Limited Records and Reputation

Qingmin Liu, Andrzej Skrzypacz
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引用次数: 31

Abstract

We study the impact of limited records on reputation dynamics, that is, how the set of equilibria and equilibrium payoffs changes in a model in which one long-lived player faces a sequence of short-lived players who observe only limited information about past play (the last K periods of the long-lived player's actions). We show that limited records dramatically change the equilibrium behavior. Moreover, with limited records, equilibria in games with complete and incomplete information are strikingly different (in contrast to games with complete records). We also obtain a lower bound for equilibrium payoffs at any moment of the game, not only at the beginning, thus providing a stronger long-run prediction.
有限的记录和声誉
我们研究了有限记录对声誉动态的影响,也就是说,在一个模型中,当一个长寿的参与者面对一系列只观察到有限的过去游戏信息(长寿参与者行为的最后K个时期)的短暂参与者时,均衡和均衡收益是如何变化的。我们表明,有限的记录极大地改变了平衡行为。此外,在有限记录的情况下,具有完整和不完整信息的博弈中的均衡是截然不同的(与具有完整记录的博弈相反)。我们还得到了博弈中任意时刻的均衡收益的下界,而不仅仅是在开始时,从而提供了更强的长期预测。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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