CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure最新文献

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Shareholders Access to Boiler Room Minutes 股东有权查阅锅炉房会议记录
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure Pub Date : 2013-01-31 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2209688
B. Kampanje
{"title":"Shareholders Access to Boiler Room Minutes","authors":"B. Kampanje","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2209688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2209688","url":null,"abstract":"Some pressure groups propagate that agency costs in companies could be reduced if shareholders would have access to board minutes as the shareholders would have first hand information regarding the affairs of the reporting entity rather than analysing the company through annual reports which tend to be in a standardise format and in summary form. This paper argues that no real tangible benefits would accrue to shareholders as current regulatory instruments provide safeguards for disgruntled shareholders.","PeriodicalId":272897,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132553020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The DISCLOSE Act, Deliberation, and the First Amendment 披露法案,审议和第一修正案
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure Pub Date : 2010-07-25 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1710803
J. Samples
{"title":"The DISCLOSE Act, Deliberation, and the First Amendment","authors":"J. Samples","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1710803","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1710803","url":null,"abstract":"The United States Supreme Court decided in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that Congress may not prohibit spending on political speech by corporations. President Obama and several members of Congress have sharply criticized Citizens United, and Sen. Charles Schumer and Rep. Chris Van Hollen have proposed the DISCLOSE Act in response to the ruling. DISCLOSE mandates disclosure of corporate sources of independent spending on speech, putatively in the interest of shareholders and voters. However, it is unlikely that either shareholders or voters would be made better off by this legislation. Shareholders could demand and receive such disclosure without government mandates, given the efficiency of capital markets. The benefits of such disclosure for voters are likely less than assumed, while the costs are paid in chilled speech and in less rational public deliberation. DISCLOSE also prohibits speech by government contractors, TARP recipients, and companies managed by foreign nationals. The case for prohibiting speech by each of these groups seems flawed. In general, DISCLOSE exploits loopholes in Citizens United limits on government control of speech to contravene the spirit of that decision and the letter of the First Amendment.","PeriodicalId":272897,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132522529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Financial Contracts and ‘Junk Bonds’ Purchases in the Italian Legal System: A Matter of (In)Correct Disclosure 意大利法律体系中的金融合同和“垃圾债券”购买:正确披露的问题
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure Pub Date : 2010-03-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1574922
C. Amato
{"title":"Financial Contracts and ‘Junk Bonds’ Purchases in the Italian Legal System: A Matter of (In)Correct Disclosure","authors":"C. Amato","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1574922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1574922","url":null,"abstract":"The essay is concerned with the protection of investors against purchases of ‘junk bonds’. As financial transactions are characterized by inherent risk, contractual unconscionability is not the relevant legal issue to be dealt with. The argument submitted by the author is therefore that protection of purchasers of financial products should focus of the nature and consequences deriving from liability triggered by reliance on negligent misstatements concerning economic information which induces investors to purchase ‘junk bonds’. Moreover, as the complex process underlying the issue and placement of financial securities involves the contribution of different professionals, their different roles should be reflected in a gradated liability scale covering each player contributing to the provision of these financial products. The conclusion is that civil liability remedies do not necessarily provide the only possible answer for the protection of investors: in addition, alternative remedies subsequent to the occurrence of damages (i.e., stricter criminal penalties), or preventive measures (such as applicable rules of conduct), as well as collateral sanctions (reputational risks), or new powerful procedural tools (class actions) may be able to support and protect investors more effectively than simple civil liability rules.","PeriodicalId":272897,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124384525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Value Relevance of Management Forecasts and Their Impact on Analysts' Forecasts: Empirical Evidence from Japan 管理层预测的价值相关性及其对分析师预测的影响:来自日本的经验证据
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure Pub Date : 2010-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6281.2009.00299.x
K. Ota
{"title":"The Value Relevance of Management Forecasts and Their Impact on Analysts' Forecasts: Empirical Evidence from Japan","authors":"K. Ota","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-6281.2009.00299.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6281.2009.00299.x","url":null,"abstract":"A major financial disclosure feature in Japan is that stock exchanges require firms to provide next year's earnings forecasts. This study investigates the value relevance of Japanese management earnings forecasts and their impact on analysts' earnings forecasts. First, the value relevance of management forecasts is investigated using a valuation framework provided by Ohlson (2001), in which firm value is expressed as a function of book value, current earnings and next year's expected earnings. The analysis yields that of the three accounting variables examined, management forecasts have the highest correlation and incremental explanatory power with stock price. Next, the impact of management forecasts on analysts' forecasts is examined. The results show that more than 90% of changes in analysts' forecasts are explained by management forecasts alone. Further analysis reveals that the heavy dependence of financial analysts on management forecasts in formulating their own forecasts may partially be attributed to the relatively high accuracy of management forecasts. At the same time, financial analysts also somewhat modify management forecasts when certain financial factors indicate that the credibility of management forecasts is in doubt. Overall, this study presents empirical evidence that Japanese management forecasts provide useful information for the market and have a significant influence on analysts' forecasts.","PeriodicalId":272897,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116990127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 49
Internet Financial Reporting: The Case of Turkey 互联网财务报告:以土耳其为例
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure Pub Date : 2009-10-18 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1490523
Aslihan E. Bozcuk, Burak Sabri Arzova, S. Aslan
{"title":"Internet Financial Reporting: The Case of Turkey","authors":"Aslihan E. Bozcuk, Burak Sabri Arzova, S. Aslan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1490523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1490523","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of our paper is to investigate the current state of internet financial reporting in light of the recent regulatory changes in the financial reporting environment of Turkish firms. Although these regulations only cover publicly listed firms, there has also been some usage of the internet as a means of disseminating financial information by large unlisted firms. However, we do not know the scale and scope of such voluntary financial disclosures or how they have changed over time. Design/methodology/approach – We survey the top 500 Turkish industrial firms on the ‘Istanbul Chamber of Industry 500 list’ (ICI500) to ascertain whether the recent regulatory changes have led to significant changes with respect to their financial reporting on the internet. Findings – Although we report a statistically significant increase in the number of firms providing financial disclosures on the internet from 2003 to 2007, we highlight a number of problem areas such as the extremely low level of voluntary disclosures (merely 7 per cent of the firms) and the apparent reluctance of listed firms to provide financial information unless it is mandatory to do so (such as financial summaries, financial ratios, share price performance and management reports). Originality/value – Our study provides detailed information on the state of internet financial reporting in Turkey before and after major regulatory changes and focuses not just on quoted firms but also on large unlisted industrials.","PeriodicalId":272897,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124141428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Is Corporate Disclosure Necessarily Desirable? A Survey 公司信息披露是否必要?一项调查显示
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure Pub Date : 2009-06-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1494238
Celine Gainet, Dhafer Saidane, Etienne Farvaque, Catherine Refait-Alexandre
{"title":"Is Corporate Disclosure Necessarily Desirable? A Survey","authors":"Celine Gainet, Dhafer Saidane, Etienne Farvaque, Catherine Refait-Alexandre","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1494238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1494238","url":null,"abstract":"This article reviews the recent literature on the consequences of disclosure for listed firms. Though some studies show that disclosure is desirable for shareholders because it reduces the cost of capital, and increases the value created, others provide more mixed results. The conclusion on the collective advantages is even less convincing; it is not at all certain that disclosure can improve the stability of financial markets. To explain these results, it is necessary to invoke the costs and pernicious effects of disclosure. Disclosing information is expensive: because of the communication and audit costs, strategic information given to competitors and because disclosure can increase managers’ suboptimal behavior. But corporate disclosure also generates informational costs, because it is not certain that it improves the information held by third parties. Indeed, a firm can disclose information that is false, manipulated, too complex or too extensive. In this case, disclosure can increase information asymmetry between agents. Finally, disclosure can reduce actors’ incentives to look for information about the firm; it can reduce the knowledge that the market has at its disposal. Disclosure can therefore lead to an illusion of knowledge, increasing the instability of the financial markets instead of reducing it.","PeriodicalId":272897,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132657755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Corporate Strategy and Information Disclosure 企业战略与信息披露
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure Pub Date : 2006-02-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.473562
Daniel Ferreira, Marcelo Rezende
{"title":"Corporate Strategy and Information Disclosure","authors":"Daniel Ferreira, Marcelo Rezende","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.473562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.473562","url":null,"abstract":"We examine voluntary disclosures of information about corporate strategies. We develop a model in which managers choose whether to reveal their strategic plans only to some partners of the firm or also to the outside world. We show that managers face a tradeoff when deciding whether to disclose their private information to outsiders. On the one hand, by disclosing their intentions, managers become reluctant to change their minds in the future. This may lead them to make inefficient project implementation decisions. On the other hand, information disclosure about corporate strategy provides strong incentives for partners of the firm to undertake strategy-specific investments.","PeriodicalId":272897,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132993729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 92
The Effect of Multi-Nationality on the Precision of Management Earnings Forecasts 多国籍对管理层盈余预测精度的影响
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1504/IJAAPE.2007.017455
Bruce Runyan, Murphy D. Smith
{"title":"The Effect of Multi-Nationality on the Precision of Management Earnings Forecasts","authors":"Bruce Runyan, Murphy D. Smith","doi":"10.1504/IJAAPE.2007.017455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJAAPE.2007.017455","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the relationship between a firm's degree of multi-nationality and its managers' earnings forecasts. Firms with a high degree of multi nationality are subject to greater uncertainty regarding earnings forecasts due to the additional risk resulting from the morecomplex multi-national environment. Prior research demonstrates that firms that fail to meet or beat market expectations experience disproportionate market losses at earnings announcement dates. The complexities and greater uncertainty resulting from higher levels of multi nationality are expected to be negatively associated with management earnings forecast precision. Results indicate that precision of management earnings forecasts is significantly negatively related to multi nationality (foreign sales/total sales and the number of geographic segments). These findings should be of interest to investors, analysts and other stakeholders who make decisions based on management earnings forecasts and to those interested in how multi-nationality affects business in general.","PeriodicalId":272897,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Disclosure","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133714624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
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