O&M: The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts (Boundaries of the Firm) eJournal最新文献

{"title":"What’s ‘New’ About New Forms of Organizing?","authors":"P. Puranam, O. Alexy, M. Reitzig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1907542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1907542","url":null,"abstract":"In order to assess if new theories are necessary to explain new forms of organizing, or whether existing theories suffice, we must first specify exactly what makes a form of organizing “new.�? We propose clear criteria for making such an assessment, and show how they are useful in assessing if and when new theories of organizing may truly be needed. We illustrate our arguments by contrasting forms of organizing often considered novel, such as Linux, Wikipedia, and Oticon against their traditional counterparts. We conclude that while there may be little that existing theory cannot explain about individual elements in these new forms of organizing, opportunities for new theorizing may lie in understanding the bundles of co-occurring elements that seem to underlie them, and why the same bundles occur in widely disparate organizations.","PeriodicalId":290803,"journal":{"name":"O&M: The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts (Boundaries of the Firm) eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130402527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up","authors":"Sebastian Kranz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2212683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2212683","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We first illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast to fundamental assumptions of hold-up models. We develop a model in which relational contracts are repeatedly newly negotiated during relationships. Negotiations take place with positive probability and cause bygones to be bygones. Traditional relational contracting and hold-up formulations are nested as opposite corner cases. Allowing for intermediate cases yields very intuitive results and sheds light on many plausible trade-offs that do not arise in these corner cases. We establish a general existence result and a tractable characterization for stochastic games in which money can be transferred.","PeriodicalId":290803,"journal":{"name":"O&M: The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts (Boundaries of the Firm) eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128054082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Characteristics, Determinants and Impacts of Cross Border Mergers in the APEC Region","authors":"Mikyung Yun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2319742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2319742","url":null,"abstract":"This study attempted to map out the patterns of cross border M&As (CBMAs) in the APEC region, and empirically verify the determinants of CBMAs, focusing on the role of trade cost. Despite the increasing levels of CBMAs in the APEC region, its determinants and impacts in the region, especially in the less developed economies of the region, remain under-researched. This study hopes to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. The empirical analysis shows that cross border mergers increased with the size of the two countries involved, as expected. While multilateral trade cost in general had a positive effect on bilateral CBMA, indicating reduction of overall non-horizontal biddings from competing countries, the effect becomes negative as proportion of horizontal mergers increases. This implies that high trade cost encourages tariff-jumping, horizontal CBMA from other competing countries. In the case of bilateral trade cost, number of CBMA decreases as trade cost increases in general, reflecting the high degree of non-horizontal CBMA in the APEC region. However, this became positive, as proportion of horizontal CBMA increased. This implies that for horizontal mergers, again, tariff jumping rather than comparative advantage was the more important motivation. Contrary to expectations, trade liberalization and market integration in the APEC region is shown to have a negative effect on CBMA from non-APEC member countries. APEC economies are heavily dependent on each other as a source of foreign investment and that cross border M&As are largely a regional affair. This suggests that CBMA in the APEC region is closely related to the regional vertical division of labor, and that, firms in the region are using CBMA as an instrument for restructuring and reorganizing across the region as trade liberalization and market integration have progressed in the APEC. It would be therefore important to explore the role of CBMAs in this restructuring process at a more micro level, such as at the level of production networks, and making comparisons across different industries.","PeriodicalId":290803,"journal":{"name":"O&M: The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts (Boundaries of the Firm) eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115354710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Effect of Stock Misvaluation and Investment Opportunities on the Method of Payment in Mergers","authors":"Alberta Di Giuli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1752332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1752332","url":null,"abstract":"This paper tests the effect of firms’ mispricing and investment opportunities on the method of payment in mergers. Using a new proxy for investment opportunities and a sample of 1,187 mergers completed between 1990 and 2005 among US publicly traded firms, I find that acquirers lead the decision on the method of payment, thus exploiting short-term market mispricing (in line with both the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) models). However, target managers believe in the quality of the merger and care about the long-term value of the merged entity’s shares (as predicted by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and contrary to Shleifer and Vishny (2003)). I also find that better investment opportunities lead to greater use of stock.","PeriodicalId":290803,"journal":{"name":"O&M: The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts (Boundaries of the Firm) eJournal","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131983913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Open or Closed Innovation? Problem Solving and Governance Choice","authors":"Teppo Felin, Todd R. Zenger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2156951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2156951","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars have recently highlighted the promise of open innovation. In this paper we treat open innovation — in it’s different forms and manifestations — as well as internal or closed innovation, as unique governance forms with different benefits and costs. We discuss how each organizational form, whether open or closed, is essentially an instrument for accessing a) different types of communication channels for knowledge sharing, b) different types of incentives, and c) different types of property rights for appropriating value from innovation. We discuss the “problem” as the central unit of analysis for deciding among different forms of governance, whether open or closed, examining in particular the varying capacities of governance forms for supporting alternative forms of solution search. In all, the goal of this paper is to provide a comparative framework for managing innovation, where we delineate and discuss four categories of open innovation governance forms (markets, partnerships, contests and tournaments and user or community innovation) and compare them with each other and with two internal or closed forms of innovation governance (authority and consensus-based hierarchy).","PeriodicalId":290803,"journal":{"name":"O&M: The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts (Boundaries of the Firm) eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122357678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is Better Information Always Good News? International Corporate Strategy and Regulation","authors":"M. Kitzmuller","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-6251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6251","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a simple model to analyze the interaction between strategic corporate public good provision, international firm location and national regulation. An information-based strategic corporate public good provision mechanism is proposed to shed light on recent firm behavior within different regulatory environments. The main insight derived is that in the presence of firms with geographic flexibility (multinational enterprises) and market provision of an international public credence good, unilateral (non-cooperative) regulatory scope depends on (1) the absolute probabilities to verify firms' corporate public good provision levels within different geographic and institutional environments, and (2) the differential between these probabilities across countries. The relative information asymmetry determines not only the market levels of the public good produced under autarky, but also the relocation incentives of multinational enterprises. A firm trades off lower production costs, which increase its competitiveness in pricing, with higher expected informational price premiums, which decrease its competitiveness. A government's ability to regulate above market (corporate public good provision) levels decreases with the absolute level of foreign transparency, while it increases in the relative (positive) difference between the same transparency at home and abroad. This may not only explain mixed empirical evidence of theoretic propositions such as the Pollution Haven Hypothesis and Regulatory Race to the Bottom dynamics, but also open up interesting policy implications as the international information playing field becomes leveled through development, while existing regulations are rather rigid, and policy coordination remains limited.","PeriodicalId":290803,"journal":{"name":"O&M: The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts (Boundaries of the Firm) eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130462923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Competition between Managed Care Organizations and Indemnity Plans in Health Insurance Markets","authors":"E. Baranes, D. Bardey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2104413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2104413","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines a model of competition between two types of health insurers: Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) and Conventional Insurers\". MCOs vertically integrate health care providers and pay them at a competitive price, while conventional insurers work as indemnity plans and pay the health care providers that are freely chosen by their policyholders at a wholesale price. This first difference is called input price effect. Moreover, we assume that policyholders put a positive value on providers. diversity supplied by their health insurance plan and that this value increases with their probability of disease. Due to the restricted choice of health care providers in MCOs, a risk segmentation occurs: policyholders who choose conventional insurers are characterized by a higher risk. Surprisingly, our results point out that the effects of this input price and risk segmentation can be countervailing and do not necessarily work in the same direction. More precisely, we show that vertical integration in health insurance markets can create an anti-raise rivals´ cost effect. Consequently, our results reveal that the penetration of vertical integration may decrease conventional insurers´ premiums, which is a sufficient condition to be Pareto-improving. After more than three decades of vertical integration waves, our model may also explain why we observe an interior equilibrium in which conventional insurers have survived.\"","PeriodicalId":290803,"journal":{"name":"O&M: The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts (Boundaries of the Firm) eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123745031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Creation of Value: The Value Circle and Evolving Market Structures","authors":"Jonathan Sallet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2149857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2149857","url":null,"abstract":"The traditional value chain is a hierarchical ordering of inputs that results in the ability of one firm - a manufacturer of automobiles, for example - to offer a finished product directly to consumers. The market is characterized by two distinct lines of business relationships: the vertical relationship between input suppliers and product manufacturers, and the horizontal relationship across the market in which the manufacturers compete against one another. Although the traditional value chain has not been replaced, today’s broadband marketplace is witnessing the rise of an alternative structure - the \"value circle.\" The value circle describes a world in which multiple companies, not necessarily in the same product markets, are able to offer competing packages of value to consumers. Thus, in the wireless broadband market, firms that manufacture devices, supply connectivity, engage in e‐commerce, create software, or provide search are all creating new economic surplus in a market in which they simultaneously compete, cooperate, buy, and supply from one another. From this new circular structure the following tenets have emerged: Many companies, traditionally associated with different product markets, can nonetheless offer competing combinations of value directly to the same audience of users; bargaining among companies divides new consumer surplus in ways that reflect the ability of companies to create value, play the \"central\" role in their composition, and each directly to consumers; the market is dynamic and swift, with competing combinations of value changing in rapid succession; the purchaser/creator at the center of the circle plays a fundamental, and not simply passive, role in the formulation of new value propositions; all of the players are making strategic decisions amid conditions of deep uncertainty; and Consumers, because they place value on the new value propositions, benefit directly from new forms of value, embodied in additional choices in the marketplace. The value circle is an additional tool for business strategists and policymakers to understand the velocity and seeming chaos of important markets.","PeriodicalId":290803,"journal":{"name":"O&M: The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts (Boundaries of the Firm) eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126923617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Clustering, Agency Costs and Operating Efficiency: Evidence from Nursing Home Chains","authors":"S. F. Lu, G. Wedig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1783054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1783054","url":null,"abstract":"Models of horizontal integration typically describe a trade-off between multiunit efficiencies and managerial agency costs. In extreme cases where managers cannot be incented contractually, private ownership is thought to be the primary organizational substitute. In this paper we explore geographic clustering as an alternative strategy for controlling managerial agency costs within the chain form of organization. Clustering may facilitate scale efficiencies in both monitoring and supervision, resulting in reduced agency costs and improved application of the chain's business model. We test this hypothesis in the nursing home industry, which is characterized by managerial contract costs resulting from multitask models of production. We find that clustered nursing homes achieve higher quality, conditional on labor inputs and patient characteristics. The clustering effect is concentrated on reductions in minor/potential harm violations, which are difficult to observe without close monitoring. Several proxies for local organizational experience “local learning” cannot account for our findings, which are robust to a variety of alternative clustering definitions and competing explanations based on gaming behavior. Further tests indicate that chains endogenously pursue clustering, presumably to realize the benefits of improved quality outcomes. \u0000 \u0000This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.","PeriodicalId":290803,"journal":{"name":"O&M: The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts (Boundaries of the Firm) eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131291945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer","authors":"Peter Lee","doi":"10.15779/Z38ZJ7N","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38ZJ7N","url":null,"abstract":"As a key driver of innovation and economic growth, university-industry technology transfer has attracted significant attention. Formal technology transfer, which encompasses patenting and licensing university inventions, is often characterized as proceeding according to market principles. According to this dominant conception, patents help commodify academic inventions, which universities then advertise and transfer to private firms in licensing markets. This Article challenges and refines this market-oriented view of technology transfer. Drawing from empirical studies, it shows that effective technology transfer often involves long-term personal relationships rather than discrete market exchanges. In particular, it explores the significant role of tacit, uncodified knowledge in effectively exploiting patented academic inventions. Markets, patents, and licenses are ill-suited to transferring such tacit knowledge, leading licensees to seek direct relationships with academic inventors themselves. Drawing on the theory of the firm, this Article then explores the role of organizational integration in transferring patented technologies and associated tacit knowledge to private companies. Presenting a descriptive theory of university-industry technology transfer, it argues that the difficulties of conveying tacit knowledge encourage various forms of organizational integration by which licensees directly absorb academic human capital. From consulting arrangements to seats on boards of directors, licensees are bringing faculty inventors (and their tacit knowledge) “in house” to aid in commercialization. Turning from the descriptive to the normative, this Article provides prescriptions for enhancing tacit knowledge transmission and technology transfer. It concludes by exploring the implications of tacit knowledge for patent theory and the organization of technology commercialization efforts.","PeriodicalId":290803,"journal":{"name":"O&M: The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts (Boundaries of the Firm) eJournal","volume":"1126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122924277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}