons","authors":"James Goodrich","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192893994.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893994.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues for a reductionist view of persons and that our ethical thinking should become more impersonal. While doing so, he argues that we may need to give up some widely shared intuitions about the Separateness of Persons and all of those views which crucially hinge upon it. However, this chapter argues that Parfit was mistaken. His reductionist views of persons and his more general claim that our ethical thinking should become more impersonal are in fact compatible with several plausible interpretations of the Separateness of Persons. Parfit’s project in Reasons and Persons should thus be understood not as undermining the Separateness of Persons, but as transforming our understanding of it. The chapter closes by considering the degree to which Parfit had reason by his own lights to accept some version of the Separateness of Persons.","PeriodicalId":314931,"journal":{"name":"Principles and Persons","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128589490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"More Supererogatory","authors":"T. Hurka, Evangeline Tsagarakis","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192893994.003.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893994.003.0022","url":null,"abstract":"If acts can be supererogatory, presumably some can be more supererogatory than others, or further beyond the call of duty. This paper explains how this is possible within a general account of supererogation that sees it arising when a prima facie duty, for example to promote other people’s good, is outweighed by a prima facie permission to promote one’s own good. An act is then more supererogatory when the permission outweighs the duty by more, or when the gap between its strength and that of the duty’s is larger. The paper contrasts its permission-based account of supererogation with a more common one typified by Parfit in On What Matters, which rests it on a conflict between two ‘reasons’ that, despite their differing contents, are of the same deontic type and have the same favouring force. Alongside several other weaknesses, Parfit’s account doesn’t allow differing degrees of supererogation but must treat all supererogatory acts as on a par.","PeriodicalId":314931,"journal":{"name":"Principles and Persons","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133983937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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