2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy最新文献

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Tamper Evident Microprocessors 防篡改微处理器
2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2010-05-16 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2010.19
A. Waksman, S. Sethumadhavan
{"title":"Tamper Evident Microprocessors","authors":"A. Waksman, S. Sethumadhavan","doi":"10.1109/SP.2010.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.19","url":null,"abstract":"Most security mechanisms proposed to date unquestioningly place trust in microprocessor hardware. This trust, however, is misplaced and dangerous because microprocessors are vulnerable to insider attacks that can catastrophically compromise security, integrity and privacy of computer systems. In this paper, we describe several methods to strengthen the fundamental assumption about trust in microprocessors. By employing practical, lightweight attack detectors within a microprocessor, we show that it is possible to protect against malicious logic embedded in microprocessor hardware. We propose and evaluate two area-efficient hardware methods - TrustNet and DataWatch - that detect attacks on microprocessor hardware by knowledgeable, malicious insiders. Our mechanisms leverage the fact that multiple components within a microprocessor (e.g., fetch, decode pipeline stage etc.) must necessarily coordinate and communicate to execute even simple instructions, and that any attack on a microprocessor must cause erroneous communications between micro architectural subcomponents used to build a processor. A key aspect of our solution is that TrustNet and DataWatch are themselves highly resilient to corruption. We demonstrate that under realistic assumptions, our solutions can protect pipelines and on-chip cache hierarchies at negligible area cost and with no performance impact. Combining TrustNet and DataWatch with prior work on fault detection has the potential to provide complete coverage against a large class of microprocessor attacks.","PeriodicalId":280492,"journal":{"name":"2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127499955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 89
Investigation of Triangular Spamming: A Stealthy and Efficient Spamming Technique 三角型垃圾邮件研究:一种隐蔽有效的垃圾邮件技术
2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2010-05-16 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2010.42
Zhiyun Qian, Z. Morley Mao, Yinglian Xie, Fang Yu
{"title":"Investigation of Triangular Spamming: A Stealthy and Efficient Spamming Technique","authors":"Zhiyun Qian, Z. Morley Mao, Yinglian Xie, Fang Yu","doi":"10.1109/SP.2010.42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.42","url":null,"abstract":"Spam is increasingly accepted as a problem associated with compromised hosts or email accounts. This problem not only makes the tracking of spam sources difficult but also enables a massive amount of illegitimate or unwanted emails to be disseminated quickly. Various attempts have been made to analyze, backtrack, detect, and prevent spam using both network as well as content characteristics. However, relatively less attention has been given to understanding how spammers actually carry out their spamming activities from a network angle. Spammers’ network behavior has significant impact on spammers’ common goal, sending spam in a stealthy and efficient manner. Our work thoroughly investigates a fairly unknown spamming technique we name as triangular spamming that exploits routing irregularities of spoofed IP packets. It is highly stealthy and efficient in that triangular spamming enables 1) exploiting bandwidth diversity of botnet hosts to carry out spam campaigns effectively without divulging precious high-bandwidth hosts and 2) bypassing the current SMTP traffic blocking policies. Despite its relative obscurity, its use has been confirmed by the network operator community. Through carefully devised probing techniques and actual deployment of triangular spamming on Planetlab (a wide-area distributed testbed), we investigate the feasibility, impact of triangular spamming and propose practical detection and prevention methods. From our probing experiments, we found that 97% of the networks which block outbound SMTP traffic are vulnerable to triangular spamming and only 44% of them are listed on Spamhaus Policy Blocking List (PBL).","PeriodicalId":280492,"journal":{"name":"2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124000300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 25
Identifying Dormant Functionality in Malware Programs 识别恶意软件程序中的休眠功能
2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2010-05-16 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2010.12
P. M. Comparetti, G. Salvaneschi, E. Kirda, C. Kolbitsch, Christopher Krügel, S. Zanero
{"title":"Identifying Dormant Functionality in Malware Programs","authors":"P. M. Comparetti, G. Salvaneschi, E. Kirda, C. Kolbitsch, Christopher Krügel, S. Zanero","doi":"10.1109/SP.2010.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.12","url":null,"abstract":"To handle the growing flood of malware, security vendors and analysts rely on tools that automatically identify and analyze malicious code. Current systems for automated malware analysis typically follow a dynamic approach, executing an unknown program in a controlled environment (sandbox) and recording its runtime behavior. Since dynamic analysis platforms directly run malicious code, they are resilient to popular malware defense techniques such as packing and code obfuscation. Unfortunately, in many cases, only a small subset of all possible malicious behaviors is observed within the short time frame that a malware sample is executed. To mitigate this issue, previous work introduced techniques such as multi-path or forced execution to increase the coverage of dynamic malware analysis. Unfortunately, using these techniques is potentially expensive, as the number of paths that require analysis can grow exponentially. In this paper, we propose Reanimator, a novel solution to determine the capabilities (malicious functionality) of malware programs. Our solution is based on the insight that we can leverage behavior observed while dynamically executing a specific malware sample to identify similar functionality in other programs. More precisely, when we observe malicious actions during dynamic analysis, we automatically extract and model the parts of the malware binary that are responsible for this behavior. We then leverage these models to check whether similar code is present in other samples. This allows us to statically identify dormant functionality (functionality that is not observed during dynamic analysis) in malicious programs. We evaluate our approach on thousands of real-world malware samples, and we show that our system is successful in identifying additional, malicious functionality. As a result, our approach can significantly improve the coverage of malware analysis results.","PeriodicalId":280492,"journal":{"name":"2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116343898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 120
Revocation Systems with Very Small Private Keys 私钥非常小的撤销系统
2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2010-05-16 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2010.23
Allison Bishop, A. Sahai, Brent Waters
{"title":"Revocation Systems with Very Small Private Keys","authors":"Allison Bishop, A. Sahai, Brent Waters","doi":"10.1109/SP.2010.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.23","url":null,"abstract":"In this work, we design a method for creating public key broadcast encryption systems. Our main technical innovation is based on a new \"two equation\" technique for revoking users. This technique results in two key contributions: First, our new scheme has ciphertext size overhead $O(r)$, where $r$ is the number of revoked users, and the size of public and private keys is only a emph{constant} number of group elements from an elliptic-curve group of prime order. In addition, the public key allows us to encrypt to an unbounded number of users. Our system is the first to achieve such parameters. We give two versions of our scheme: a simpler version which we prove to be selectively secure in the standard model under a new, but non-interactive assumption, and another version that employs the new dual system encryption technique of Waters to obtain adaptive security under the d-BDH and decisional Linear assumptions. Second, we show that our techniques can be used to realize Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) systems with non-monotonic access formulas, where our key storage is significantly more efficient than previous solutions. This result is also proven selectively secure in the standard model under our new non-interactive assumption.","PeriodicalId":280492,"journal":{"name":"2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124170141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 282
A Practical Attack to De-anonymize Social Network Users 社交网络用户去匿名化的实用攻击
2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2010-05-16 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2010.21
Gilbert Wondracek, Thorsten Holz, E. Kirda, Christopher Krügel
{"title":"A Practical Attack to De-anonymize Social Network Users","authors":"Gilbert Wondracek, Thorsten Holz, E. Kirda, Christopher Krügel","doi":"10.1109/SP.2010.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.21","url":null,"abstract":"Social networking sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Xing have been reporting exponential growth rates and have millions of registered users. In this paper, we introduce a novel de-anonymization attack that exploits group membership information that is available on social networking sites. More precisely, we show that information about the group memberships of a user (i.e., the groups of a social network to which a user belongs) is sufficient to uniquely identify this person, or, at least, to significantly reduce the set of possible candidates. That is, rather than tracking a user's browser as with cookies, it is possible to track a person. To determine the group membership of a user, we leverage well-known web browser history stealing attacks. Thus, whenever a social network user visits a malicious website, this website can launch our de-anonymization attack and learn the identity of its visitors. The implications of our attack are manifold, since it requires a low effort and has the potential to affect millions of social networking users. We perform both a theoretical analysis and empirical measurements to demonstrate the feasibility of our attack against Xing, a medium-sized social network with more than eight million members that is mainly used for business relationships. Furthermore, we explored other, larger social networks and performed experiments that suggest that users of Facebook and LinkedIn are equally vulnerable.","PeriodicalId":280492,"journal":{"name":"2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131347493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 387
Side-Channel Leaks in Web Applications: A Reality Today, a Challenge Tomorrow Web应用程序中的侧信道泄漏:今天的现实,明天的挑战
2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2010-05-16 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2010.20
Shuo Chen, Rui Wang, Xiaofeng Wang, Kehuan Zhang
{"title":"Side-Channel Leaks in Web Applications: A Reality Today, a Challenge Tomorrow","authors":"Shuo Chen, Rui Wang, Xiaofeng Wang, Kehuan Zhang","doi":"10.1109/SP.2010.20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.20","url":null,"abstract":"With software-as-a-service becoming mainstream, more and more applications are delivered to the client through the Web. Unlike a desktop application, a web application is split into browser-side and server-side components. A subset of the application’s internal information flows are inevitably exposed on the network. We show that despite encryption, such a side-channel information leak is a realistic and serious threat to user privacy. Specifically, we found that surprisingly detailed sensitive information is being leaked out from a number of high-profile, top-of-the-line web applications in healthcare, taxation, investment and web search: an eavesdropper can infer the illnesses/medications/surgeries of the user, her family income and investment secrets, despite HTTPS protection; a stranger on the street can glean enterprise employees' web search queries, despite WPA/WPA2 Wi-Fi encryption. More importantly, the root causes of the problem are some fundamental characteristics of web applications: stateful communication, low entropy input for better interaction, and significant traffic distinctions. As a result, the scope of the problem seems industry-wide. We further present a concrete analysis to demonstrate the challenges of mitigating such a threat, which points to the necessity of a disciplined engineering practice for side-channel mitigations in future web application developments.","PeriodicalId":280492,"journal":{"name":"2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134312907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 427
Inspector Gadget: Automated Extraction of Proprietary Gadgets from Malware Binaries Inspector Gadget:自动从恶意软件二进制文件中提取专有Gadget
2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2010-05-16 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2010.10
C. Kolbitsch, Thorsten Holz, Christopher Krügel, E. Kirda
{"title":"Inspector Gadget: Automated Extraction of Proprietary Gadgets from Malware Binaries","authors":"C. Kolbitsch, Thorsten Holz, Christopher Krügel, E. Kirda","doi":"10.1109/SP.2010.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.10","url":null,"abstract":"Unfortunately, malicious software is still an unsolved problem and a major threat on the Internet. An important component in the fight against malicious software is the analysis of malware samples: Only if an analyst understands the behavior of a given sample, she can design appropriate countermeasures. Manual approaches are frequently used to analyze certain key algorithms, such as downloading of encoded updates, or generating new DNS domains for command and control purposes. In this paper, we present a novel approach to automatically extract, from a given binary executable, the algorithm related to a certain activity of the sample. We isolate and extract these instructions and generate a so-called gadget, i.e., a stand-alone component that encapsulates a specific behavior. We make sure that a gadget can autonomously perform a specific task by including all relevant code and data into the gadget such that it can be executed in a self-contained fashion. Gadgets are useful entities in analyzing malicious software: In particular, they are valuable for practitioners, as understanding a certain activity that is embedded in a binary sample (e.g., the update function) is still largely a manual and complex task. Our evaluation with several real-world samples demonstrates that our approach is versatile and useful in practice.","PeriodicalId":280492,"journal":{"name":"2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130567955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 112
Bootstrapping Trust in Commodity Computers 在商品计算机中引导信任
2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2010-05-16 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2010.32
Bryan Parno, Jonathan M. McCune, A. Perrig
{"title":"Bootstrapping Trust in Commodity Computers","authors":"Bryan Parno, Jonathan M. McCune, A. Perrig","doi":"10.1109/SP.2010.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.32","url":null,"abstract":"Trusting a computer for a security-sensitive task (such as checking email or banking online) requires the user to know something about the computer's state. We examine research on securely capturing a computer's state, and consider the utility of this information both for improving security on the local computer (e.g., to convince the user that her computer is not infected with malware) and for communicating a remote computer's state (e.g., to enable the user to check that a web server will adequately protect her data). Although the recent \"Trusted Computing\" initiative has drawn both positive and negative attention to this area, we consider the older and broader topic of bootstrapping trust in a computer. We cover issues ranging from the wide collection of secure hardware that can serve as a foundation for trust, to the usability issues that arise when trying to convey computer state information to humans. This approach unifies disparate research efforts and highlights opportunities for additional work that can guide real-world improvements in computer security.","PeriodicalId":280492,"journal":{"name":"2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116699783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 177
Object Capabilities and Isolation of Untrusted Web Applications 对象功能和不受信任的Web应用程序的隔离
2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2010-05-16 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2010.16
S. Maffeis, John C. Mitchell, Ankur Taly
{"title":"Object Capabilities and Isolation of Untrusted Web Applications","authors":"S. Maffeis, John C. Mitchell, Ankur Taly","doi":"10.1109/SP.2010.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.16","url":null,"abstract":"A growing number of current web sites combine active content (applications) from untrusted sources, as in so-called mashups. The object-capability model provides an appealing approach for isolating untrusted content: if separate applications are provided disjoint capabilities, a sound object-capability framework should prevent untrusted applications from interfering with each other, without preventing interaction with the user or the hosting page. In developing language-based foundations for isolation proofs based on object-capability concepts, we identify a more general notion of authority safety that also implies resource isolation. After proving that capability safety implies authority safety, we show the applicability of our framework for a specific class of mashups. In addition to proving that a JavaScript subset based on Google Caja is capability safe, we prove that a more expressive subset of JavaScript is authority safe, even though it is not based on the object-capability model.","PeriodicalId":280492,"journal":{"name":"2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121625234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 129
On the Incoherencies in Web Browser Access Control Policies Web浏览器访问控制策略的不一致性研究
2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2010-05-16 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2010.35
Kapil Singh, Alexander Moshchuk, Helen J. Wang, Wenke Lee
{"title":"On the Incoherencies in Web Browser Access Control Policies","authors":"Kapil Singh, Alexander Moshchuk, Helen J. Wang, Wenke Lee","doi":"10.1109/SP.2010.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.35","url":null,"abstract":"Web browsers' access control policies have evolved piecemeal in an ad-hoc fashion with the introduction of new browser features. This has resulted in numerous incoherencies. In this paper, we analyze three major access control flaws in today's browsers: (1) principal labeling is different for different resources, raising problems when resources interplay, (2) runtime changes to principal identities are handled inconsistently, and (3)browsers mismanage resources belonging to the user principal. We show that such mishandling of principals leads to many access control incoherencies, presenting hurdles for web developers to construct secure web applications. A unique contribution of this paper is to identify the compatibility cost of removing these unsafe browser features. To do this, we have built WebAnalyzer, a crawler-based framework for measuring real-world usage of browser features, and used it to study the top 100,000 popular web sites ranked by Alexa. Our methodology and results serve as a guideline for browser designers to balance security and backward compatibility.","PeriodicalId":280492,"journal":{"name":"2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"86 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128996872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 90
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