在动荡的市场中设计组织

Shuo Liu, Dimitri Migrow
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引用次数: 6

摘要

跨国公司和多产品公司在不同市场开展活动的相对回报往往不确定,例如由于汇率波动或不同产品前景的变化。我们研究了一个多部门的组织在如此动荡的市场中如何将决策权最优地分配给其管理成员。为了能够使其决策适应当地情况,组织必须依靠自利的部门经理来收集和传播相关信息。我们的研究表明,如果沟通采用可验证披露的形式,那么集中决策就不会遭受信息不对称的影响,它使组织总部能够更好地应对市场间的不确定性。然而,中央集权的一个缺点是它可能阻碍信息的获取,而这种消极影响由于需要协调不同部门的活动而被放大。因此,分散决策的最优性实际上是由一个大的协调动机驱动的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets
Multinational and multiproduct firms often experience uncertainty in the relative return of conducting activities in different markets due to, for example, exchange rate volatility or the changing prospects of different products. We study how a multi-divisional organization should optimally allocate decision-making authority to its managerial members when operating in such volatile markets. To be able to adapt its decisions to local conditions, the organization has to rely on self-interested division managers to collect and disseminate the relevant information. We show that if communication takes the form of verifiable disclosure, then centralized decision-making does not suffer from information asymmetry and it allows the headquarter of the organization to better cope with the inter-market uncertainty. However, a downside of centralization is that it can discourage information acquisition, and this negative effect is amplified by the need for coordinating the activities of different divisions. As a result, the optimality of decentralized decision-making can actually be driven by a large coordination motive.
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