Rules for RebelsPub Date : 2018-09-20DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0011
Max Abrahms
{"title":"The Benefits of Centralizing","authors":"Max Abrahms","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"The main argument in this book is that moderation pays for militant groups. The first part of the book revealed Rule #1 for the leaders—the folly of attacking civilians. The second part of the book develops Rule #2—to build the organization in a way that can restrain lower-level members from harming civilians. The last chapter explained why centralization can promote task cohesion in the ranks. Structuring the organization in this way helps leaders to communicate their tactical instructions, discipline wayward members, and vet out potential terrorists. This chapter demonstrates more scientifically the extent to which centralization indeed prevents members from shooting the cause in the foot.","PeriodicalId":265287,"journal":{"name":"Rules for Rebels","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114535144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rules for RebelsPub Date : 2018-09-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0013
Max Abrahms
{"title":"Denial of Organizational Involvement","authors":"Max Abrahms","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"The first two rules for rebels are important for the leader in minimizing terrorism. Even in the best-run groups, though, some militants may occasionally commit terrorism due to ignorance, stupidity, carelessness, bad luck, or for personal reasons like revenge. Regardless of the exact cause, civilian attacks are a public relations fiasco for the organization. Like the head of any organization, militant leaders must act strategically to minimize the fallout to its reputation whenever members blunder. The third rule for rebels is for the leader to brand the organization as moderate even when members act otherwise. In practice, this means denying organizational involvement (DOI) in civilian attacks. This chapter explains the scientific basis of DOI and its pervasiveness in militant groups with smart leaders.","PeriodicalId":265287,"journal":{"name":"Rules for Rebels","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115889596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rules for RebelsPub Date : 2018-09-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0003
Max Abrahms
{"title":"Testing the Strategic Model of Terrorism","authors":"Max Abrahms","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter tests the Strategic Model of Terrorism. The Strategic Model posits that groups engage in terrorism because doing so increases the likelihood of achieving their political demands. Testing the efficacy of a tactic is challenging and there are trade-offs to every methodological approach. For this reason, the author presents several statistical approaches showing that groups lower the odds of government compliance when they engage in terrorism by attacking civilians. Terrorism negatively affects the odds of concessions even after taking into account the capability of the perpetrators, the nature of their demands, and the strength of government opposition. This information is invaluable for militant group leaders, forming the basis of Rule #1 to refrain from terrorism.","PeriodicalId":265287,"journal":{"name":"Rules for Rebels","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115869780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rules for RebelsPub Date : 2018-09-20DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0005
Max Abrahms
{"title":"Correspondence of Means and Ends Bias","authors":"Max Abrahms","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter shows why terrorism is a losing political tactic. In theory, terrorism serves as a political communication strategy by amplifying the demands of the perpetrators. In reality, terrorism fails because it’s awful at conveying the political goals of the perpetrators. The author explains why terrorism malfunctions as a communication tool with a newfound cognitive heuristic called the Correspondence of Means and Ends bias. Evidence for this bias is revealed in both an experiment embedded in a survey and detailed case studies. Rebels who engage in terrorism will thus struggle to amplify their political demands, lowering the odds of concessions.","PeriodicalId":265287,"journal":{"name":"Rules for Rebels","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134524286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rules for RebelsPub Date : 2018-09-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0007
Max Abrahms
{"title":"What Smart Leaders Know","authors":"Max Abrahms","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The first rule for rebels is to avoid attacking civilians. As previous chapters have shown, terrorism hurts the cause by lowering the odds of concessions and survival. There is considerable variation in the tactical IQ of militant leaders. Smart leaders understand the costs of terrorism or at least learn them over time from their own experience or that of others. By contrast, stupid terrorist leaders, such as those of the Armed Islamic Group, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Islamic State never learn the value of tactical restraint. These groups pay a steep price for having ignorant leaders. This chapter shows that the leadership is important to militant groups in order for them to wield violence productively.","PeriodicalId":265287,"journal":{"name":"Rules for Rebels","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126577178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rules for RebelsPub Date : 2018-09-20DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0010
Max Abrahms
{"title":"The Structure of Success","authors":"Max Abrahms","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"How can the militant leader help to ensure that members faithfully execute his targeting preferences? That is, how can he promote task cohesion in the ranks so subordinates refrain from targeting civilians? For the militant leader, the key to task cohesion is centralizing the organization. Centralizing the organization helps the leader to communicate his tactical instructions to the rank-and-file, discipline wayward members for attacking civilians, and vet out high-risk recruits prone to subverting the cause with terrorism. The leader has considerable agency over the degree to which his group is centralized. This chapter explains the benefits of centralizing it before quantifying them statistically.","PeriodicalId":265287,"journal":{"name":"Rules for Rebels","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133037943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rules for RebelsPub Date : 2018-09-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0006
Max Abrahms
{"title":"How Terrorism Expedites Organizational Demise","authors":"Max Abrahms","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explains why terrorism reduces the lifespan of militant groups. Whereas previous chapters showed that terrorism is ineffective for achieving their demands, this chapter shows that the civilian attacks decrease support, membership size, and ultimately the prospects of survival. Current and prospective members must reconcile the benefits of participation with the near-universal norm against killing civilians. Not only does terrorism present moral barriers to participation, but governments are far more likely to violently oppose groups that attack civilians, raising the physical costs of being a member. It is thus important for militant leaders to follow Rule #1, refraining from harming civilians, even when they are uninterested in pressuring government concessions.","PeriodicalId":265287,"journal":{"name":"Rules for Rebels","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127866311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rules for RebelsPub Date : 2018-09-20DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0004
Max Abrahms
{"title":"Terrorism Success Stories Revisited","authors":"Max Abrahms","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter revisits the most commonly cited examples in history of terrorism paying politically. If even these cases fail to illustrate the political effectiveness of terrorism then that would further undermine the evidentiary basis of the Strategic Model. Many scholars point to the political successes of the Irgun, African National Congress, and Hezbollah as evidence that terrorism is an effective instrument of coercion. Yet these campaigns did not coerce the occupying powers to withdraw by attacking their civilians. Instead, the groups focused their attacks on military and other government targets. This chapter shows that people overestimate the value of terrorist campaigns by lumping them together with guerrilla campaigns that have been far more successful.","PeriodicalId":265287,"journal":{"name":"Rules for Rebels","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134552932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rules for RebelsPub Date : 2018-09-20DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0009
Max Abrahms
{"title":"Cultivating Task Cohesion","authors":"Max Abrahms","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198811558.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"The key for militant leaders is to cultivate in the ranks what’s known in management as task cohesion. Task cohesion is the degree to which group members act together to accomplish a common goal. This chapter offers what might seem like obvious advice for rebels to cultivate task cohesion in the ranks. But this initial step is crucial and inconsistently applied by leaders to restrain members from jeopardizing the cause with terrorism. Task cohesion in militant groups begins with educating the rank-and-file about their political ends and the optimal means to achieve them. As this chapter shows, education is necessary, though insufficient, for leaders to prevent subordinates from attacking civilians and sinking the cause.","PeriodicalId":265287,"journal":{"name":"Rules for Rebels","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125372451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rules for RebelsPub Date : 2018-09-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0008
Max Abrahms
{"title":"Principal–Agent Problems in Militant Groups","authors":"Max Abrahms","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198811558.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Militant leaders must not only understand the folly of terrorism, but prevent members from carrying it out. Members are known to harm civilians even when their leaders oppose this targeting practice. This disconnect between the preferences of leaders and behavior of subordinates is due to what economists call a principal–agent problem. This chapter explains the principal–agent problem facing militant leaders and how they can overcome it. The second rule for rebels is grasping this organizational predicament to minimize it. Smart leaders know not only the political costs of civilian attacks, but how to restrain their members from committing them.","PeriodicalId":265287,"journal":{"name":"Rules for Rebels","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129570717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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