Justice & Negotiations最新文献

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In Favor of Clear Thinking: Incorporating Moral Rules into a Wise Cost-Benefit Analysis 支持清晰的思维:将道德规则纳入明智的成本-收益分析
Justice & Negotiations Pub Date : 2009-07-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1431982
M. Bazerman, Joshua D. Greene
{"title":"In Favor of Clear Thinking: Incorporating Moral Rules into a Wise Cost-Benefit Analysis","authors":"M. Bazerman, Joshua D. Greene","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1431982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1431982","url":null,"abstract":"Bennis, Medin, and Bartels (2009) have contributed an interesting paper on the comparative benefit of moral rules versus cost-benefit analysis. Many of their specific comments are accurate, useful, and insightful. At the same time, we believe they have misrepresented cost-benefit analysis and have reached a set of conclusions that are misguided and, if adopted wholesale, potentially dangerous. Overall, they offer wise suggestions for making CBA more effective, rather than eliminating CBA as a decision-making tool.","PeriodicalId":269123,"journal":{"name":"Justice & Negotiations","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133840509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Understanding the Market for Justice 理解正义市场
Justice & Negotiations Pub Date : 2009-06-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1416841
M. Barendrecht
{"title":"Understanding the Market for Justice","authors":"M. Barendrecht","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1416841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1416841","url":null,"abstract":"If justice is so dearly needed, why does it not emerge spontaneously? Socio-legal research shows how people shop for justice. They approach friends, advisers, lawyers, mediators, suppliers of legal information, local authorities, community leaders, priests, imams, arbiters, or judges in order to obtain redress in situations of conflict. From the perspective of clients, law is probably not so much a system of procedures in which they face barriers to access, but a variety of options on a market for justice services. In this paper, five types of justice services are distinguished. Whether these services are affordable for clients and sustainable to supply, depends on the costs of production and on the transaction costs of making them available. Investigating the sources of transaction costs for each of these justice services improves our understanding of the legal system. This perspective explains why ADR has hardly succeeded in attracting clients, lawyer services are unlikely to become a commodity, norms for distributive issues are often lacking, and courts have trouble to orient themselves on the needs of their customers. It also indicates which type of policies governments and civil society can consider if they wish to improve access to justice.","PeriodicalId":269123,"journal":{"name":"Justice & Negotiations","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122528026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Electronic Negotiation and Relationship: Corporate-Bank Relationship Consequences of Electronic Reverse Auctions 电子议付与关系:电子逆向拍卖对公司-银行关系的影响
Justice & Negotiations Pub Date : 2008-11-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1293960
Lionel Bobot
{"title":"Electronic Negotiation and Relationship: Corporate-Bank Relationship Consequences of Electronic Reverse Auctions","authors":"Lionel Bobot","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1293960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1293960","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate-Bank relationships develop organically over time as a result of a number of factors, including such disparate elements as simple longevity, frequency of contact, full and effective communication, efficient and satisfactory service, and a range of human factors that are based round the skills and personalities of bank and company staff, and their ability to interact on a personal level and it is a crucial element in negotiation. However the use of electronic reverse auctions (eRAs) by buying organizations has increased dramatically over the past five years and has modified the buyer-supplier relationship. In the bank & mutual funds area, the company Bfinance, established in 1999, manages the only one European eRA finance platform and during the course of 2003 and 2004, they have conducted over 100 fund manager search and selection engagements for some 60 clients among Europe's largest Pension Funds, Local Authorities and Institutional Investors, involving assets under management in excess of 12 billion Euro. While recently some researchers begin to examine the relationship consequences of eRA use, we are unaware of any research which has investigated the ensuing impact of perceptions of opportunism and trust on other relationship outcomes such as conflict, commitment, and, in the end, performance in the context of corporate-bank eRA. On top of that, there was no research on corporate-bank relationship consequences of eRA. Thus the motivation of our research is to extend the findings of researchers on buyer-supplier relationship, by examining how eRA usage affects bank performance, through the effects of opportunism and trust, along with commitment and conflict. The author's findings suggest that increased levels of opportunism harm bank non-price performance, through both their short-term impact on dysfunctional conflict and their long-term effects on relationship trust and commitment.","PeriodicalId":269123,"journal":{"name":"Justice & Negotiations","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129470506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social Asymmetries and Bargaining in the Ultimatum Game: A Compared Study 最后通牒博弈中的社会不对称与议价:一个比较研究
Justice & Negotiations Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.916926
P. Fajfar
{"title":"Social Asymmetries and Bargaining in the Ultimatum Game: A Compared Study","authors":"P. Fajfar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.916926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.916926","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper analyzes the dynamics of bargaining of the ultimatum game in presence of social differences amidst the participants. To that end, two parallel experiments were set-up. One where the social status states of the individuals were of common knowledge (alternative version) and another one where they were unknown (traditional version, our control group). From a population of 190 undergraduate students and using \"micro-state\" incentives according to the prevalent status, the obtained results differ significantly from those found by Hoffman et al. (1994) in the original paper. Regarding this aspect, we find that when the asymmetries are not exalted within the protocol, therefore the proposed offers as well as the acceptance decisions turn out to be a homogenous pair.","PeriodicalId":269123,"journal":{"name":"Justice & Negotiations","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134153391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Litigation Cost Strategies, Settlement Offers and Game Theory 诉讼成本策略、和解方案与博弈论
Justice & Negotiations Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.989211
Rupert Macey-Dare
{"title":"Litigation Cost Strategies, Settlement Offers and Game Theory","authors":"Rupert Macey-Dare","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.989211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.989211","url":null,"abstract":"Starting with a simple economic model of the value of civil litigation from each side's perspective, this paper analyses a wide range of potential litigation cost strategies, settlement offers and negotiations, together with relevant applications and insights from game theory. Specific issues examined include: optimal settlement agreements, optimal settlement timing, optimal choice of lawyers; principal-agent problems aligning lawyer cost incentives; optimal client-lawyer contracts; \"Conditional Fee Agreements\" (CFAs); success rules and size of success premia; the exploitation and mitigation of liquidity and bankruptcy constraints; impact of collateral, \"Security for Costs\" and \"Freezing Orders\"; optimal \"Part 36 Offers\"; public and \"without prejudice\" offers; fixed rate and state-contingent offers; the role of mediation and alternative dispute resolution (ADR); the effect of litigant group size, co-ordination and class actions; rationale for confidential no-liability settlement agreements; effects of legal aid; time-value to trial and optionality of news; the impact of the \"Law of Costs\"; optimal trial cost applications and requests for \"leave to appeal\". Both familiar and paradoxical new results are confirmed by the analysis.","PeriodicalId":269123,"journal":{"name":"Justice & Negotiations","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131631662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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