欧洲央行

V. Schmidt
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引用次数: 0

摘要

第6章讨论了欧洲央行在货币政策方面从“一刀切”规则转向“不惜一切代价”的合法性之路。这一章从欧洲央行的权力来源开始,以其作为央行的自主权和其领导人的魅力为基础,以及其吞吐量合法性的依据。这在很大程度上取决于欧洲央行对技术论坛的问责制,因为它对政治论坛的正式问责制很少(只对欧洲议会),尽管它通过与政治领导人的对话非正式地增加了问责制。这一章接着讨论了公众对欧洲央行在危机期间对欧元的治理所持的两种看法,一种观点认为欧洲央行是拯救欧元的英雄,另一种观点认为欧洲央行是强迫各国实施紧缩和结构改革的恶魔。作为英雄,这一章详细描述了欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉对其职责的日益灵活的重新解释,他从前任的“可信度”话语转变为“稳定性”话语,从否认欧洲央行是最后贷款人(LOLR),到通过量化宽松(QE)非常接近最后贷款人,他隐藏在“显而易见”的情况下。作为食人魔,本章描述了欧洲央行行长让-克洛德•特里谢(Jean-Claude Trichet)如何强迫脆弱的国家接受苛刻的条件计划,以及德拉吉如何将其积极干预作为紧缩和结构改革的交换条件,以及欧洲央行最初的无能;其观点继续保持正统,尤其是与IMF形成鲜明对比;以及它在三驾马车中的角色。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The European Central Bank
Chapter 6 discusses the ECB’s pathway to legitimacy, as it moved from following “one size fits none” rules to doing “whatever it takes” in monetary policy. The chapter begins with the ECB’s sources of power, based in its autonomy as a central bank and its leaders’ charismatic qualities, and with its grounds for throughput legitimacy. These largely depend upon ECB accountability to technical forums, since it has minimal formal accountability to political forums (only to the European Parliament), although it has informally increased its accountability through dialogue with political leaders. The chapter follows with a discussion of the Janus-faced public perceptions of the ECB’s governance of the euro during the crisis, split between views of the ECB as hero saving the euro or as ogre imposing austerity and structural reform while railroading countries into programs. As hero, the chapter details ECB President Mario Draghi’s increasingly flexible reinterpretation of his mandate, hid “in plain view” as he transitioned from his predecessor’s “credibility” discourse to a “stability” discourse and from denials of the ECB being a lender of last resort (LOLR) to coming very close to one through quantitative easing (QE). As ogre, the chapter delineates the ways in which ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet coerced vulnerable countries into harsh conditionality programs and Draghi made his active interventions a quid pro quo for austerity and structural reform, as well as the ECB’s initial inefficacy; the continuing orthodoxy of its ideas, especially in contrast to the IMF; and its role in the Troika.
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