Cloud Computing Security Workshop最新文献_第7页

Cloud security is not (just) virtualization security: a short paper 云安全不仅仅是虚拟化安全:这是一篇简短的文章

Cloud Computing Security Workshop Pub Date : 2009-11-13 DOI: 10.1145/1655008.1655022

Mihai Christodorescu, R. Sailer, D. Schales, D. Sgandurra, D. Zamboni

{"title":"Cloud security is not (just) virtualization security: a short paper","authors":"Mihai Christodorescu, R. Sailer, D. Schales, D. Sgandurra, D. Zamboni","doi":"10.1145/1655008.1655022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1655008.1655022","url":null,"abstract":"Cloud infrastructure commonly relies on virtualization. Customers provide their own VMs, and the cloud provider runs them often without knowledge of the guest OSes or their configurations. However, cloud customers also want effective and efficient security for their VMs. Cloud providers offering security-as-a-service based on VM introspection promise the best of both worlds: efficient centralization and effective protection. Since customers can move images from one cloud to another, an effective solution requires learning what guest OS runs in each VM and securing the guest OS without relying on the guest OS functionality or an initially secure guest VM state.\u0000 We present a solution that is highly scalable in that it (i) centralizes guest protection into a security VM, (ii) supports Linux and Windows operating systems and can be easily extended to support new operating systems, (iii) does not assume any a-priori semantic knowledge of the guest, (iv) does not require any a-priori trust assumptions into any state of the guest VM. While other introspection monitoring solutions exist, to our knowledge none of them monitor guests on the semantic level required to effectively support both white- and black-listing of kernel functions, or allows to start monitoring VMs at any state during run-time, resumed from saved state, and cold-boot without the assumptions of a secure start state for monitoring.","PeriodicalId":300613,"journal":{"name":"Cloud Computing Security Workshop","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133252622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 200

Patient controlled encryption: ensuring privacy of electronic medical records 患者控制的加密:确保电子病历的隐私

Cloud Computing Security Workshop Pub Date : 2009-11-13 DOI: 10.1145/1655008.1655024

Josh Benaloh, Melissa Chase, E. Horvitz, K. Lauter

引用次数: 527

Controlling data in the cloud: outsourcing computation without outsourcing control 控制云端数据:外包计算，不外包控制

Cloud Computing Security Workshop Pub Date : 2009-11-13 DOI: 10.1145/1655008.1655020

Richard Chow, P. Golle, M. Jakobsson, E. Shi, Jessica Staddon, R. Masuoka, J. Molina

引用次数: 981

Secure anonymous database search 安全匿名数据库搜索

Cloud Computing Security Workshop Pub Date : 2009-11-13 DOI: 10.1145/1655008.1655025

Mariana Raykova, B. Vo, S. Bellovin, T. Malkin

{"title":"Secure anonymous database search","authors":"Mariana Raykova, B. Vo, S. Bellovin, T. Malkin","doi":"10.1145/1655008.1655025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1655008.1655025","url":null,"abstract":"There exist many large collections of private data that must be protected on behalf of the entities that hold them or the clients they serve. However, there are also often many legitimate reasons for sharing that data in a controlled manner. How can two parties decide to share data without prior knowledge of what data they have? For example, two intelligence agencies might be willing to cooperate by sharing documents about a specific case, and need a way of determining which documents might be of interest to each other.\u0000 We introduce and address the problem of allowing such entities to search each other's data securely and anonymously. We aim to protect the content of the queries, as well as the content of documents unrelated to those queries, while concealing the identity of the participants. Although there exist systems for solving similar problems, to our knowledge we are the first to address this specific need and also the first to present a secure anonymous search system that is practical for real-time querying. In order to achieve this in an efficient manner, we make use of Bloom filters [5], definitions of security for deterministic encryption [22] that we adapt and instantiate in the private key setting and of a novel encryption primitive, reroutable encryption.","PeriodicalId":300613,"journal":{"name":"Cloud Computing Security Workshop","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116555487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 90

On protecting integrity and confidentiality of cryptographic file system for outsourced storage 外包存储加密文件系统的完整性和机密性保护

Cloud Computing Security Workshop Pub Date : 2009-11-13 DOI: 10.1145/1655008.1655017

Aaram Yun, Chunhui Shi, Yongdae Kim

引用次数: 73

Website fingerprinting: attacking popular privacy enhancing technologies with the multinomial naïve-bayes classifier 网站指纹识别:利用多项naïve-bayes分类器攻击流行的隐私增强技术

Cloud Computing Security Workshop Pub Date : 2009-11-13 DOI: 10.1145/1655008.1655013

Dominik Herrmann, Rolf Wendolsky, H. Federrath

{"title":"Website fingerprinting: attacking popular privacy enhancing technologies with the multinomial naïve-bayes classifier","authors":"Dominik Herrmann, Rolf Wendolsky, H. Federrath","doi":"10.1145/1655008.1655013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1655008.1655013","url":null,"abstract":"Privacy enhancing technologies like OpenSSL, OpenVPN or Tor establish an encrypted tunnel that enables users to hide content and addresses of requested websites from external observers This protection is endangered by local traffic analysis attacks that allow an external, passive attacker between the PET system and the user to uncover the identity of the requested sites. However, existing proposals for such attacks are not practicable yet.\u0000 We present a novel method that applies common text mining techniques to the normalised frequency distribution of observable IP packet sizes. Our classifier correctly identifies up to 97% of requests on a sample of 775 sites and over 300,000 real-world traffic dumps recorded over a two-month period. It outperforms previously known methods like Jaccard's classifier and Naïve Bayes that neglect packet frequencies altogether or rely on absolute frequency values, respectively. Our method is system-agnostic: it can be used against any PET without alteration. Closed-world results indicate that many popular single-hop and even multi-hop systems like Tor and JonDonym are vulnerable against this general fingerprinting attack. Furthermore, we discuss important real-world issues, namely false alarms and the influence of the browser cache on accuracy.","PeriodicalId":300613,"journal":{"name":"Cloud Computing Security Workshop","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116302241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 419