Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans最新文献

{"title":"Review Article","authors":"S. Pavlowitch","doi":"10.1080/1461319032000062688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319032000062688","url":null,"abstract":"Two quotations strike me as symbols of Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman’s intelligent critique of nationalism. The first one, taken from Lewis Namier, is an epigraph to their preface. It concerns peasants from a district in western Galicia in the period of the 1848 upheavals who, when asked whether they were Poles, replied: ‘We are quiet folk.’ ‘Then are you Germans?’, the anecdote continues, to which they answered again: ‘We are decent folk’ (p. ix). The second relates to one of the more fashionable nationalisms of our time. The Catalan leader Pujol has defined as Catalan ‘everyone who lives and works in Catalonia and has the wish to be so’, while his wife is reported to have denounced ‘Muslim incomers who want to impose their culture on the region’ (p. 178). Having renounced nationalism, and all its pomps and vanities, Spencer and Wollman denounce the contradictions and pernicious consequences of linking nationalism to the programmes of liberals, conservatives, democrats, socialists, communists and feminists alike. They note that, appearances notwithstanding, the analytical literature about nationalism has become oddly uncritical of it. It has slipped from analysis to advocacy, with the excuse that nationalism is there, and has to be taken seriously. Marx had seen that Polish and Irish nationalism was ‘good’ to weaken Russian and British power, respectively. This inspired Lenin who understood the potential of ‘oppressed’ against ‘oppressor’ nationalism, and who left it to Stalin to define the nation. The latter’s pragmatic and arbitrary arrangements were meant to solve the ‘national question’ in Russia, and ultimately helped to facilitate the break-up of the Soviet Union on highly divisive national lines. Adapted by Tito to Yugoslavia, such arrangements contributed to the catastrophic consequences of the explosion of nationalism there in the early 1990s. That was the time when Spencer and Wollman began to think seriously about nationalism. Between then and the present book, they have already expressed the view that nationalism is a major threat to democracy, and that socialism, at least in its formerly ‘really-existing’ kind, far from suppressing nationalism, accommodated it and even fostered it (in T. Sfikas and C. Williams (eds), Ethnicity and Nationalism in East-Central Europe and the Balkans, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999).","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127970230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Albanians in Great Britain: Diasporic identity and experience in the educational perspective since 1990","authors":"Denisa Kostovicova","doi":"10.1080/1461319032000062651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319032000062651","url":null,"abstract":"The outbreak of inter-ethnic fighting in Kosovo in spring 1998 drew attention to the Albanians’ plight in the Serb-ruled province. However, it also gave unprecedented visibility to Albanians in Great Britain. In the course of 1998 and until June 1999 when the entry of the NATO troops to Kosovo ended the Serb dominance in the province, Albanians took to the streets of British cities to protest Serb violence, funded the Albanian armed resistance, and even joined the ranks of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to fight on the ground in an effort to overthrow the Serb rule. Yet, throughout the 1990s, prior to such intense demonstrations of its presence, the Albanian community in Great Britain expanded silently, while giving a crucial boost to non-violent resistance in the homeland with its loyal remittances. In the process, a motley of political émigrés, asylum seekers, economic migrants and refugees began to acquire a diasporan identity. The conflict in Kosovo heightened the sense of Albanians’ national self-awareness in Great Britain. It was translated into the utmost acts of long-distant nationalism, which, according to Srkbis, is ‘that type of nationalism that crosses neighbouring states and/or continents’. Its various forms are part and parcel of diasporic groups with a distinct sense of ethnicity whilst","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127975146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why nationalist discourse really matters: Two studies of Serbian nationalism","authors":"Veljko Vujacčić","doi":"10.1080/1461319032000062697","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319032000062697","url":null,"abstract":"The role of Serbian nationalism and Slobodan Milošević in Yugoslavia’s violent breakdown has been a favorite subject of debates about the causes of the wars of Yugoslav succession. Some scholars and journalists have attributed the ethnic cleansing campaigns in Croatia and Bosnia to the historically aggressive character of ‘greater Serbian nationalism’, detecting continuity between 19thcentury programs of Serbian unification and Serbia’s ‘war of conquest’ in the 1990s. Others have stressed the manipulative role of leaders like Milošević and Tudjman in deliberately fanning the flames of war in order to acquire, consolidate, and preserve power in the face of threatening rivals. A third group of explanations has emphasized the dramatic consequences of institutional breakdown in ethnically divided societies. Such institutional breakdown is said to lead the elites of different groups to advance mutually irreconcilable territorial claims and wage preventive war as a way of addressing the impending ‘security dilemma’ faced by their ethnic group. Whatever their merits, most of these explanations have one deficiency in common: the almost deliberate absence of a systematic analysis of the actual content of nationalist discourse in Serbia or the former Yugoslavia in the critical decade of the 1980s, of the biographical and sociological backgrounds of its intellectual carriers, its impact on political actors and public opinion, and its symbolic and mobilizing functions in the context of communism’s terminal crisis. It is as if the ideas of the intellectual carriers of contemporary nationalism did not really matter since the external observer can apply ‘superior’ historical insight or ‘rigorous’ social scientific theory in disregard of critical evidence. No one could ever win a lawsuit on this basis, but it does not seem to matter to those who advance ‘bold conjectures’ without putting much effort in understanding the actual, not simply assumed motives of the key actors. However, such understanding—in the Weberian sense of verstehen—is most needed precisely in the study of nationalism for the simple reason that each nationalism tells its own story. To understand the nationalist narrative in its historical context, therefore, is to understand the motivations of the Kulturträger","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123628392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Debates","authors":"V. Fouskas","doi":"10.1080/1461319032000062660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319032000062660","url":null,"abstract":"Any state’s foreign policy, including America’s, is constrained by a complex combination of external and domestic factors, which constitute the sources upon which the political classes elaborate their international and domestic strategies. Foreign policy per se is, or should be, the balanced refinement, political aesthetic and combined diplomatic projection of four fundamental components: the economic, the military, the ideological and the juridical/legal. Each component is relatively autonomous from the other, a fact that enables both an independent development of its ramifications (e.g. ‘economic diplomacy’, ‘defence diplomacy’, ‘coercive diplomacy’ and so on) and, if need be, a robust projection of integrated power, accompanied by an attempt to incorporate all four elements. This is basically what Carl Von Klauzewitz meant by his famous ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’. It is the weakness and/or lack (of combination) of the four main components of foreign policy that make non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-state organizations (e.g. the UN)—albeit successful in some humanitarian issues, charitable work and light peace-keeping—unable to project influence as coherently and dynamically as the modern state does. It is also interesting to note that the last two components, the ideological and juridical/legal, have somewhat to be a distorted image of reality, inasmuch as they were formed by the dominant classes in order to be manipulated by them and to legitimize actions based on their self-interests. ‘The task of political hegemony’, Terry Eagleton wrote back in 1990, ‘is to produce the very forms of subjecthood which will form the basis of political unity’. Law and ideology are, in the last analysis, reified commodities that tend to ‘regulate’ reality in order to mystify the real profile of forces operating along the lines of national and class interests. At times, the forms of law available happen not to satisfy these specific interests. Therefore, those who make the laws are often those who fail to abide by them.","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129964461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Approaches to political violence and terrorism in former Yugoslavia 1","authors":"F. Bieber","doi":"10.1080/1461319032000062642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319032000062642","url":null,"abstract":"Discusses political violence and terrorism in Yugoslavia caused by ethnic nationalism in the 1990s. Kinds of political conflict; Comparison of political violence with war and terrorism in Yugoslavia; Concept of terrorism and its presence in Southeastern Europe.","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123577931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Barriers to the transition of enterprises from central plan to market economy: The Balkan case","authors":"P. Liargovas, D. Chionis","doi":"10.1080/1461319022000021620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319022000021620","url":null,"abstract":"The post-communist countries still face enormously demanding challenges that encompass the rapid collapse of traditional markets, legal and institutional uncertainties regarding ownership and governance, rampant ination, cash ow blockages (e.g. the non-payment for goods delivered to customers and the widespread unavailability of bank and trade credit), the appearance of technologically and Žnancially superior global competitors from outside the region, lack of skills and of experience for operating in a market economy and workers and managers who are frightened, suspicious, or even hostile with respect to the monumental change required. This is also true for the Balkan region (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, FYR Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and FR Yugoslavia), which represents a region with a common set of problems and other characteristics. The magnitude of ethnic, political and economic problems that these countries are facing today within both the domestic and the international context, are enormous. The majority of these countries are in a stage of transition towards the establishment of a market economy and the creation of a basis for self-sustained economic and social growth. They have to resolve a wide range of practical, ethnic, economic, social and related issues. Their industries urgently need modern technologies, better management, higher efŽciency, substantive reduction of production costs and more exibility so that in the future their goods can successfully compete in international markets. Managers of state and privatized enterprises in these countries are not only facing a harsh external environment but they also have to transform managerial practices from those employed in centralized, command economies to those appropriate for a competitive market-driven business environment. However, little is being done to understand the destructive difŽculties that attend this challenge. Knowing what to change and what to leave in place—either because of its intrinsic value or because of its impenetrable and unyielding nature—further complicates the situation. It is of great importance to know the main factors affecting managerial decisions and to examine the process of transforming internal and external","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127117106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Bosniaks: From nation to threat","authors":"Lily Hamourtziadou","doi":"10.1080/1461319022000021594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319022000021594","url":null,"abstract":"Authors writing about nationalism in Yugoslavia or the war in Bosnia tend to explain the Muslim connection in terms of ‘rights’ and ‘self-determination’; the Muslims are not seen as nationalistic (a title that seems to be reserved for the Serbs and, occasionally, for the Croats) but as victims of the nationalism of others. Their ideology and activity therefore tends to be ignored or overlooked. Yet the Serbs claim that the Muslims are a threat to them and to the Christians of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the Serb claim most commonly described by authors as a ‘myth’, or as a false belief central to ‘elite manipulation’. As this claim is so central both to Serbian nationalism and to academic writing, this paper addresses the rise of the Muslim nation of Bosnia, the development of its nationalism and the Muslim identity, with the help of its most famous leader, Alija Izetbegovic. Among the issues discussed are self-determination, and Tito’s role in the recognition and the ourishing of the Muslim nation. Most importantly, the paper will explore the extent to which the Muslims were a threat to the Serbs and Croats, and how the Muslims themselves contributed to their own enemy status. The crisis of identity within the Muslim community that followed the decline of the traditional Muslim elites, after the defeat and withdrawal of the Ottomans, led to national indeterminacy and a tactical Yugoslavism. Yet after the agreed partition of Bosnia between the Serb prime minister, Cvetkovic, and the leader of the Croat Peasant Party, Macek at the outbreak of World War II, a movement for the autonomy of Bosnia was created by leaders of the JMO (Jugoslovenska Muslimanska Organizacija) and Islamic religious organizations. The Yugoslav communists’ attitude to communitarianism was ambiguous. While the Communist Party attacked the traditional religious and communitarian structures—the shariat courts and the Muslim cultural association Preporod were desolved in 1946, while the Muslim seminaries madrasas closed in 1947— the Party recognized the Macedonian and Montenegrin nations in 1945, and the Muslim nation in 1968. As Bougarel says, the really distinctive feature of socialist Yugoslavia lay in ‘an attempt at modernisation aimed at the eventual disappearance of national peculiarities’ which ‘led in fact to a reinforcement of national identities ... and ultimately to a resurgence of communitarian ways of doing things, and of nationalist ideologies’.","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126635323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Histories behind names: An interview with Stevan K. Pavlowitch","authors":"S. Pavlowitch, D. Djokić","doi":"10.1080/1461319022000021576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319022000021576","url":null,"abstract":"I did Žnd it difŽcult, because I am rather out of my depth in the Middle Ages, yet I have always been fascinated by the period. Indeed, I can almost say that I am something of a mediaevalist manqué. After I had graduated I turned to later modern history, because it was immediately accessible. I did not have to go through the purgatory of the so-called auxiliary sciences, such as diplomatic, sigillography, numismatic, chronology, not to mention ancient languages. Mediaeval Serbia is not unchartered. There is a vigorous critical school of mediaevalists going back to the 1860s, and it has been kept up whatever the onslaughts of popular myth, romantic nationalism, epic traditionalism and ideological misuse. For me, it was both necessary and challenging to understand what came before ‘my’ period, but because I was not able to cast myself back into the Middle Ages and the early modern period in the same way as I could in the 19th century, I had to inict the draft of my early chapter to a specialist. I needed to be sure that my non-specialist’s perceptions of 12 centuries or so were not totally off the mark before I turned them into a bold 25-page personal interpretation. Professor Sima Ćirković, Serbia‘s most-eminent mediaevalist, was good enough to set me right on several points. I hasten to add that the general interpretation, for what it is worth, is mine.","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132460512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Meeting the conditions of monetary union: The challenge to the Spanish model of regionalization","authors":"M. Farrell","doi":"10.1080/1461319022000021611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319022000021611","url":null,"abstract":"European integration entered a new phase with the introduction of the euro on 1 January 2002. For the 12 member states, this involved the adoption of a single currency for the whole region and handing over authority for the conduct of monetary policy to an independent European Central Bank. Under the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria, and the subsequent conditions laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact agreed at the Dublin summit in December 1996, the national governments accepted the obligations to maintain monetary and exchange rate stability, to cut public sector deŽcits and national debt, and ultimately to grant sole responsibility for monetary and interest rate policy to the European Central Bank (ECB). The apparent willingness of the national governments to accept what were in effect major constraints on national sovereignty obscured for some time any serious consideration of the tensions that could arise at the national level. However, conict and tensions can be expected when governments commit themselves to serious restrictions on public spending, and accept the guidelines on economic policy coordination set down by the European Commission. Such actions impinge upon prior commitments made in the past, and have consequences for different areas of public policy, and for the beneŽciaries of those policies. In the case of Spain, the obligations of monetary union forced a","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131132168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Germany and the Balkans: Reflections on an uneasy relationship","authors":"Wolfgang Deckers","doi":"10.1080/1461319022000021602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319022000021602","url":null,"abstract":"‘Germany is again ... one of the leading states in the world.’ Many felt uneasy when they read this. They felt uneasy about a possible German relapse into its old, self-regarding, egotistical, nationalistic persona. The fear was that the uniŽed Germany would develop from ‘Minerva’ to being ‘Mars’. Others expected, feared, hoped, that Germany would become ‘normal at last’, even though David Marsh of the London Financial Times argued that this would not happen ‘rapidly’. Wolfgang Krieger thinks that uniŽcation brought about a ‘normal’ country, that is domestically, but not yet internationally normal. Some observers have already concluded that the foreign policy of the united Germany will be different from that of the Federal Republic in the years between 1949 and 1989. Philip Gordon refers to the ‘exceptional character’ German foreign policy had in the years between 1949 and 1989 and already sees a ‘normalization’ of German foreign policy: ‘Germany is becoming more self-assured, less military-averse, more global and more assertive than in the past.’ Timothy Garton Ash outlines four choices the united Germany has in its foreign policy, personally favouring the ‘wider Europe’ option that reects Germany’s geopolitical location in Europe. Gerald Livingston sees Eastern Europe becoming a ‘German zone’ because other Western countries ‘lack Germany’s strong interests, motivations and capabilities’. Gregor Schollgen speaks of the ‘power in the center of Europe’; Arnulf Baring states a return to the European centre position (europaische Mittellage) of Germany; Hans-Peter Schwarz discusses the ‘central power’ (Zentralmacht) in Europe and Germany’s return to the world stage; Bonder, Rottger and Ziebura deŽne Germany’s new role as that of a ‘fulcrum’ (Scharniermacht) in Europe and Lothar Ruhl maintains","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126906589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}