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Observing Enforcement: Evidence from Banking 观察执行:来自银行业的证据
ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-07-27 DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2021.049
Anya Kleymenova, R. Tomy
{"title":"Observing Enforcement: Evidence from Banking","authors":"Anya Kleymenova, R. Tomy","doi":"10.17016/FEDS.2021.049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2021.049","url":null,"abstract":"This paper finds that the disclosure of supervisory actions is associated with changes in regulators' enforcement behavior. Using a novel sample of enforcement decisions and orders (EDOs) and the setting of the 1989 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), which required the public disclosure of EDOs, we find that U.S. bank regulators issue more EDOs, intervene sooner, and rely more on publicly observable signals after the disclosure regime change. The content of EDOs also changes, with documents becoming more complex and boilerplate. Our results are stronger in counties with higher news circulation, indicating that disclosure plays an incremental role in regulators' changing behavior. We evaluate the main potentially confounding changes around FIRREA, including the S&L crisis and competition from thrifts, and find robust results. We also study changes in bank outcomes following the regime change and find that uninsured deposits decline at EDO banks, especially for banks with EDOs covered in the news. Finally, we observe that bank failure accelerates despite improvements in capital ratios and asset quality.","PeriodicalId":266240,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122913451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 24
The Time Has Come for Banks to Say Goodbye: New Evidence on Bank Roles and Duration Effects in Relationship Terminations 银行说再见的时候到了:关于银行在关系终止中的角色和持续时间影响的新证据
ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-03-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2711974
Kiyotaka Nakashima, Koji Takahashi
{"title":"The Time Has Come for Banks to Say Goodbye: New Evidence on Bank Roles and Duration Effects in Relationship Terminations","authors":"Kiyotaka Nakashima, Koji Takahashi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2711974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2711974","url":null,"abstract":"Using a matched sample of Japanese banks and firms, we examine what factors determine the termination of the bank-firm relationship. The constraints on bank capital in a Japanese banking crisis increased relationship terminations, implying the presence of a capital crunch in it. Moreover, the \"flight-to-quality\" behavior of bank prevailed instead of \"evergreening\" in relationship terminations. We also found that a longer duration of the relationship strongly decreased the probability of termination when Japan's banking system was stable. Such duration effects weakened when the system was fragile, however, the longer duration still had the intertemporal smoothing effects of loan prices.","PeriodicalId":266240,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127877644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
The Perils of Removing Rating-Based Regulation: Evidence From the US Money Market Funds Reform 取消评级监管的危险:来自美国货币市场基金改革的证据
ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-11-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3301330
S. Lugo
{"title":"The Perils of Removing Rating-Based Regulation: Evidence From the US Money Market Funds Reform","authors":"S. Lugo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3301330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3301330","url":null,"abstract":"Focusing on the 2016 US money market funds (MMFs) reform, this study assesses the impact of removing rating-based rules on the behavior of regulated investors and on market prices. Difference-in-differences fund-level and security-level analyses show a positive impact of the reform on the level of risk-taking by non-government MMFs. No empirical support is found for alternative explanations for the verified change in portfolio allocation. This shift has material consequences for the pricing of credit risk: all else equal, the reform-driven increase in the demand for riskier securities by MMFs is associated with a significant decrease in credit premia for commercial papers.","PeriodicalId":266240,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124413084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Impacts of Minimum Trading Units and Tick Size Changes on Bid-ask Spread, Depth, and Trading Volume: Evidence from the Indonesia Stock Exchange 最小交易单位和刻度大小变化对买卖价差、深度和交易量的影响:来自印度尼西亚证券交易所的证据
ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-05-30 DOI: 10.20294/JGBT.2019.15.1.39
E. Junarsin, Enrico Libert, Jordan Kristanto
{"title":"The Impacts of Minimum Trading Units and Tick Size Changes on Bid-ask Spread, Depth, and Trading Volume: Evidence from the Indonesia Stock Exchange","authors":"E. Junarsin, Enrico Libert, Jordan Kristanto","doi":"10.20294/JGBT.2019.15.1.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20294/JGBT.2019.15.1.39","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose – This research aims to analyze the differences in the bid-ask spread, depth, and trading volume after a new tick size and minimum trading unit policy were imposed by the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) on January the 6th, 2014. <br><br>Design/Methodology/Approach – This research is exercised on the three variables of liquidity, i.e. the bid-ask spread, the depth, and the trading volume. This research used a paired difference test to measure the impact before and after the policy was imposed. <br><br>Findings – The results showed that the smaller the tick size, the greater the average decrease of the bid-ask spread, ask depth, and bid depth, but the trading volume did not show a significant average difference. <br><br>Research Implications – The tick size reduction was consistent and supported the previous research from different countries. The bid-ask spread, ask depth, and bid depth significantly decreased, and the trading volume had a tendency to increase as well, although it was not significant. <br><br>Results are aimed at the IDX and Bapepam as additional information related to the changes that occurred as a result of the implementation of the new policy in stock trading. Investors can use the information from this study to make investment decisions.","PeriodicalId":266240,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":"166 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132719764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Adverse Selection in the Market for Mortgage Servicing Rights 抵押贷款服务权市场中的逆向选择
ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-03-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3073805
Tom Mayock, Lan Shi
{"title":"Adverse Selection in the Market for Mortgage Servicing Rights","authors":"Tom Mayock, Lan Shi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3073805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3073805","url":null,"abstract":"Activity in the U.S. market for mortgage servicing rights has increased in recent years. Incumbent servicers are at a significant informational advantage relative to potential buyers of these servicing rights, introducing the possibility of adverse selection. This paper marks the first investigation of adverse selection in the market for mortgage servicing rights. Using data from mortgage servicers, we find that loans with higher ex ante measures of prepayment and default risk were more likely to experience a servicing transfer. Results from an ex post analysis in which we condition on these risk measures reveals that loans that experienced a servicing transfer were more likely to prepay and default, a finding that suggests that the market for servicing rights is characterized by adverse selection.","PeriodicalId":266240,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122534755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Commodity Markets Intervention: Consequences of Speculation, and Informed Trading 商品市场干预:投机和知情交易的后果
ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-10-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3222762
P. Luong, Ben Sopranzetti
{"title":"Commodity Markets Intervention: Consequences of Speculation, and Informed Trading","authors":"P. Luong, Ben Sopranzetti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3222762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3222762","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Chinese regulatory authority's interventions into the futures market for steel during 2016 provide a rare opportunity to study the unintended consequences of interventions. Although hot rolled coil (HRC) and rebar are products with nearly identical components, their futures contracts trade separately. The regulatory authority intervened into the futures market for rebar but refrained from doing so for HRC. We document impacts of interventions measured by increased volatility, trading volume, and spreads in rebar markets. There is also evidence of informed trading in both markets, reflected by abnormally high trading volumes and low open interests occurring the day before the announcement of interventions.","PeriodicalId":266240,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131900834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Selective Pump-and-Dump: The Manipulation of Their Top Holdings by Chinese Mutual Funds Around Quarter Ends 选择性抽脱:中国共同基金在季末前后对其主要持仓的操纵
ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-07-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3211344
L. Ouyang, Bolong Cao
{"title":"Selective Pump-and-Dump: The Manipulation of Their Top Holdings by Chinese Mutual Funds Around Quarter Ends","authors":"L. Ouyang, Bolong Cao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3211344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3211344","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the abnormal returns and excess trading volume around quarter ends of the quarterly disclosed top holdings by Chinese mutual funds from 2009 to 2016. We find evidence that a portion of these stocks experience return reversals and high level of excess trading around quarter ends, which is consistent with the view that the Chinese mutual fund managers pump-and-dump some of their top holdings in order to boost their quarterly or annual performances. The top holding stocks that are owned by more funds within a fund family and smaller are more likely to become the manipulation targets and experience larger return reversals around quarter ends. We also find that the fund managers select their manipulation targets differently between yearends and non-yearend quarter ends and some features of their manipulation remain prominent under tightened regulations after the 2015 Chinese stock market crash.","PeriodicalId":266240,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127927357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Forgive Me All My Sins: How Penalties Imposed on Banks Travel Through Markets 原谅我所有的罪过:对银行的惩罚是如何通过市场传播的
ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-04-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3178589
Christian Flore, H. Degryse, S. Kolaric, D. Schiereck
{"title":"Forgive Me All My Sins: How Penalties Imposed on Banks Travel Through Markets","authors":"Christian Flore, H. Degryse, S. Kolaric, D. Schiereck","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3178589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3178589","url":null,"abstract":"From 2005 to 2015, the 25 largest global financial institutions paid more than 285 billion US dollars in legal penalties, corresponding to approximately 20% of their market value. We examine the stock, bond, and CDS market reaction to the announcements of fines and settlements for banks. We document positive stockholder and bondholder valuation effects as well as a tightening of CDS spreads for banks to these resolution announcements. These reactions can be attributed to the resolution of uncertainty surrounding legal proceedings. Moreover, even though monetary penalties are cash-flow-effective, they are not income-effective in the year they are announced, suggesting that banks make adequate provisions for these penalties. In addition, we observe positive spillover effects to other banks facing pending lawsuits with the same plaintiff.","PeriodicalId":266240,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124752298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Oversight and Regulation of Cryptocurrencies: BitLicense 监督和监管加密货币:BitLicense
ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-03-03 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3133342
Usman W. Chohan
{"title":"Oversight and Regulation of Cryptocurrencies: BitLicense","authors":"Usman W. Chohan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3133342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3133342","url":null,"abstract":"This discussion paper examines the localization of the oversight and regulatory roles for cryptocurrencies using the case of Bitlicense which is issued in New York by the Department of Financial Services, with a view to discussing the possibilities for localized regulatory licenses and agent responses to such regulatory activity.","PeriodicalId":266240,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121372716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 33
The Effect of SEC Reviewers on Comment Letters and Financial Reporting Quality 美国证券交易委员会审查员对意见书和财务报告质量的影响
ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-11-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3068223
Matthew Baugh, Kyonghee Kim, Kwang-keun Lee
{"title":"The Effect of SEC Reviewers on Comment Letters and Financial Reporting Quality","authors":"Matthew Baugh, Kyonghee Kim, Kwang-keun Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3068223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3068223","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether the idiosyncrasy of individual employees of U.S. financial regulators contributes to inconsistent regulatory outcomes. Using a sample of SEC comment letters, we show that SEC reviewers’ idiosyncratic style plays an economically and statistically significant role in explaining the cross-sectional variation in filing review outcomes, even after holding firm and disclosure attributes constant. We also show that the reviewer style is persistent across firms and time. Finally, we find that reviewers with a stricter style are associated with improved financial reporting quality. These findings suggest that individual SEC reviewers have significant influence on the SEC filing review process.","PeriodicalId":266240,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Econometric Studies of Government Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114682822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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