{"title":"What is a Secret and What does that have to do with Computer Security?","authors":"R. Nelson","doi":"10.1109/NSPW.1994.656234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/NSPW.1994.656234","url":null,"abstract":"This paper questions some of the basic assumptions of computer security in the context of keeping secrets, and it finds some major discrepancies. It then proposes a new paradigm for functional security in computer systems.\u0000The first conclusion of the paper is that secrecy and security cannot be expressed both algorithmically and accurately. The second conclusion of the paper is that functional security models, which look at the application software as well as the data, can be very useful. Use of more realistic models involves a more complex definition of secure systems, but it may reduce the conflict between security and function and may result in more effective secure systems.","PeriodicalId":265057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings New Security Paradigms Workshop","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130206164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"New Email Security Infrastructure","authors":"M. Ferris","doi":"10.1109/NSPW.1994.656218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/NSPW.1994.656218","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the problem of analysing an information system for security flaws or vulnerabilities in a way that is analogous to the analysis of a safety-critical system. In particular, instead of adopting the approach that security is a property that must be proved to hold (fault avoidance), it shows how to analyse a system for possible security failures so that fault prevention, tolerance, recovery or even fault acceptance techniques can be chosen where appropriate.","PeriodicalId":265057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings New Security Paradigms Workshop","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124139673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Charles G. Limoges, R. Nelson, J. Heimann, David S. Becker
{"title":"Versatile Integrity and Security Environment (VISE) for Computer Systems","authors":"Charles G. Limoges, R. Nelson, J. Heimann, David S. Becker","doi":"10.1109/NSPW.1994.656252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/NSPW.1994.656252","url":null,"abstract":"We have developed a model of security and integrity for computer systems, the Versatile Integrity and Security Environment (VISE), which describes the basic functionality of these systems and which addresses data confidentiality and correctness of processing. It has yielded significant insight into secure application-oriented systems and is applicable to both Department of Defense and commercial requirements. Based on our model, we have developed an implementation framework which provides for enforcement of flexible access controls that are easily defined and tailored to meet a variety of requirements. This paper examines the integrity problem, discusses the general ideas behind VISE, illustrates the requirements of the framework, and demonstrates how the framework meets a general need for secure, high-integrity processing systems.","PeriodicalId":265057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings New Security Paradigms Workshop","volume":"14 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132748047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Formal Semantics of Confidentiality in Multilevel Logic Databases","authors":"Adrian Spalka","doi":"10.1109/NSPW.1994.656232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/NSPW.1994.656232","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a new formal approach to the definition of confidentiality in multilevel logic databases. We regard a multilevel secure database as an extension of an open database which preserves the database-semantics. We give four definitions of confidentiality which capture various degrees of information on secrets. Three of them are relevant in the presence of the Closed World Assumption. We present their formalisation within standard predicate logic and their interpretation for multilevel databases. From this viewpoint, the definitions lead to a formal semantics of the Simple-Security-Property and the *-property. In particular, we demonstrate that the traditional interpretation of these properties represents just a special case of our formalism.","PeriodicalId":265057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings New Security Paradigms Workshop","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131560222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}