Intellectual Property Law eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Estimates of Patent Rents from Firm Market Value","authors":"James Bessen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.912661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.912661","url":null,"abstract":"The value of patent rents is an important quantity for policy analysis. However, estimates in the literature based on patent renewals might be understated. Market value regressions could provide validation, but they have not had clear theoretical foundations for estimating patent rents. I develop a simple model to make upper-bound estimates of patent rents using regressions on Tobin's Q. I test this on a sample of US firms and find it robust to a variety of considerations. Estimates from market value regressions correspond well with estimates based on patentee behavior generally, but renewal estimates might be understated for pharmaceuticals.","PeriodicalId":281709,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property Law eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123925981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Appropriability, Preemption, and Firm Performance","authors":"M. Ceccagnoli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.962523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.962523","url":null,"abstract":"The impact of strategies used to appropriate innovation rents on firm performance is analyzed using a sample of U.S. public manufacturing firms. Stronger appropriability at the firm level, achieved through patent protection or the ownership of specialized complementary assets, leads to superior economic performance, as measured by the stock market valuation of a firm's R&D assets. Among commonly used 'non-conventional' patent strategies, preemptive patenting allows incumbents to strengthen their market power. Consistent with theory, such effect is higher for incumbents with higher ex ante market power and facing a higher threat of entry, and lower when R&D competition is characterized by the discovery of drastic innovations.","PeriodicalId":281709,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property Law eJournal","volume":"227 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123584529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reply: Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking","authors":"Mark A. Lemley, C. Shapiro","doi":"10.17605/OSF.IO/7JG5A","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/7JG5A","url":null,"abstract":"We argued in our paper, \"Patent Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking,\" that the threat to obtain a permanent injunction greatly enhances the patent holder's negotiating power, leading to royalty rates that exceed a benchmark level based on the value of the patented technology and the strength of the patent. John Golden, in his extensive comment on our paper, claims: \"Lemley and Shapiro err when they claim to have proven that 'patentees whose inventions are only one component of a larger product are systematically overcompensated.'\" However, the error is Golden's not ours. When patentees systematically capture value they did not create from others who did create it, they are being overcompensated by any reasonable measure, including the standard economic models on which we relied. In Part II, we briefly respond to his criticism of our empirical study of court-awarded reasonable royalties. Finally, Golden also claims that our recommendation to reduce the availability of permanent injunctions to patent holders who have claims to reasonable royalties but not lost profits remedy \"threatens to distort markets for innovation.\" We strongly disagree. It is patent holdup, which skews damages in ways more favorable to reasonable royalties, that distorts markets for innovation. A rule such as the one we propose, in which damages are calibrated to compensate patentees for their loss, is sensible public policy.","PeriodicalId":281709,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property Law eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116309122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets - Legal Requirements, Economic Aspects and Commercial Solutions, Taking Two Specific Situations and Application of Methods to Other Situations, Need for International Consensus","authors":"Akshat V. Pande","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.998781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.998781","url":null,"abstract":"This paper would discuss the valuation process, legal, economic and commercial aspects involved in two of such situations. First is the calculation of damages in an infringement suit where much of the law has already been laid down. However, this paper would suggest and discuss the Method of Econometric valuation which is by far a better method over the conventional methods and which satisfies the requirements of law laid down in UK and US and other important jurisdictions. The second situation analyzed is valuation for royalty calculation in Technology Transfer in which there is a great need as well as scope of negotiation and any valuation done is mainly to justify each party's quotation. This paper would suggest the application of option pricing methods which are used for valuation of financial options, to valuation of intellectual property assets to evaluate a reasonable royalty rate in an arm's length transaction. The last part of the paper would list various other purposes for which valuation of IP assets is done and how these two methods can prove better methods than the conventional methods and would suggest changes in law and need for international consensus in this particular area.","PeriodicalId":281709,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property Law eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121939416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Average Patent Pendency and Examination Errors: A Queuing Theoretic Analysis","authors":"A. Batabyal, Gregory J. DeAngelo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.983817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.983817","url":null,"abstract":"Researchers have raised two concerns about the current patent approval process by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). First, it takes too long to process applications. Second, examiners make too many errors in the approval process. The first concern suggests that examiners ought to be less stringent in their decision making and hence take less time in processing applications. The second concern suggests exactly the opposite. Given this state of affairs, we analyze the following question: Does a more stringent examination of applications always lengthen the pendency period? Our theoretical analysis shows that there is no definite answer to this question. Hence, we use numerical methods and our numerical analysis leads to two conclusions. For many values of the model parameters that describe the stringency of examinations, a more stringent examination process does lengthen the pendency period. In contrast, for most values of the model parameter that describes the volume of patent applications handled by the PTO under study, a more stringent examination process does not lengthen the pendency period.","PeriodicalId":281709,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property Law eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132410196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Music Market in the Age of Download","authors":"Iacopo Grassi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1003804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1003804","url":null,"abstract":"Internet, mp3 files, peer-to-peer software and digital technologies for copying have radically modified the music sector. In this paper I present a theoretical model, that investigates the consequences of the appearance of a pirate low quality good (typically a mp3 file) in the music market. In this paper I propose a model of sampling, consider the possibility that the firm modifies its business entering into the low quality segment and investigate the supposed conflict between the recording company, whose profit depends on the CD sold, and the artist, whose profits depend in part on the live performance, the demand of which can increase for the positive externality due to the illegal download of music.","PeriodicalId":281709,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property Law eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123818243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Access-Right and Copyright - [Presentation Slides]","authors":"Z. Efroni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.997568","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.997568","url":null,"abstract":"Slides of a presentation at Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property in Munich describing a work project on copyright law in the digital environment. Slides introduce the underlying inquiry and frame the issues as descriptive and prescriptive questions concerning proprietary access control under copyright. Three fundamental concepts stand at the basis of such questions, namely, access, property and information. These concepts receive some elaboration in the context of access-to-information problems. The presentation next elaborates on the concept of the \"access-right\" and offers a formal definition. It then attempts to identify aspects and elements of the access-right as manifested in \"traditional\" copyright law and compares it to new manifestation of the access-right in current \"digital\" copyright law. I address overprotection concerns related to the formal (de jure) and actual (de facto) expansion of the exclusive rights and briefly touch upon three categories of solutions and approached: copyright neo-conservatism, copyright reformism and finally, an access-right approach to the problems of copyright law and policy in the digital age.","PeriodicalId":281709,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property Law eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114820901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Internet Packet Sniffing and its Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate and the Balance of Power between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers","authors":"R. Frieden","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.995273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.995273","url":null,"abstract":"When Internet Service Providers (\"ISPs\") serve as neutral conduits they qualify for a safe harbor exemption from liability for carrying copyright infringing traffic provided by Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. However ISPs now want to operate non-neutral networks capable of offering \"better than best efforts\" routing and premium services for both content providers and consumers seeking higher quality of service and more reliable traffic delivery. The ability to inspect specific packet streams also enables ISPs to identify traffic type and routing priority as well as a greater ability to determine copyright compliance. The debate about Internet neutrality has largely ignored whether ISPs risk losing safe harbors from copyright infringement when they actively manage their networks to offer tiered services. This paper will assess non-neutral network operation in terms of its impact on intellectual property rights, including consumers' fair use opportunities. The paper will assess whether and how ISPs might lose their safe harbor for copyright infringement liability based on new technological means to know about the content they carry. Additionally the paper will consider whether ISPs have an affirmative duty to conduct packet inspection absent a legislative mandate. The paper also will examine litigation over mandatory processing of broadcast television \"flags,\" which specify consumer use options, but which require equipment processing on user premises. The paper concludes that ISPs regulatory status as information service providers does not provide an absolute exemption from responsibilities to examine the content they carry and to provide reasonable safeguards for protecting copyrights. However such affirmative efforts to operate a non-neutral network may impose greater burdens on ISPs to protect creators' intellectual property rights with the likely reduction of consumers' fair use opportunities.","PeriodicalId":281709,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property Law eJournal","volume":"228 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117008227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"International Approaches to the Orphan Works Problem","authors":"S. Bezos","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.989213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.989213","url":null,"abstract":"Regardless of the immediacy of the threat to intellectual progress created by orphan works, several countries have had systems in place for a number of years in order to combat the problem of stagnant works, such as those that have been orphaned. For many more countries, a solution has not yet been implemented, and the orphan works problem is the subject of myriad studies. This paper will look at the systems that are in place, as well as the inquiries into the problem in the United States and in Europe. What seems at first like a minor by-product of modern copyright law in reality threatens the need to rethink our copyright regimes in order to better serve the real functions of the property right.","PeriodicalId":281709,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131272588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Using Apportionment to Rein in the Georgia-Pacific Factors","authors":"Eric E. Bensen, Danielle M. White","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.982897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.982897","url":null,"abstract":"In a dramatic departure from well established patented damages law, which would confine a reasonable royalty to a portion of the profit contributed by the infringed patent, current Federal Circuit precedent permits a reasonable royalty on an even relatively insignificant component to exceed not only the profit attributable that component, but, in some cases, the entire profit on the product. That precedent ignores the history of the reasonable royalty award, which originated as merely a substitute for an established royalty. Just as the real life negotiations that led to an established royalty would result in the licensor and each licensee splitting the profit attributable to the licensed patent, the hypothetical negotiation that results in a reasonable royalty should result in the patentee and infringer splitting the profits attributable to the infringed patent. The Federal Circuit's precedent also ignores longstanding apportionment principles, under which a patentee should not be entitled to recover any reasonable royalty on the unpatented features of an infringing product. Unbound as they are from their economic and legal foundations, royalty awards have, not surprisingly, become arbitrary and often punitive. This article argues that to rein in reasonable royalty awards, restore them to their historical role, and ensure that they are consistent with long-standing principles of patent damages law, apportionment should be the threshold question in every reasonable royalty analysis. That is, the first question should be: what portion of the profits on the infringing product is attributable to the claimed invention's advance over the prior art? It is that portion of the profits - and only that portion - that the patentee should receive as a share by way of a royalty. By treating apportionment as a threshold question, therefore, courts can ensure that the resulting reasonable royalty award is properly confined to a portion of the profits attributable to the patent. The proper magnitude of that portion can then be determined by reference to the remaining Georgia-Pacific and other relevant factors.","PeriodicalId":281709,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property Law eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131018829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}