{"title":"Pricing Ethics in the Foreign Exchange Market: Environmental, Social and Governance Ratings and Currency Premia","authors":"I. Filippou, Mark P. Taylor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3887760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3887760","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine the cross-sectional predictive ability of the Refinitiv Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) score for returns in the foreign exchange market, using ESG scores aggregated at the national level, and find that ESG is a strong negative predictor of currency returns. Intuitively, investors require a premium for financing low-ESG countries while high-ESG countries offer lower returns and provide a hedge in the bad state of the world. We show that ESG is priced in the cross-section of currency returns. We also consider the different components of ESG and show that its predictability is driven by the environmental pillar of the ESG ratings. Our results have strong implications for portfolios of individual investors and fund managers and offer new insights for policymakers in the foreign exchange market. The profitability of the ESG currency strategy is not driven by the carry trade and is robust to transaction costs.","PeriodicalId":269008,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Decision-Making Authority (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125605523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"I Am The Firm! Eponymous Firms and Rose-Coloured Forecasts","authors":"D. Kliger, Yevgeny Mugerman, Ruth Rooz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3755887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3755887","url":null,"abstract":"We invoke the famous Louis XIV quote “L'État, c'est moi,” applying it to the corporate world, and introduce the novel idea that a self-serving bias, which we define as “I Am The Firm,” is infused within the culture of certain companies. We hypothesize that the owners of eponymous firms – firms that bear the names of their owners – experience enhanced self-identification with their firms, and thus tend to inject their own subjective beliefs and desires into the realistic objective prospects of the firms. The “I am the firm” effect is a form of a self-serving bias, which arises from the blurring of boundaries between the owner and the corporate eponymy entity that carries the same name. Employing a unique corporate setting in Israel, we demonstrate that eponymous firms disclose unduly optimistic biased forecasts relative to their non-eponymous counterparts, which cannot be validated or justified solely by rational explanations. The obfuscation of the boundaries in eponymous firms between subjective illusory desires and objective realistic truths is revelatory and has far-reaching implications in various aspects of corporate decisions, which we suggest will require future research.","PeriodicalId":269008,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Decision-Making Authority (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116716571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets","authors":"Shuo Liu, Dimitri Migrow","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3275742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3275742","url":null,"abstract":"Multinational and multiproduct firms often experience uncertainty in the relative return of conducting activities in different markets due to, for example, exchange rate volatility or the changing prospects of different products. We study how a multi-divisional organization should optimally allocate decision-making authority to its managerial members when operating in such volatile markets. To be able to adapt its decisions to local conditions, the organization has to rely on self-interested division managers to collect and disseminate the relevant information. We show that if communication takes the form of verifiable disclosure, then centralized decision-making does not suffer from information asymmetry and it allows the headquarter of the organization to better cope with the inter-market uncertainty. However, a downside of centralization is that it can discourage information acquisition, and this negative effect is amplified by the need for coordinating the activities of different divisions. As a result, the optimality of decentralized decision-making can actually be driven by a large coordination motive.","PeriodicalId":269008,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Decision-Making Authority (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132196397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}