Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal最新文献_第2页

Rule of Law Crisis, Judiciary and Competition Law 法治危机、司法与竞争法

Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal Pub Date : 2019-06-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3431631

M. Bernatt

引用次数: 1

A Theory of Self-Enforcing Monetary Constitutions With Reference to the Suffolk System, 1825–1858 参考1825-1858年萨福克制度的自我执行货币制度理论

Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal Pub Date : 2018-10-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3173294

A. Salter, A. Young

引用次数: 13

Constitutional Rights as Bribes 贿赂的宪法权利

Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal Pub Date : 2018-09-10 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3246732

Rosalind Dixon

{"title":"Constitutional Rights as Bribes","authors":"Rosalind Dixon","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3246732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3246732","url":null,"abstract":"Constitutions worldwide protect an increasingly long list of rights. Constitutional scholars point to a variety of top-down and bottom-up explanations for this pattern of rights expansion. This Article, however, identifies an additional, underexplored dynamic underpinning this pattern in certain countries: the pairing of constitutional rights with various forms of structural constitutional change as part of a trade between civil society and dominant political actors in their aspirations, or support, for constitutional change. This form of trade, the Article further suggests, has potential troubling consequences for democracy: it can pave the way for the consolidation of dominant-party or presidential rule in ways that limit the effectiveness of rights-based constitutional changes themselves and pose a major threat to the institutional “minimum core” necessary for a true democracy. This, the Article argues, suggests a greater need for caution on the part of civil society before accepting rights as a form of “bribe,” or inducement, to support certain forms of structural constitutional change. For democratic constitutional designers, it also points to the advantages of “unbundling” different forms of constitutional change. The Article explores these arguments by reference to two recent examples of constitutional change, in Ecuador and Fiji, involving the combination of rights-based change with increasingly noncompetitive forms of democratic rule.","PeriodicalId":284892,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132013847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

A Constitutional Moment for the European Rule of Law - Upcoming Landmark Decisions Concerning the Polish Judiciary 欧洲法治的宪法时刻——即将到来的关于波兰司法的里程碑式决定

Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal Pub Date : 2018-06-20 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3199809

Armin von Bogdandy, Piotr Bogdanowicz, Iris Canor, Maciej Taborowski, Matthias Schmidt

引用次数: 3

Reforming the Justice System in the Western Balkans. Constitutional Concerns and Guarantees 改革西巴尔干地区的司法制度。宪法关注与保障

Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal Pub Date : 2018-06-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3198787

A. Anastasi

{"title":"Reforming the Justice System in the Western Balkans. Constitutional Concerns and Guarantees","authors":"A. Anastasi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3198787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3198787","url":null,"abstract":"It analyzes the judicial reform process in the region of the Western Balkans, especially for the transition countries that are in the process of being integrated in the European Union. The new mechanisms and institutions established by the reforms are analyzed to identify the solutions to the problems of the judiciary system in those countries. After the fall of the communist regimes, the countries have undergone reforms to establish new judicial systems in a democratic separation of power. However, the system needs to be extensively reformed, to fight corruption and strengthen the judicial power in a rule of law. The paper responds to the constitutional concerns and challenges of new mechanisms, set up by the reform, in order to find correct and effective solutions. Although each Western Balkan country has its own reform process, the presence of and assistance offered by the international community is a common feature. In addition to the analysis of the institutional changes, the role of international factors is treated as a guarantee, in two phases, during the process of drafting the reform and during the process of its application. The analysis focuses on Albania, which underwent the most recent reform of the judicial system, assisted by the International Monitoring Operation. Why such extensive reforms? Are the societies in crisis during this transition period toward democracy? Although these countries are committed to the European Union, the judicial system is involved in a crisis of integrity and non-independence. This type of crisis weakens the judicial power and public trust in the system. Through the study of these aspects of the reform, the paper responds to some of the questions raised in this framework.","PeriodicalId":284892,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126104556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

The Great Asymmetry and the Rule of Law in International Investment Arbitration 国际投资仲裁中的大不对称与法治化

Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal Pub Date : 2017-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3152808

A. Arcuri

{"title":"The Great Asymmetry and the Rule of Law in International Investment Arbitration","authors":"A. Arcuri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3152808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3152808","url":null,"abstract":"International investment arbitration can be said to be built on a great asymmetry: on the one hand, foreign investors are endowed with a set of significant rights, most notably the right to initiate disputes before arbitration tribunals; on the other hand, States and citizens of the host State affected by the investment do not enjoy comparable rights. This article assesses whether the in-built asymmetry of investor-state arbitration runs counter to the rule of law. Clarifying the relationship between the rule of law and the system of investment arbitration is of crucial importance, given that one of the rationales to have investor-state arbitration in international treaties is the enhancement of the rule of law; at least, many jurists so profess. While there is a rich literature (empirically) studying the effects of investment treaties on the rule of law, few studies have addressed whether the investment arbitration itself has the qualities of the rule of law. This article bridges this gap by showing how the in-built asymmetry of the system runs counter to the rule of law. Drawing on the rule of law research field, two conceptions of the rule of law - a teleological and a reflexive one – are presented and employed as basis for the the main analysis of this article. In light of the examination of the great asymmetry and of its clash with the rule of law, the article’s concluding remarks hint at possible reforms that would rebalance the asymmetry of current investment arbitration law.","PeriodicalId":284892,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123982263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Dynamic De/Centralization in Switzerland, 1848-2010 动态的瑞士去中心化，1848-2010

Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal Pub Date : 2017-09-27 DOI: 10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJX056

Paolo Dardanelli, S. Mueller

引用次数: 22

Counter-Majoritarian, Representative and Enlightened: The Roles of Constitutional Courts in Democracies 反多数主义、代议制与开明:民主国家宪法法院的角色

Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal Pub Date : 2017-09-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3096203

Luís Roberto Barroso

引用次数: 3

Constitutional Catallaxy: Friends and Enemies in an Open-Ended Social Order 宪法催化:一个开放式社会秩序中的朋友和敌人

Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal Pub Date : 2017-05-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2965513

A. Salter, R. Wagner

引用次数: 6

Property, Power, and Revolution in Russia, 1917-2017: Institutional Transformations in the ‘Longue Durée’ 1917-2017年俄国的财产、权力与革命:《Longue dur<s:1>》中的制度变迁

Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal Pub Date : 2017-03-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2946859

Carsten Herrmann-Pillath

{"title":"Property, Power, and Revolution in Russia, 1917-2017: Institutional Transformations in the ‘Longue Durée’","authors":"Carsten Herrmann-Pillath","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2946859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2946859","url":null,"abstract":"This paper unfolds an analytical perspective on the evolution of property rights in Russia from Tsarist times until today, combining the theory on violence and institutions suggested by North, Wallis and Weingast with Foucault’s analysis of power in society, especially his notions of biopolitics and governmentality. I argue that a historical constant is the subordination of property rights to the biopolitics of catch-up modernization, independent from their specific form, private or public (state-owned). This is embedded in the persistence of informal and ideational structures of Empire, manifest in peculiar forms of governmentality. The bridging concept between these different phenomena is that of ‘state capacity’. State ownership under socialism and Stalinism emerged as the default solution to the challenge of weak state capacity in the Empire. In Tsarist times, the transfer of absolute private property rights from the West had resulted in a developmental stalemate. However, after the biopolitics of the war economy had shifted to cold war rivalry, socialist planning was a mere formal shell in which the informal structures of governmentality in the Soviet Empire evolved. These provided the setting in which the privatization of the 1990s resulted in the emergence of an oligarchic ownership regime, eventually morphing into Putinist state capitalism which can be interpreted as a ‘neo-patrimonial regime’. These developments can be explained by the role of rent distribution in stabilizing intra-elite conflicts. With Imperial structures still prevalent, informal governmentality remains an important means to make up for weak state capacity, thus also weakening private property rights in their role of drawing boundaries between the political and the economic system.","PeriodicalId":284892,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Constitutions eJournal","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114399982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0