2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)最新文献

Measuring and Analyzing Search Engine Poisoning of Linguistic Collisions 测量和分析搜索引擎中毒的语言冲突

2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2019.00025

Matthew Joslin, Neng Li, S. Hao, Minhui Xue, Haojin Zhu

{"title":"Measuring and Analyzing Search Engine Poisoning of Linguistic Collisions","authors":"Matthew Joslin, Neng Li, S. Hao, Minhui Xue, Haojin Zhu","doi":"10.1109/SP.2019.00025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00025","url":null,"abstract":"Misspelled keywords have become an appealing target in search poisoning, since they are less competitive to promote than the correct queries and account for a considerable amount of search traffic. Search engines have adopted several countermeasure strategies, e.g., Google applies automated corrections on queried keywords and returns search results of the corrected versions directly. However, a sophisticated class of attack, which we term as linguistic-collision misspelling, can evade auto-correction and poison search results. Cybercriminals target special queries where the misspelled terms are existent words, even in other languages (e.g., \"idobe\", a misspelling of the English word \"adobe\", is a legitimate word in the Nigerian language). In this paper, we perform the first large-scale analysis on linguistic-collision search poisoning attacks. In particular, we check 1.77 million misspelled search terms on Google and Baidu and analyze both English and Chinese languages, which are the top two languages used by Internet users. We leverage edit distance operations and linguistic properties to generate misspelling candidates. To more efficiently identify linguistic-collision search terms, we design a deep learning model that can improve collection rate by 2.84x compared to random sampling. Our results show that the abuse is prevalent: around 1.19% of linguistic-collision search terms on Google and Baidu have results on the first page directing to malicious websites. We also find that cybercriminals mainly target categories of gambling, drugs, and adult content. Mobile-device users disproportionately search for misspelled keywords, presumably due to small screen for input. Our work highlights this new class of search engine poisoning and provides insights to help mitigate the threat.","PeriodicalId":272713,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122695166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

LBM: A Security Framework for Peripherals within the Linux Kernel LBM: Linux内核中外设的安全框架

2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2019.00041

D. Tian, Grant Hernandez, Joseph I. Choi, Vanessa Frost, Peter C. Johnson, Kevin R. B. Butler

{"title":"LBM: A Security Framework for Peripherals within the Linux Kernel","authors":"D. Tian, Grant Hernandez, Joseph I. Choi, Vanessa Frost, Peter C. Johnson, Kevin R. B. Butler","doi":"10.1109/SP.2019.00041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00041","url":null,"abstract":"Modern computer peripherals are diverse in their capabilities and functionality, ranging from keyboards and printers to smartphones and external GPUs. In recent years, peripherals increasingly connect over a small number of standardized communication protocols, including USB, Bluetooth, and NFC. The host operating system is responsible for managing these devices; however, malicious peripherals can request additional functionality from the OS resulting in system compromise, or can craft data packets to exploit vulnerabilities within OS software stacks. Defenses against malicious peripherals to date only partially cover the peripheral attack surface and are limited to specific protocols (e.g., USB). In this paper, we propose Linux (e)BPF Modules (LBM), a general security framework that provides a unified API for enforcing protection against malicious peripherals within the Linux kernel. LBM leverages the eBPF packet filtering mechanism for performance and extensibility and we provide a high-level language to facilitate the development of powerful filtering functionality. We demonstrate how LBM can provide host protection against malicious USB, Bluetooth, and NFC devices; we also instantiate and unify existing defenses under the LBM framework. Our evaluation shows that the overhead introduced by LBM is within 1 μs per packet in most cases, application and system overhead is negligible, and LBM outperforms other state-of-the-art solutions. To our knowledge, LBM is the first security framework designed to provide comprehensive protection against malicious peripherals within the Linux kernel.","PeriodicalId":272713,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"181 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122143269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 18

The Code That Never Ran: Modeling Attacks on Speculative Evaluation 从未运行的代码:对推测性求值的建模攻击

2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2019.00047

Craig Disselkoen, R. Jagadeesan, A. Jeffrey, J. Riely

引用次数: 22

PrivKV: Key-Value Data Collection with Local Differential Privacy PrivKV:具有本地差分隐私的键值数据收集

2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2019.00018

Qingqing Ye, Haibo Hu, Xiaofeng Meng, Huadi Zheng

{"title":"PrivKV: Key-Value Data Collection with Local Differential Privacy","authors":"Qingqing Ye, Haibo Hu, Xiaofeng Meng, Huadi Zheng","doi":"10.1109/SP.2019.00018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00018","url":null,"abstract":"Local differential privacy (LDP), where each user perturbs her data locally before sending to an untrusted data collector, is a new and promising technique for privacy-preserving distributed data collection. The advantage of LDP is to enable the collector to obtain accurate statistical estimation on sensitive user data (e.g., location and app usage) without accessing them. However, existing work on LDP is limited to simple data types, such as categorical, numerical, and set-valued data. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing LDP work on key-value data, which is an extremely popular NoSQL data model and the generalized form of set-valued and numerical data. In this paper, we study this problem of frequency and mean estimation on key-value data by first designing a baseline approach PrivKV within the same \"perturbation-calibration\" paradigm as existing LDP techniques. To address the poor estimation accuracy due to the clueless perturbation of users, we then propose two iterative solutions PrivKVM and PrivKVM+ that can gradually improve the estimation results through a series of iterations. An optimization strategy is also presented to reduce network latency and increase estimation accuracy by introducing virtual iterations in the collector side without user involvement. We verify the correctness and effectiveness of these solutions through theoretical analysis and extensive experimental results.","PeriodicalId":272713,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115323182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 95

The 9 Lives of Bleichenbacher's CAT: New Cache ATtacks on TLS Implementations Bleichenbacher的CAT的九种生命:对TLS实现的新缓存攻击

2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2019.00062

Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham, Daniel Genkin, A. Shamir, David Wong, Y. Yarom

{"title":"The 9 Lives of Bleichenbacher's CAT: New Cache ATtacks on TLS Implementations","authors":"Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham, Daniel Genkin, A. Shamir, David Wong, Y. Yarom","doi":"10.1109/SP.2019.00062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00062","url":null,"abstract":"At CRYPTO'98, Bleichenbacher published his seminal paper which described a padding oracle attack against RSA implementations that follow the PKCS #1 v1.5 standard. Over the last twenty years researchers and implementors had spent a huge amount of effort in developing and deploying numerous mitigation techniques which were supposed to plug all the possible sources of Bleichenbacher-like leakages. However, as we show in this paper, most implementations are still vulnerable to several novel types of attack based on leakage from various microarchitectural side channels: Out of nine popular implementations of TLS that we tested, we were able to break the security of seven implementations with practical proof-of-concept attacks. We demonstrate the feasibility of using those Cache-like ATacks (CATs) to perform a downgrade attack against any TLS connection to a vulnerable server, using a BEAST-like Man in the Browser attack. The main difficulty we face is how to perform the thousands of oracle queries required before the browser's imposed timeout (which is 30 seconds for almost all browsers, with the exception of Firefox which can be tricked into extending this period). Due to its use of adaptive chosen ciphertext queries, the attack seems to be inherently sequential, but we describe a new way to parallelize Bleichenbacher-like padding attacks by exploiting any available number of TLS servers that share the same public key certificate. With this improvement, we can demonstrate the feasibility of a downgrade attack which could recover all the 2048 bits of the RSA plaintext (including the premaster secret value, which suffices to establish a secure connection) from five available TLS servers in under 30 seconds. This sequential-to-parallel transformation of such attacks can be of independent interest, speeding up and facilitating other side channel attacks on RSA implementations.","PeriodicalId":272713,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114318887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 47

Fuzzing File Systems via Two-Dimensional Input Space Exploration 通过二维输入空间探索模糊化文件系统

2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2019.00035

Wen Xu, Hyungon Moon, Sanidhya Kashyap, Po-Ning Tseng, Taesoo Kim

{"title":"Fuzzing File Systems via Two-Dimensional Input Space Exploration","authors":"Wen Xu, Hyungon Moon, Sanidhya Kashyap, Po-Ning Tseng, Taesoo Kim","doi":"10.1109/SP.2019.00035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00035","url":null,"abstract":"File systems, a basic building block of an OS, are too big and too complex to be bug free. Nevertheless, file systems rely on regular stress-testing tools and formal checkers to find bugs, which are limited due to the ever-increasing complexity of both file systems and OSes. Thus, fuzzing, proven to be an effective and a practical approach, becomes a preferable choice, as it does not need much knowledge about a target. However, three main challenges exist in fuzzing file systems: mutating a large image blob that degrades overall performance, generating image-dependent file operations, and reproducing found bugs, which is difficult for existing OS fuzzers. Hence, we present JANUS, the first feedback-driven fuzzer that explores the two-dimensional input space of a file system, i.e., mutating metadata on a large image, while emitting image-directed file operations. In addition, JANUS relies on a library OS rather than on traditional VMs for fuzzing, which enables JANUS to load a fresh copy of the OS, thereby leading to better reproducibility of bugs. We evaluate JANUS on eight file systems and found 90 bugs in the upstream Linux kernel, 62 of which have been acknowledged. Forty-three bugs have been fixed with 32 CVEs assigned. In addition, JANUS achieves higher code coverage on all the file systems after fuzzing 12 hours, when compared with the state-of-the-art fuzzer Syzkaller for fuzzing file systems. JANUS visits 4.19x and 2.01x more code paths in Btrfs and ext4, respectively. Moreover, JANUS is able to reproduce 88–100% of the crashes, while Syzkaller fails on all of them.","PeriodicalId":272713,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126456513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 81

Drones' Cryptanalysis - Smashing Cryptography with a Flicker 无人机的密码分析-用闪烁粉碎密码

2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2019.00051

Ben Nassi, Raz Ben-Netanel, A. Shamir, Y. Elovici

{"title":"Drones' Cryptanalysis - Smashing Cryptography with a Flicker","authors":"Ben Nassi, Raz Ben-Netanel, A. Shamir, Y. Elovici","doi":"10.1109/SP.2019.00051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00051","url":null,"abstract":"In an \"open skies\" era in which drones fly among us, a new question arises: how can we tell whether a passing drone is being used by its operator for a legitimate purpose (e.g., delivering pizza) or an illegitimate purpose (e.g., taking a peek at a person showering in his/her own house)? Over the years, many methods have been suggested to detect the presence of a drone in a specific location, however since populated areas are no longer off limits for drone flights, the previously suggested methods for detecting a privacy invasion attack are irrelevant. In this paper, we present a new method that can detect whether a specific POI (point of interest) is being video streamed by a drone. We show that applying a periodic physical stimulus on a target/victim being video streamed by a drone causes a watermark to be added to the encrypted video traffic that is sent from the drone to its operator and how this watermark can be detected using interception. Based on this method, we present an algorithm for detecting a privacy invasion attack. We analyze the performance of our algorithm using four commercial drones (DJI Mavic Air, Parrot Bebop 2, DJI Spark, and DJI Mavic Pro). We show how our method can be used to (1) determine whether a detected FPV (first-person view) channel is being used to video stream a POI by a drone, and (2) locate a spying drone in space; we also demonstrate how the physical stimulus can be applied covertly. In addition, we present a classification algorithm that differentiates FPV transmissions from other suspicious radio transmissions. We implement this algorithm in a new invasion attack detection system which we evaluate in two use cases (when the victim is inside his/her house and when the victim is being tracked by a drone while driving his/her car); our evaluation shows that a privacy invasion attack can be detected by our system in about 2-3 seconds.","PeriodicalId":272713,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128159323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 30

Iodine: Fast Dynamic Taint Tracking Using Rollback-free Optimistic Hybrid Analysis 碘:使用无回滚乐观混合分析的快速动态污点跟踪

2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2019.00043

Subarno Banerjee, David Devecsery, Peter M. Chen, S. Narayanasamy

{"title":"Iodine: Fast Dynamic Taint Tracking Using Rollback-free Optimistic Hybrid Analysis","authors":"Subarno Banerjee, David Devecsery, Peter M. Chen, S. Narayanasamy","doi":"10.1109/SP.2019.00043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00043","url":null,"abstract":"Dynamic information-flow tracking (DIFT) is useful for enforcing security policies, but rarely used in practice, as it can slow down a program by an order of magnitude. Static program analyses can be used to prove safe execution states and elide unnecessary DIFT monitors, but the performance improvement from these analyses is limited by their need to maintain soundness. In this paper, we present a novel optimistic hybrid analysis (OHA) to significantly reduce DIFT overhead while still guaranteeing sound results. It consists of a predicated whole-program static taint analysis, which assumes likely invariants gathered from profiles to dramatically improve precision. The optimized DIFT is sound for executions in which those invariants hold true, and recovers to a conservative DIFT for executions in which those invariants are false. We show how to overcome the main problem with using OHA to optimize live executions, which is the possibility of unbounded rollbacks. We eliminate the need for any rollback during recovery by tailoring our predicated static analysis to eliminate only safe elisions of noop monitors. Our tool, Iodine, reduces the overhead of DIFT for enforcing security policies to 9%, which is 4.4x lower than that with traditional hybrid analysis, while still being able to be run on live systems.","PeriodicalId":272713,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"447 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131681168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 20

How Well Do My Results Generalize? Comparing Security and Privacy Survey Results from MTurk, Web, and Telephone Samples 我的结果有多好概括?比较来自MTurk、Web和电话样本的安全和隐私调查结果

2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2019.00014

Elissa M. Redmiles, Sean Kross, Michelle L. Mazurek

{"title":"How Well Do My Results Generalize? Comparing Security and Privacy Survey Results from MTurk, Web, and Telephone Samples","authors":"Elissa M. Redmiles, Sean Kross, Michelle L. Mazurek","doi":"10.1109/SP.2019.00014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00014","url":null,"abstract":"Security and privacy researchers often rely on data collected from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to evaluate security tools, to understand users' privacy preferences and to measure online behavior. Yet, little is known about how well Turkers' survey responses and performance on security- and privacy-related tasks generalizes to a broader population. This paper takes a first step toward understanding the generalizability of security and privacy user studies by comparing users' self-reports of their security and privacy knowledge, past experiences, advice sources, and behavior across samples collected using MTurk (n=480), a census-representative web-panel (n=428), and a probabilistic telephone sample (n=3,000) statistically weighted to be accurate within 2.7% of the true prevalence in the U.S. Surprisingly, the results suggest that: (1) MTurk responses regarding security and privacy experiences, advice sources, and knowledge are more representative of the U.S. population than are responses from the census-representative panel; (2) MTurk and general population reports of security and privacy experiences, knowledge, and advice sources are quite similar for respondents who are younger than 50 or who have some college education; and (3) respondents' answers to the survey questions we ask are stable over time and robust to relevant, broadly-reported news events. Further, differences in responses cannot be ameliorated with simple demographic weighting, possibly because MTurk and panel participants have more internet experience compared to their demographic peers. Together, these findings lend tempered support for the generalizability of prior crowdsourced security and privacy user studies; provide context to more accurately interpret the results of such studies; and suggest rich directions for future work to mitigate experience- rather than demographic-related sample biases.","PeriodicalId":272713,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130410635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 158

New Primitives for Actively-Secure MPC over Rings with Applications to Private Machine Learning 环上主动安全MPC的新原语及其在私有机器学习中的应用

2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2019.00078

I. Damgård, Daniel E. Escudero, T. Frederiksen, Marcel Keller, Peter Scholl, Nikolaj Volgushev

{"title":"New Primitives for Actively-Secure MPC over Rings with Applications to Private Machine Learning","authors":"I. Damgård, Daniel E. Escudero, T. Frederiksen, Marcel Keller, Peter Scholl, Nikolaj Volgushev","doi":"10.1109/SP.2019.00078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00078","url":null,"abstract":"At CRYPTO 2018 Cramer et al. presented SPDZ2k , a new secret-sharing based protocol for actively secure multi-party computation against a dishonest majority, that works over rings instead of fields. Their protocol uses slightly more communication than competitive schemes working over fields. However, implementation-wise, their approach allows for arithmetic to be carried out using native 32 or 64-bit CPU operations rather than modulo a large prime. The authors thus conjectured that the increased communication would be more than made up for by the increased efficiency of implementations. In this work we answer their conjecture in the affirmative. We do so by implementing their scheme, and designing and implementing new efficient protocols for equality test, comparison, and truncation over rings. We further show that these operations find application in the machine learning domain, and indeed significantly outperform their field-based competitors. In particular, we implement and benchmark oblivious algorithms for decision tree and support vector machine (SVM) evaluation.","PeriodicalId":272713,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"208 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121853541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 112