{"title":"Security evaluation of different AES implementations against practical setup time violation attacks in FPGAs","authors":"S. Bhasin, J. Danger, S. Guilley, Nidhal Selmane","doi":"10.1109/HST.2009.5225057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2009.5225057","url":null,"abstract":"Security evaluation of various AES implementation against practical power attacks has been reported in literature. However, to the authors' knowledge, very few of the fault attacks reported on AES have been practically realized. Since sbox is a crucial element in AES, in this article, we evaluate the security of some unprotected AES implementations differing in sbox construction, targeted for FPGA. Here the faults have been generated practically by underpowering the targeted circuit. Then we correlate our results with the underlying architecture, along a methodology already suggested in other articles, albeit theoretically. We also carry out an extensive characterization of the faults, in terms of temporal localization. On the basis of our results, we reach the conclusion that the two cheaper implementations in terms of silicon area are also the more vulnerable against DFA when implemented without counter-measures.","PeriodicalId":306863,"journal":{"name":"2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121286225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Early feedback on side-channel risks with accelerated toggle-counting","authors":"Zhimin Chen, P. Schaumont","doi":"10.1109/HST.2009.5224961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2009.5224961","url":null,"abstract":"Early detection of side-channel leakage in the design of a digital crypto-circuit is as important as getting the design functionally correct. Currently, side-channel leakage is confirmed by measuring actual prototypes, or by detailed SPICE-level simulations of the hardware model. However, this feedback does not help the designer: it comes either too late (after the implementation), or else it has unreasonable simulation-time requirements. In this paper, we present a design method to provide early feedback on side-channel leakage based on toggle-counting. We show how to abstract the low-level circuit effects, such as glitches and routing imbalances, into high-level simulation models that can be toggle-counted. Furthermore, we propose an acceleration method for fast toggle-counting using reconfigurable hardware. The proposed methods accelerate the evaluation of side-channel leakage by a factor of 105 over comparable SPICE-level simulations.","PeriodicalId":306863,"journal":{"name":"2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125653102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. R. McIntyre, F. Wolff, C. Papachristou, S. Bhunia
{"title":"Dynamic evaluation of hardware trust","authors":"D. R. McIntyre, F. Wolff, C. Papachristou, S. Bhunia","doi":"10.1109/HST.2009.5224990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2009.5224990","url":null,"abstract":"Current research into Trojan detection suggests that exhaustive Trojan detection in a chip during limited manufacturing test time is an extremely difficult problem. Indeed, an especially nefarious form of Trojan known as the time bomb has a payload activated in a delayed manner making it extremely hard to detect. As a result, chip trust detection at manufacturing test time may not be adequate especially for critical applications. This suggests that some form of dynamic trust detection of the chip both preliminary (possibly during a preproduction phase) and during in-field use at run time is required. We explore an approach to this problem that combines multicore hardware with dynamic distributed software scheduling to determine hardware trust during in-field use at run time. Our approach involves the scheduling and execution of functionally equivalent variants (obtained by different compilations, or different algorithm variations) simultaneously on different PEs and comparing the results. The process dynamically achieves trust determination by identifying the existence of Trojans with a high level of confidence.","PeriodicalId":306863,"journal":{"name":"2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123121596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"New design strategy for improving hardware Trojan detection and reducing Trojan activation time","authors":"H. Salmani, M. Tehranipoor, J. Plusquellic","doi":"10.1109/HST.2009.5224968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2009.5224968","url":null,"abstract":"Hardware Trojans in integrated circuits and systems have become serious concern to fabless semiconductor industry and government agencies in recent years. Most of the previously proposed Trojan detection methods rely on Trojan activation to either observe a faulty output or measure side-channel signals such as transient current or charge. From the authentication stand point, time to trigger a hardware Trojan circuit is a a major concern. This paper analyzes time to (i) generate a transition in functional Trojans and (ii) fully activate them. An efficient dummy flip-flop insertion procedure is proposed to increase Trojan activity. Depending on authentication time and circuit topology, a transition probability threshold is selected so that inserted dummy flip-flops would moderately impact area overhead. The simulation results on s38417 benchmark circuit demonstrate that, with a negligible area overhead, our proposed method can significantly increase Trojan activity and reduce Trojan activation time.","PeriodicalId":306863,"journal":{"name":"2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133866706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Performance of delay-based Trojan detection techniques under parameter variations","authors":"Devendra Rai, J. Lach","doi":"10.1109/HST.2009.5224966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2009.5224966","url":null,"abstract":"Various schemes utilizing path delay information have been proposed to determine the authenticity of a given integrated circuit. However, the performance of these techniques under parameter variations must be evaluated, as delay variations may mask the delay impact of design alterations, such as hardware Trojan horses. This paper examines how path delay characterization performs under extensive delay variations, and results reveal that it remains a powerful tool for detecting design alterations by leveraging statistical techniques.","PeriodicalId":306863,"journal":{"name":"2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123732011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
K. Kursawe, A. Sadeghi, Dries Schellekens, B. Škorić, P. Tuyls
{"title":"Reconfigurable Physical Unclonable Functions - Enabling technology for tamper-resistant storage","authors":"K. Kursawe, A. Sadeghi, Dries Schellekens, B. Škorić, P. Tuyls","doi":"10.1109/HST.2009.5225058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2009.5225058","url":null,"abstract":"A PUF or Physical Unclonable Function is a function that is embodied in a physical structure that consists of many random uncontrollable components which originate from process variations during manufacturing. Due to this random structure a physical stimulus or challenge generates unpredictable responses. Because of their physical properties PUFs are unclonable and very promising primitives for the purpose of authentication and storage of cryptographic keys. Previous work on PUFs considers mainly static challenge-response PUFs. In many applications, however, a dynamic PUF would be desirable, e.g., in order to allow the key derived from the PUF to be updated. We define a new primitive, the reconfigurable PUF (rPUF) which is a PUF with a mechanism to transform it into a new PUF with a new unpredictable and uncontrollable challenge-response behavior, even if the challengeresponse behavior of the original PUF is already known. We present two practical instantiations of a reconfigurable PUF. One is a new variant of the optical PUF, and the other is based on phase change memory. We also illustrate how an rPUF can be used to protect non-volatile storage against invasive physical attacks.","PeriodicalId":306863,"journal":{"name":"2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122519247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OS support for detecting Trojan circuit attacks","authors":"Gedare Bloom, B. Narahari, R. Simha","doi":"10.1109/HST.2009.5224959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2009.5224959","url":null,"abstract":"Rapid advances in integrated circuit (IC) development predicted by Moore's Law lead to increasingly complex, hard to verify IC designs. Design insiders or adversaries employed at untrusted locations can insert malicious Trojan circuits capable of launching attacks in hardware or supporting software-based attacks. In this paper, we provide a method for detecting Trojan circuit denial-of-service attacks using a simple, verifiable hardware guard external to the complex CPU. The operating system produces liveness checks, embedded in the software clock, to which the guard can respond. We also present a novel method for the OS to detect a hardware-software (HW/SW) Trojan privilege escalation attack by using OS-generated checks to test if the CPU hardware is enforcing memory protection (MP). Our implementation of fine-grained periodic checking of MP enforcement incurs only 2.2% overhead using SPECint 2006.","PeriodicalId":306863,"journal":{"name":"2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125642240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"VITAMIN: Voltage inversion technique to ascertain malicious insertions in ICs","authors":"Mainak Banga, M. Hsiao","doi":"10.1109/HST.2009.5224960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2009.5224960","url":null,"abstract":"We propose an inverted voltage scheme for exciting and pronouncing the behavior of any undesirable logic that may be inserted in the IC manufactured abroad. The inverted voltage scheme is coupled with a sustained vector simulation technique to further enhance the behavioral difference between the genuine and targeted test IC. Experimental results on a variety of ISCAS'89 benchmarks show that we are able to significantly magnify the difference between the genuine and tampered designs. For most of the smaller benchmarks, our inverted voltage method is able to detect the effect of the tamper directly at the primary outputs of the IC, especially when existing techniques fail to make any observable distinction. For the larger circuits, our technique is able to magnify the power consumption of the tampered circuit by several times.","PeriodicalId":306863,"journal":{"name":"2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126106977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Experiences in Hardware Trojan design and implementation","authors":"Yier Jin, Nathan Kupp, Y. Makris","doi":"10.1109/HST.2009.5224971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2009.5224971","url":null,"abstract":"We report our experiences in designing and implementing several hardware Trojans within the framework of the Embedded System Challenge competition that was held as part of the Cyber Security Awareness Week (CSAW) at the Polytechnic Institute of New York University in October 2008. Due to the globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) manufacturing industry, hardware Trojans constitute an increasingly probable threat to both commercial and military applications. With traditional testing methods falling short in the quest of finding hardware Trojans, several specialized detection methods have surfaced. To facilitate research in this area, a better understanding of what Hardware Trojans would look like and what impact they would incur to an IC is required. To this end, we present eight distinct attack techniques employing Register Transfer Level (RTL) hardware Trojans to compromise the security of an Alpha encryption module implemented on a Digilent BASYS Spartan-3 FPGA board. Our work, which earned second place in the aforementioned competition, demonstrates that current RTL designs are, indeed, quite vulnerable to hardware Trojan attacks.","PeriodicalId":306863,"journal":{"name":"2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126969354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Circuit-level techniques for reliable Physically Uncloneable Functions","authors":"Vignesh Vivekraja, L. Nazhandali","doi":"10.1109/HST.2009.5225054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2009.5225054","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we study the effect of transistor supply voltage and body bias on the performance of ring oscillator Physically Uncloneable Functions (PUFs). The uniqueness (ability to identify a PUF) and reproducibility (ability to reproduce the same output) of PUFs increase drastically in the subthreshold region of operation. Also, the reproducibility of PUFs increase when the transistors are forward body biased. A ring oscillator PUF was tested and it achieved a uniqueness of 47.8% and reproducibility of 100% when operating at a supply voltage of 0.2 V. Compared to a base line configuration, our method improved the uniqueness by 18% and reproducibility by 7%. Therefore, apart from architectural optimizations, circuit level considerations like supply voltage and body bias can improve the reliability of PUFs.","PeriodicalId":306863,"journal":{"name":"2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132329831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}