{"title":"The European Central Bank","authors":"V. Schmidt","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198797050.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198797050.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 6 discusses the ECB’s pathway to legitimacy, as it moved from following “one size fits none” rules to doing “whatever it takes” in monetary policy. The chapter begins with the ECB’s sources of power, based in its autonomy as a central bank and its leaders’ charismatic qualities, and with its grounds for throughput legitimacy. These largely depend upon ECB accountability to technical forums, since it has minimal formal accountability to political forums (only to the European Parliament), although it has informally increased its accountability through dialogue with political leaders. The chapter follows with a discussion of the Janus-faced public perceptions of the ECB’s governance of the euro during the crisis, split between views of the ECB as hero saving the euro or as ogre imposing austerity and structural reform while railroading countries into programs. As hero, the chapter details ECB President Mario Draghi’s increasingly flexible reinterpretation of his mandate, hid “in plain view” as he transitioned from his predecessor’s “credibility” discourse to a “stability” discourse and from denials of the ECB being a lender of last resort (LOLR) to coming very close to one through quantitative easing (QE). As ogre, the chapter delineates the ways in which ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet coerced vulnerable countries into harsh conditionality programs and Draghi made his active interventions a quid pro quo for austerity and structural reform, as well as the ECB’s initial inefficacy; the continuing orthodoxy of its ideas, especially in contrast to the IMF; and its role in the Troika.","PeriodicalId":262894,"journal":{"name":"Europe's Crisis of Legitimacy","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123502639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Split-Level Legitimacy and Politicization in EU Governance","authors":"V. Schmidt","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198797050.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198797050.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 3 explores the dilemmas of the EU’s “split-level” legitimacy, where output and throughput operate primarily at the EU level and input at the national, and then examines the impact of politicization on both national and EU levels. The chapter begins by considering the EU’s legitimacy problems stemming from the fragmentation of its governing activities, with policies and processes located mainly at the EU level while politics remains national. While the EU has been largely successful in improving legitimacy in all three categories over time, it has faced major challenges to legitimacy. In the Eurozone crisis, citizens’ sense of EU legitimacy has suffered even if their EU-related identity may not have. The chapter then focuses on the EU’s biggest challenge, the politicization of EU governance. After briefly describing the longstanding depoliticization of EU technocratic governance, this section argues that the EU’s politicization has been increasing not only at the bottom, as evidenced by the weakening of mainstream parties to the benefit of populist challengers, or from the bottom up, as national politics influences EU actors, but also at the top, where EU actors have become more politicized. The chapter uses the debates about who is in charge or control of EU governance to show how scholars’ defense of “their” actor through “new” or traditional versions of intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, and parliamentarism actually demonstrates the EU’s increasingly political dynamics of interaction. This chapter ends with the question: Is such politicization a good thing or a bad thing?","PeriodicalId":262894,"journal":{"name":"Europe's Crisis of Legitimacy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114919752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The European Parliament","authors":"V. Schmidt","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198797050.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198797050.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 8 discusses the European Parliament’s pathway to legitimacy, and its transition from having “no size at all” in Eurozone governance to increasing influence. The chapter begins with an analysis of the EP’s sources of power—which were initially very few, given its marginalization in Eurozone governance—and of its growing throughput legitimacy. Although the most input legitimate of EU actors in principle, in practice it has had limited relevance to citizens and has been far removed from them as well as from national parliaments—themselves the biggest losers in Eurozone crisis governance. But the EP’s lack of remit did not stop it from using its input legitimacy to enhance its own procedural exercise of “voice,” deployed increasingly critically to demand accountability from other EU actors. The EP also slowly gained influence as the “go-to” body for other EU actors in search of legitimation via a political accountability forum. The chapter follows with a discussion of the Janus-faced public perceptions of the EP’s role in Eurozone governance, moving from views of the European Parliament as a talking shop increasingly toward its being a potential equal partner. The chapter shows that initially the EP was a talking shop that largely went along with Council and Commission initiatives, in keeping with its minimal powers, but that over time the EP gained increasing powers both formally, through legislation, and informally, in particular as other EU actors turned more and more to the EP for legitimation by giving accounts to an input-legitimate accountability body.","PeriodicalId":262894,"journal":{"name":"Europe's Crisis of Legitimacy","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131908862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}