{"title":"Kripke on modality","authors":"J. Burgess","doi":"10.4324/9781315742144-43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315742144-43","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":299587,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Modality","volume":"135 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131435649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quine on modality","authors":"Roberta Ballarin","doi":"10.4324/9781315742144-42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315742144-42","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":299587,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Modality","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126080162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"De re modality","authors":"Boris Kment","doi":"10.4324/9781315742144-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315742144-10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":299587,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Modality","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126261359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Modality in mathematics","authors":"Øystein Linnebo, S. Shapiro","doi":"10.4324/9781315742144-32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315742144-32","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I argue that there are some quite basic questions that we can’t yet answer, about how we write and read mathematics. The questions themselves are straightforward enough to state, provided that we don’t allow ourselves to be distracted by irrelevances. I formulate them in terms of the use of modal notions in mathematical writing, but I think it will become clear that these formulations are special cases of much larger questions. How far the answers depend on general facts about language, and how far on peculiar features of mathematics, is one of the things we don’t yet know. Readers who want background information on English modals can find a readable treatment in Palmer [7]. I am in debt to various audiences and correspondents. But let me particularly thank the organisers and contributors of the Amsterdam meeting on ‘Practice-based philosophy of Logic and Mathematics’ in August and September 2009, and especially Catarina Dutilh who designed and led the whole enterprise.","PeriodicalId":299587,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Modality","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124462177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Impossibility and impossible worlds","authors":"Daniel Nolan","doi":"10.4324/9781315742144-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315742144-6","url":null,"abstract":"Possible worlds have found many applications in contemporary philosophy: from theories of possibility and necessity, to accounts of conditionals, to theories of mental and linguistic content, to understanding supervenience relationships, to theories of properties and propositions, among many other applications. Almost as soon as possible worlds started to be used in formal theories in logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and elsewhere, theorists started to wonder whether impossible worlds should be postulated as well. To take just one example, possible-worlds theories of mental content associate sets of worlds with beliefs (or perhaps entire belief systems): the content of a belief is (or is represented by) the set of possible worlds where that belief is true. But what should we say about beliefs that cannot possibly be true: false logical or mathematical beliefs, for example, or beliefs in metaphysical impossibilities? It would be natural to represent these beliefs with sets of impossible worlds. If James thinks that 87 is a prime number, the set of worlds associated with his beliefs includes worlds where 87 is prime, for example. If Jane is undecided about the principle of excluded middle, her belief worlds should include some at which the principle is correct and some where it is incorrect. And so on.","PeriodicalId":299587,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Modality","volume":"219 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122996324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Essentialism and modality","authors":"P. Mackie","doi":"10.4324/9781315742144-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315742144-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":299587,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Modality","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129852107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemology, the constitutive, and the principle-based account of modality","authors":"C. Peacocke","doi":"10.4324/9781315742144-21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315742144-21","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":299587,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Modality","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129904236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Modal set theory *","authors":"Christopher Menzel","doi":"10.4324/9781315742144-33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315742144-33","url":null,"abstract":"Set theory is the study of sets using the tools of contemporary mathematical logic. Modal set theory draws in particular upon contemporary modal logic, the logic of necessity and possibility. One simple and obvious motivation for modal set theory is the fact that, from a realist perspective that takes the existence of sets seriously, sets have philosophically interesting modal properties. For instance, perhaps the most notable and distinctive property of sets is their extensionality: sets a and b are identical if they have exactly the same members; formally, where we take variables from the lower end of the alphabet to range over sets:","PeriodicalId":299587,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Modality","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127056565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}