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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 4最新文献

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Absence of Consent 未经同意
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 4 Pub Date : 2021-11-18 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192848871.003.0008
T. Macklem
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引用次数: 0
Sources of Law 法律渊源
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 4 Pub Date : 2021-11-18 DOI: 10.4324/9780203876817-3
G. Pino
{"title":"Sources of Law","authors":"G. Pino","doi":"10.4324/9780203876817-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203876817-3","url":null,"abstract":"Oddly enough, very scant reference—if any—is made to the sources of law as a genuinely jurisprudential topic in contemporary legal philosophy. Yet, the jurisprudential import of the concept of ‘sources of law’ seems substantial: sources of law are what makes of something ‘a law’—a law is what is produced by, or derives from, a source of law. Sources epitomize the very ‘positivity’ of positive law, an aspect of law which is central to legal positivism of course, but whose importance not even a natural lawyer or an anti-positivist would ever deny. This essay highlights several jurisprudential questions that surround the sources of law, and tries to show they relate to–and contribute to illuminate–many long-debated jurisprudential topics such as the concept of legal validity, the notion and the conditions of existence of a legal system, the problem of legal change, and the scope of legal disagreements.","PeriodicalId":291716,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 4","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129697001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Against Accomplice Liability 反对从犯责任
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 4 Pub Date : 2021-11-18 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192848871.003.0005
Alex Kaiserman
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引用次数: 1
Silencing Without Uptake 没有吸收的沉默
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 4 Pub Date : 2020-02-06 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192848871.003.0007
K. Greasley
{"title":"Silencing Without Uptake","authors":"K. Greasley","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192848871.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192848871.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Catharine MacKinnon has claimed that some pornography “silences” women. Some work in feminist analytical philosophy suggests it does so by depriving them of the capacity to perform certain speech acts, such as (and most prominently) the speech act of sexual refusal. This has been termed the silencing of “illocutionary disablement.” Critics object that this silencing claim involves a contentious thesis about the success conditions of speech acts such as sexual refusal: that the auditor’s comprehension, or “uptake,” of the speaker’s intent is required for the speech act to come off. I try to show that the illocutionary disablement claim can do without the uptake condition as it has heretofore been formulated. Even if audience uptake is not a success condition for each individual act of sexual refusal, reciprocity of a certain kind is still a condition of women’s continuing ability to engage the refusal illocution. When pornography disrupts the conditions for that reciprocity it will effectuate illocutionary disablement. I also consider whether the illocutionary disablement under consideration here is properly thought of as “silencing.”","PeriodicalId":291716,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 4","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126060394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Epistemic Commitments of Nondiscrimination 非歧视的认识论承诺
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 4 Pub Date : 2018-10-26 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192848871.003.0006
Deborah Hellman
{"title":"The Epistemic Commitments of Nondiscrimination","authors":"Deborah Hellman","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192848871.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192848871.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"A commitment to nondiscrimination at times appears to require both that one not act in particular ways and that one not believe certain things. This is potentially troubling if one ought to believe what one has warrant to believe, and to the extent that one can take actions that affect what one comes to believe, one ought to do so with the aim of acquiring true beliefs. This article argues that current social controversies—like the debate over the memo by the Google employee which claimed that women are less suited for careers in technology fields—demonstrate that some defenders of norms of nondiscrimination understand these norms as including epistemic commitments. The article articulates what these epistemic commitments are, explores whether they can themselves be epistemically justified and, if not, situates the popular controversy in a philosophical debate about whether moral considerations properly encroach on epistemic norms.","PeriodicalId":291716,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 4","volume":"222 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132652057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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