{"title":"Capital Structure and Systematic Risk","authors":"Michael Schwert, Ilya A. Strebulaev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2421020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2421020","url":null,"abstract":"Systematic risk is an important determinant of corporate capital structure. A one standard deviation increase in asset beta corresponds to a decrease in leverage of 13%, controlling for total asset volatility. This evidence is consistent with recent dynamic capital structure models that relate financing decisions to macroeconomic factors and provides further impetus for exploring the impact of systematic risk on corporate decisions.","PeriodicalId":290133,"journal":{"name":"Rock Center: Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126383227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Elizabeth Blankespoor, Thomas J. Linsmeier, K. Petroni, Catherine Shakespeare
{"title":"Fair Value Accounting for Financial Instruments: Does It Improve the Association Between Bank Leverage and Credit Risk?","authors":"Elizabeth Blankespoor, Thomas J. Linsmeier, K. Petroni, Catherine Shakespeare","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1565653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1565653","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT : Many have argued that financial statements created under an accounting model that measures financial instruments at fair value would not fairly represent a bank's business model. In this study we examine whether financial statements using fair values for financial instruments better describe banks' credit risk than less fair-value-based financial statements. Specifically, we assess the extent to which various leverage ratios, which are calculated using financial instruments measured along a fair value continuum, are associated with various measures of credit risk. Our leverage ratios include financial instruments measured at (1) fair value; (2) U.S. GAAP mixed-attribute values; and (3) Tier 1 regulatory capital values. The credit risk measures we consider are bond yield spreads and future bank failure. We find that leverage measured using the fair values of financial instruments explains significantly more variation in bond yield spreads and bank failure than the other less fair-value-based lev...","PeriodicalId":290133,"journal":{"name":"Rock Center: Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129788837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Product Market Competition Lead Firms to Decentralize?","authors":"N. Bloom, R. Sadun, J. Van Reenen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1533435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1533435","url":null,"abstract":"There is a widespread sense that over the last two decades firms have been decentralizing decisions to employees further down the managerial hierarchy. Economists have developed a range of theories to account for delegation, but there is less empirical evidence, especially across countries. This has limited the ability to understand the phenomenon of decentralization. To address the empirical lacuna we have developed a research program to measure the internal organization of firms - including their decentralization decisions - across a large range of industries and countries. In this paper we investigate whether greater product market competition increases decentralization. For example, tougher competition may make local manager's information more valuable, as delays to decisions become more costly. Since globalization and liberalization have increased the competitiveness of product markets, one explanation for the trend towards decentralization could be increased competition. Of course there are a range of other factors that may also be at play, including human capital, information and communication technology, culture and industrial composition. To tackle these issues we collected detailed information on the internal organization of firms across nations. The few datasets that exist are either from a single industry or (at best) across many firms in a single country. We analyze data on almost 4,000 firms across twelve countries in Europe, North America and Asia. We find that competition does indeed seem to foster greater decentralization.","PeriodicalId":290133,"journal":{"name":"Rock Center: Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123086858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure Staff Report No. 424","authors":"D. Duffie, Ada Li, Theodore Lubke","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1534874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1534874","url":null,"abstract":"In the wake of the recent financial crisis, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives have been blamed for increasing systemic risk. Although OTC derivatives were not a central cause of the crisis, the complexity and limited transparency of the market reinforced the potential for excessive risk-taking, as regulators did not have a clear view into how OTC derivatives were being used. We discuss how the New York Fed and other regulators could improve weaknesses in the OTC derivatives market through stronger oversight and better regulatory incentives for infrastructure improvements to reduce counterparty credit risk and bolster market liquidity, efficiency, and transparency. Used responsibly with these reforms, over-the-counter derivatives can provide important risk management and liquidity benefits to the financial system.","PeriodicalId":290133,"journal":{"name":"Rock Center: Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116990512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Limited Records and Reputation","authors":"Qingmin Liu, Andrzej Skrzypacz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1435096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1435096","url":null,"abstract":"We study the impact of limited records on reputation dynamics, that is, how the set of equilibria and equilibrium payoffs changes in a model in which one long-lived player faces a sequence of short-lived players who observe only limited information about past play (the last K periods of the long-lived player's actions). We show that limited records dramatically change the equilibrium behavior. Moreover, with limited records, equilibria in games with complete and incomplete information are strikingly different (in contrast to games with complete records). We also obtain a lower bound for equilibrium payoffs at any moment of the game, not only at the beginning, thus providing a stronger long-run prediction.","PeriodicalId":290133,"journal":{"name":"Rock Center: Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122052425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Policy Dynamics and Inefficiency in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation","authors":"D. Baron, D. Diermeier, Pohan Fong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.969415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.969415","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a dynamic model of election, government formation, and legislation in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation in which the policy chosen in one period becomes the status quo for the next period. The electorate votes strategically by taking into account the likely governments that parties would form and the policies they would choose as a function of the status quo. The status quo also affects the bargaining power of the parties during government formation and their respective policy choices. A formateur party thus has incentives to strategically position the current policy to gain an advantage in both the next election and the subsequent government formation. These incentives can give rise to centrifugal forces that result in policies that are outside the Pareto set of the parties.","PeriodicalId":290133,"journal":{"name":"Rock Center: Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132607315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Delisting Returns and Their Effect on Accounting-Based Market Anomalies","authors":"W. Beaver, M. McNichols, R. Price","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.949601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.949601","url":null,"abstract":"We show that tests of market efficiency are sensitive to the inclusion of delisting firm-years. When included, trading strategy returns based on anomaly variables can increase (for strategies based on earnings, cash flows and the book-to-market ratio) or decrease (for a strategy based on accruals). This is due to the disproportionate number of delisting firm-years in the lowest decile of these variables. Delisting firm-years are most often excluded because the researcher does not correctly incorporate delisting returns, because delisting return data are missing or because other research design choices implicitly exclude them.","PeriodicalId":290133,"journal":{"name":"Rock Center: Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134415838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}