{"title":"Health Care Rationing and the Badness of Death","authors":"T. Campbell","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0019","url":null,"abstract":"According to Jeff McMahan, health care professionals ought to save an individual, A, from dying as a young adult (e.g., at age 30) rather than save some other individual, B, from dying as a newborn, even if the latter intervention would give B twice as many years of full-quality life as the former intervention would give A. Call this claim Young Adults over Newborns. In this chapter, I argue that if we accept Young Adults over Newborns, then we must reject at least one of three other more plausible claims. This constitutes a strong reason to reject Young Adults over Newborns.","PeriodicalId":283402,"journal":{"name":"Saving People from the Harm of Death","volume":"8 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124678239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epicurean Challenges to the Disvalue of Death","authors":"C. Solberg","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"In global health, several practices rely on the assumption that death has a disvalue for those who die. This includes the fact that we prioritize extending human lives rather than creating new ones, the combination Years Lived with Disability (YLD) and Years of Life Lost (YLL) into Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), as well as managing the trade-off between morbidity and mortality reduction in a health priority setting. According to Epicureanism, however, death cannot have any disvalue for those who die. Three main arguments are offered on behalf of Epicureanism: the view that we cannot experience death (the experience argument), the view that there is no time where death harms us (the time argument), and the view that there is a symmetry between the nonexistence before and after our lives (the symmetry argument). I show that all three arguments fail to convince.","PeriodicalId":283402,"journal":{"name":"Saving People from the Harm of Death","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131866518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Death Is Bad for Us as Agents","authors":"S. Burri","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Deprivation Account, a person’s death is bad for her if she would have lived a better life had she not died when she did in fact die. While the Deprivation Account rightly draws our attention to the fact that a person’s death can be overall bad for her in this way, there are other ways in which a person’s death can affect her adversely. In this chapter, I explore two of these other ways, both of which are related to the fact that we live our lives as agents. I argue that the prospect of death for individuals as agents sometimes puts limits on what enjoyable activities they may reasonably pursue. I also argue that when a person’s death frustrates her plans, it is to that extent absolutely bad for her: it provides a correct explanation for the presence of intrinsic badness in the person’s life. I conclude by showing how focusing on agential value can help us make sense of the judgment that the deaths of infants and adolescents can be similarly bad in a way that is relevant to policymaking.","PeriodicalId":283402,"journal":{"name":"Saving People from the Harm of Death","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128223203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against “the Badness of Death”","authors":"H. Greaves","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"It is tempting for health care analysts to theorize about the value of life-saving in terms of the “badness of death.” This move is innocuous in principle, but in practice it tends to lead theorists seriously astray. The problems arise because the concept of “badness” has several very different natural interpretations, and it proves notoriously difficult to keep the focus on the relevant ones. By way of illustration, this chapter surveys two particular such mistakes that (I will argue) philosophers and health care analysts have made. The first occurs in the context of Jeff McMahan’s Time-Relative Interest Account of the badness of death. The second concerns the value of family planning interventions. The mistakes in question would both be avoided if the debates were reframed in terms of the maximization of an appropriately chosen overall value function, eschewing any explicit reference to badness.","PeriodicalId":283402,"journal":{"name":"Saving People from the Harm of Death","volume":"210 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123003668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Gradualist View about the Badness of Death","authors":"B. Bradley","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter I introduce a view that has not been explored in detail and argue that it is a more plausible version of gradualism than extant views. It is based on the following simple thoughts: there is a difference between individuals that are susceptible to harm (by death or anything else) and individuals that are not. This difference is just the difference between individuals that are subjects of well-being and individuals that are not. And there is no sharp boundary between the individuals that are subjects of well-being and those that are not. In many cases it is vague whether an individual is a welfare subject. I attempt to formulate a view about the badness of death that takes account of this vagueness. I argue that this view, the Partial Welfare Subject View, has advantages over other gradualist views about death’s badness such as the Time-Relative Interest Account.","PeriodicalId":283402,"journal":{"name":"Saving People from the Harm of Death","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127707365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In Defense of the Time-Relative Interest Account","authors":"J. Mcmahan","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0020","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter defends the Time-Relative Interest Account of the misfortune of death against the two ingenious objections that Tim Campbell advances in chapter 18 of this volume. Campbell argues that this account, when combined with two other highly plausible claims, generates intransitive judgments about which options we ought to choose in a series of choices among pairs of options. He then argues that even if we can accept the intransitivity, our judgments must violate the principle of Contraction Consistency. I argue that there are good explanations of why the violations of transitivity and Contraction Consistency are innocuous.","PeriodicalId":283402,"journal":{"name":"Saving People from the Harm of Death","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114564149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Age, Death, and the Allocation of Life-Saving Resources","authors":"Espen Gamlund","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Each year policymakers around the world must make hard decisions about how to allocate scarce health care resources. Given the scarcity of many life-saving interventions, making allocation decisions entails determining who lives and who dies. One relevant aspect of such allocation decisions concerns the relative importance of death at different ages. The purpose of this chapter is to explore this issue by examining three age-specific allocation principles and their underlying moral foundations: a youngest first principle, prioritizing infants; a children first principle, prioritizing children; and a young adults first principle, prioritizing adolescents and young adults. My claim is that a youngest first principle can draw support from the Deprivation Account, a children first principle can draw support from a gradualist view, and a young adult first principle can draw support from the Complete Lives Account. I conclude, tentatively, that gradualism and children first allocation should be our favored choice.","PeriodicalId":283402,"journal":{"name":"Saving People from the Harm of Death","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123511565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deprivation and Identity","authors":"Jens Johansson","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"Don Marquis famously argues that abortion is typically immoral because it deprives the fetus of a future like yours and mine. He bases his argument on “animalism,” the view that human persons are human animals. Correspondingly, some of Marquis’s critics reject the argument by rejecting animalism. I argue, however, that animalism is considerably less friendly to Marquis’s argument than he and others have assumed. The discussion also suggests several more general points—for example, that in order to reject moral views such as Marquis’s, we need not deny that death is typically worse for its victim the more well-being it deprives her of or the earlier in life it occurs.","PeriodicalId":283402,"journal":{"name":"Saving People from the Harm of Death","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127086021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Badness of Dying Early","authors":"J. Broome","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"A common intuition suggests that it is less bad for an infant to die than for a young adult to die. This is puzzling because the infant has more life ahead of her than a young adult, so it seems she loses more when she dies. Jeff McMahan supports the common intuition and defends it by means of what he calls the “Time-Relative Interest Account” of the badness of death. I shall describe two possible interpretations of the Time-Relative Interest Account and raise a problem for each. Then I shall offer an alternative defense of the common intuition, which is an extension of the theory in population ethics known as “critical-level utilitarianism.”","PeriodicalId":283402,"journal":{"name":"Saving People from the Harm of Death","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128733136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quantifying the Harm of Death","authors":"E. Nord","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190921415.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"In economic evaluation of health interventions and in measurements of burden of disease, the harm of death is routinely quantified. Can this make sense? I review approaches to measuring willingness to pay to reduce risks of death, discuss methods used in health economics and burden of disease estimation for measuring the undesirability of death relative to the undesirability of illness, and address context-dependent variation in the harm of death. I conclude that most of the approaches to quantifying the harm of death are in fact quantifications of something else or quantifications based on questionable assumptions. However, there is a relatively straightforward approach consisting in studying how many averted cases of a given health loss people think an averted death is equal to in value and priority merit. Results from such studies can help policymakers set priorities between health programs in accord with population values.","PeriodicalId":283402,"journal":{"name":"Saving People from the Harm of Death","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132979899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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