{"title":"Fault Analysis of the Stream Cipher Snow 3G","authors":"B. Debraize, Irene Marquez Corbella","doi":"10.1109/FDTC.2009.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FDTC.2009.33","url":null,"abstract":"Snow 3G is the backup encryption algorithm used in the mobile phone UMTS technology to ensure data confidentiality. Its design - a combiner with memory - is derived from the stream cipher Snow 2.0, with improvements against algebraic cryptanalysis and distinguishing attacks. No attack is known against Snow 3G today. In this paper, a fault attack against Snow 3G is proposed. Our attack recovers the secret key with only 22 fault injections.","PeriodicalId":288453,"journal":{"name":"2009 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133906699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Securing the Elliptic Curve Montgomery Ladder against Fault Attacks","authors":"N. Ebeid, Rob Lambert","doi":"10.1109/FDTC.2009.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FDTC.2009.35","url":null,"abstract":"The Montgomery ladder method of computing elliptic curve scalar multiplication is esteemed as an efficient algorithm, inherently resistant to simple side-channel attacks as well as to various fault attacks. In FDTC 08, Fouque etal present an attack on the Montgomery ladder in the presence of a point validation countermeasure, when the $y$-coordinate is not used. In this paper, we present an efficient countermeasure that renders the algorithm resistant to this attack as well as to other known fault attacks.","PeriodicalId":288453,"journal":{"name":"2009 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130054964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Practical Fault Attack on a Cryptographic LSI with ISO/IEC 18033-3 Block Ciphers","authors":"Toshinori Fukunaga, J. Takahashi","doi":"10.1109/FDTC.2009.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FDTC.2009.34","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents practical fault attack results on six kinds of block ciphers listed in ISO/IEC 18033-3 that are implemented on an LSI: AES, DES, Camellia, CAST-128, SEED, and MISTY1. We developed an experimental environment that injects faults into any desired round by supplying a clock signal with a glitch. We examined practical attack assumptions and the fault model based on experimental results. We also succeeded in recovering AES keys in the LSI using Piret's attack, which uses only one faulty cipher text obtained using the proposed experimental environment.","PeriodicalId":288453,"journal":{"name":"2009 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117182942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}