{"title":"Taxing Capital in the Age of Intangibles","authors":"Dan Ciuriak, Eurallyah Akinyi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3920763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3920763","url":null,"abstract":"The challenges of taxing capital are hardly new. Historically, given the differences in corporate profit tax rates across jurisdictions, companies have manipulated pricing to reduce their total tax burden. With advanced economies shifting to the innovation-intensive knowledge-based mode in the post-1980 period, taxing returns to capital became even more challenging since intangible capital assets can be parked in a low tax jurisdiction of choice. Furthermore, this rise of the intangibles economy has posed numerous governance problems, including how we measure economic activity, how we classify products, and importantly how and where economic returns are booked – and thus where and how they are taxed. The rise of the intangibles economies has led to a significant erosion of corporate tax revenue in the innovation-intensive advanced economies, even as the share of national income flowing to capital rose. For developing countries, the erosion is worse and comes on top of substantial erosion of corporate tax revenues from the tangibles economy due to weak tax administration and corruption. However, addressing the erosion would likely have significant redistributive impacts across economies, thereby creating political economy problems for designing and implementing reforms. The intangibles economy thus clearly poses a taxing problem that has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which accelerated the digital transformation, thereby escalating the problems facing governments in taxing intangibles, while at the same time blowing large holes in public finances thereby making it all the more urgent to stop the erosion. In this paper, we take up the following questions: how big is the taxing problem, whose problem is it, and the prospects for success of the various approaches to addressing, including inter alia the various digital services taxes that have been proposed or implemented and the proposed OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework. We conclude that the importance of tax reform in the modern digitalizing economy goes beyond preventing base erosion and profit shifting for it is about sustainable development and future prosperity. And whether we are there yet is a matter of wait and see.","PeriodicalId":285241,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Taxation","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128364909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corrective Regulation with Imperfect Instruments","authors":"E. Dávila, A. Walther","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3902824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3902824","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the optimal design of second-best corrective regulation, when some agents or activities cannot be perfectly regulated. We show that policy elasticities and Pigouvian wedges are sui¬€icient statistics to characterize the marginal welfare impact of regulatory policies in a large class of environments. We show that the optimal second-best policy is determined by a subset of policy elasticities: leakage elasticities, and characterize the marginal value of relaxing regulatory constraints. We apply our results to scenarios with unregulated agents/activities and with uniform regulation across agents/activities. We illustrate our results in applications to shadow banking, scale-invariant regulation, asset substitution, and fire sales.","PeriodicalId":285241,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Taxation","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126612579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is Dividend Distribution Tax a Tax on Income of Shareholder? The Debate Continues","authors":"Tarun Jain","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3880245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3880245","url":null,"abstract":"An inquiry into the innate nature of a tax presupposes examination of an intricate web of variables, which on most occasions results into raging debates. For examples, whether a tax on service provider is a tax on service or a professional tax, whether a tax on capital value of assets is same as wealth tax, whether a tax on tobacco is luxury tax, nature of expenditure tax, etc. are some intriguing controversies into the true nature of various taxes which have received exposition of the Supreme Court. In such cases, the complexities often issues when the characteristics of the tax legislation depart from the ordinarily understood dimensions of a particular tax. The immediate case at hand is of ‘tax on distributed dividend’, or Dividend Distribution Tax (‘DDT’), as it is popularly called which is imposed under a separate Chapter of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘ITA’). This tax was introduced in 2000, omitted and reintroduced after a brief hiatus. DDT has since then been in vogue upto March 2020 when its levy was discontinued. Its contours have been examined twice by the Supreme Court, yet the debate on its true nature continues. The exact issue for consideration is whether DDT is a tax on income of the shareholder, which has resulted into extensive debates, particularly in the context of international tax. The inquiry arises from the challenges by taxpayers to the official view of the Government that DDT is not a tax on the income of the shareholder. According to the shareholders, particularly those who are Non-Residents and entitled to invoke Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAA), DDT is nothing but a tax on income of shareholder and therefore the levy of DDT should also observe the limitations under the DTAA on any tax on dividend in India. The debate is ongoing and has received mixed response. Currently, the issue awaits consideration of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. This article seeks to demystify the cause of controversy and the run-up to the present status.","PeriodicalId":285241,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Taxation","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129614654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Picciotto, Tommaso Faccio, Jeffery M. Kadet, P. Janský, Alex Cobham, Javier Garcia-Bernardo
{"title":"For a Better GLOBE. METR: A Minimum Effective Tax Rate for Multinationals","authors":"S. Picciotto, Tommaso Faccio, Jeffery M. Kadet, P. Janský, Alex Cobham, Javier Garcia-Bernardo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3796030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3796030","url":null,"abstract":"An initiative is needed to break the logjam in the international negotiations to reform taxation of multinational enterprises (MNEs). The primary agreed goal of the project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) was to better align MNEs’ taxable profits with the location of real economic activity. The more recent phase of the process has established that this entails starting from each MNE’s global consolidated profits and applying formulaic methods to ensure that those profits are taxed by at least one, and only one country. It has also become clear that countries wishing to defend their corporate tax base should ensure that MNEs’ global profits are subject to a minimum effective tax rate, to end both profit shifting and tax competition. <br><br>We propose a modified version of the proposal for a global anti-base erosion tax (the GloBE) that would integrate its two main components to provide a balanced allocation of taxing rights to the home and host countries of MNEs. This could command the wide basis of support needed for rapid adoption by a coalition of willing countries, allowing immediate action for a sharp reduction of the revenue losses caused by the current rules. <br><br>Our methodology for a minimum effective tax rate (METR) could be applied to MNEs by any countries that choose to do so, whether they are home to MNEs, host of MNEs, or both. Building on the GloBE, the METR would be compatible with existing tax treaties, but being non-discriminatory it also complies with other international obligations. Although it could be introduced unilaterally, interested countries, supported by regional groupings and international organisations, should develop mutually agreed rules for application of the METR. Integrating many elements of the current proposals and aligning with the identified direction of travel, the METR both attacks immediate concerns and contributes to the momentum for a more comprehensive multilateral agreement.<br>","PeriodicalId":285241,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Taxation","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116068285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Promoting Female Economic Inclusion for Tax Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"S. Asongu, Alex Adegboye, J. Nnanna","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3740391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3740391","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores whether female economic inclusion enhances tax performance in a sample of 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 2000 to 2018. The study’s empirical evidence is based on the generalized method of moments in order to account for endogeneity concerns. Three tax performance measurements are used, notably, total taxes revenue excluding social contributions, reported tax revenue derived from natural resources sources, and total non-resource tax revenue. Three female inclusion indicators are used, namely, female employment in industry, female labour force participation, and female employment. The following empirical evidences are documented; (i) There is a negative net effect from the enhancement of female employment in the industry on the total tax revenue. (ii) There is a positive net effect of female employment in the industry on the non-resource taxes. An extended threshold analysis is performed to establish the critical masses that could further influence tax performance positively. The following thresholds are established. (i) a minimum of 15.35 “employment in industry, female (% of female employment)†for the total tax revenue and (ii) a maximum of 23.75 “employment in industry, female (% of female employment)†for the non-resource tax revenue. These critical masses are crucial for sustainable development because, below or beyond these thresholds, policy makers should complement the female economic inclusion with other economic measures designed to improve tax performance in Sub-Saharan Africa.","PeriodicalId":285241,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Taxation","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116408729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Social Accounting Matrix for Andalusia","authors":"R. Roson, Camille Van der Vosrt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3764507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3764507","url":null,"abstract":"We present the structure and the process of construction of a social accounting matrix for the Spanish region of Andalusia, for the year 2016. The SAM includes 359 accounts with their respective balances of revenues and expenses, and distinguishes exchanges and income transfers between Andalusia, the rest of Spain and the rest of the world. As the dataset provides a detailed summary on the economic structure, we illustrate some key characteristics of the Andalusian economy at the year 2016, by presenting some relevant statistics and indexes.","PeriodicalId":285241,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Taxation","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116960175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trump’s Taxes: An Analysis of the Allegations","authors":"Robert W. McGee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3707721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3707721","url":null,"abstract":"For years, the media and President Trump’s political opponents have been talking about the amount of taxes Trump pays (or doesn’t pay). As of this writing, his recent tax returns have not been released, so anything anyone says needs to be discounted. However, it is possible to make certain tentative statements and conclusions based on the facts that have been made available and the application of economic and political theory. The present paper does that.","PeriodicalId":285241,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Taxation","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130927491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vietnam Tax Policy Model","authors":"A. Shashkova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3744009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3744009","url":null,"abstract":"The present work adheres to the invisible political approach and the socio-economic approach leading to innovational development and forgotten in the official science. The author considers how the general approach to taxation changed with the transition from pre-industrial to industrial society and what changes underwenttook place in countries where this transition happened a century later than in Europe and America.","PeriodicalId":285241,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Taxation","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130412116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Transformation in BEPS Mechanism and Tax Evaluation from Global Digitalization and Tax Competition","authors":"Sonali Sachdeva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3726954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3726954","url":null,"abstract":"With the advent of the globalization, it was witnessed that there was a growth of communication system within the companies and the services were more intangible in nature. Therefore, the initiative of the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), 2013 was the one of the most significant effort to eradicate the problem of shifting tax profit. Further, the misalignment of the national tax laws benefitted the companies in shifting their profits to the less tax jurisdiction. This imbedded the basis for the arm’s length principle acting as a guidance for comparison of associated enterprises with the independent one.<br><br>The OECD/G20 Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, 2014 articulated a structural shift towards the profit-split method which is more suitable for intangible transactions. However, the 2018 Revised Guidance on the Application of the Transactional Profit Split Method: action 10 prescribed a revision of the above consideration. Consequently, Inclusive Framework’s 2019 asserted a need to address a more appropriate transfer pricing method that would be allow the evaluation of profits to go beyond the basic arm’s length principle. As a result, there is an unlikeliness with a stable tax system that can be adhered too. Therefore, I evaluate alternative proposals including the value created method or the residual profit-split method to re-examine the loopholes of the existing residence-source paradigm.","PeriodicalId":285241,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Taxation","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132375751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Costly Is Tax Avoidance? Evidence from Structural Estimation","authors":"Charles McClure","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3373777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3373777","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I develop a structural model to quantify the costs of tax avoidance. In the model, the firm trades off tax savings with tax audit risk, financial reporting considerations, and operational frictions imposed by tax avoidance, the last of which I label as nontax costs. The estimated parameters suggest nontax costs, which are difficult to observe, decrease pretax income by 6.4 percent or $58 million per firm-year. The large magnitude of this estimate can explain why firms appear to underutilize tax avoidance strategies. Through counterfactual analysis, I estimate the effect of tax audit risk and financial reporting considerations to find that financial reporting considerations have an effect on tax avoidance similar to the penalties imposed by tax authorities. Overall, the estimated parameters help explain the “undersheltering puzzle.”\u0000 JEL Classifications: G14; H21; H25; H26; M41; M48.","PeriodicalId":285241,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Taxation","volume":"176 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121090922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}