Jack Cable, Drew Gregory, Liz Izhikevich, Z. Durumeric
{"title":"Stratosphere: Finding Vulnerable Cloud Storage Buckets","authors":"Jack Cable, Drew Gregory, Liz Izhikevich, Z. Durumeric","doi":"10.1145/3471621.3473500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3473500","url":null,"abstract":"Misconfigured cloud storage buckets have leaked hundreds of millions of medical, voter, and customer records. These breaches are due to a combination of easily-guessable bucket names and error-prone security configurations, which, together, allow attackers to easily guess and access sensitive data. In this work, we investigate the security of buckets, finding that prior studies have largely underestimated cloud insecurity by focusing on simple, easy-to-guess names. By leveraging prior work in the password analysis space, we introduce Stratosphere, a system that learns how buckets are named in practice in order to efficiently guess the names of vulnerable buckets. Using Stratosphere, we find wide-spread exploitation of buckets and vulnerable configurations continuing to increase over the years. We conclude with recommendations for operators, researchers, and cloud providers.","PeriodicalId":257330,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115230799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Yampolskiy, Lynne Graves, J. Gatlin, A. Skjellum, M. Yung
{"title":"What Did You Add to My Additive Manufacturing Data?: Steganographic Attacks on 3D Printing Files","authors":"M. Yampolskiy, Lynne Graves, J. Gatlin, A. Skjellum, M. Yung","doi":"10.1145/3471621.3471843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471843","url":null,"abstract":"Additive Manufacturing (AM) adoption is increasing in home and industrial settings, but information security for this technology is still immature. Thus far, three security threat categories have been identified: technical data theft, sabotage, and illegal part manufacturing. In this paper, we expand to a new threat category: misuse of digital design files as a subliminal communication channel. We identify and explore attacks by which arbitrary information can be embedded steganographically in the most common digital design file format, the STL, without distorting the printed object. Because the technique will not change the manufactured object’s geometry, it is likely to remain unnoticed and can be exploited for data transfer. Further, even with knowledge of our methods, defenders cannot distinguish between actual data transfer and random manipulation of the files. This is the first info-hiding attack on this system, conducted despite the fact that random changes may spoil the physical artifact and result in detection.","PeriodicalId":257330,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133965259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Usability (In)Security of In-App Browsing Interfaces in Mobile Apps","authors":"Zicheng Zhang","doi":"10.1145/3471621.3471625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471625","url":null,"abstract":"Due to the frequent encountering of web URLs in various application scenarios (e.g., chatting and email reading), many mobile apps build their in-app browsing interfaces (IABIs) to provide a seamless user experience. Although this achieves user-friendliness by avoiding the constant switching between the subject app and the system built-in browser apps, we find that IABIs, if not well designed or customized, could result in usability security risks. In this paper, we conduct the first empirical study on the usability (in)security of in-app browsing interfaces in both Android and iOS apps. Specifically, we collect a dataset of 25 high-profile mobile apps from five common application categories that contain IABIs, including Facebook and Gmail, and perform a systematic analysis (not end-user study though) that comprises eight carefully designed security tests and covers the entire course of opening, displaying, and navigating an in-app web page. During this process, we obtain three major security findings: (1) about 30% of the tested apps fail to provide enough URL information for users to make informed decisions on opening an URL; (2) nearly all custom IABIs have various problems in providing sufficient indicators to faithfully display an in-app page to users, whereas ten IABIs that are based on Chrome Custom Tabs and SFSafariViewController are generally secure; and (3) only a few IABIs give warnings to remind users of the risk of inputting passwords during navigating a (potentially phishing) login page. Most developers had acknowledged our findings but their willingness and readiness to fix usability issues are rather low compared to fixing technical vulnerabilities, which is a puzzle in usability security research. Nevertheless, to help mitigate risky IABIs and guide future designs, we propose a set of secure IABI design principles.","PeriodicalId":257330,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115489226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Where We Stand (or Fall): An Analysis of CSRF Defenses in Web Frameworks","authors":"Xhelal Likaj, Soheil Khodayari, Giancarlo Pellegrino","doi":"10.1145/3471621.3471846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471846","url":null,"abstract":"Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is among the oldest web vulnerabilities that, despite its popularity and severity, it is still an understudied security problem. In this paper, we undertake one of the first security evaluations of CSRF defense as implemented by popular web frameworks, with the overarching goal to identify additional explanations to the occurrences of such an old vulnerability. Starting from a review of existing literature, we identify 16 CSRF defenses and 18 potential threats agains them. Then, we evaluate the source code of the 44 most popular web frameworks across five languages (i.e., JavaScript, Python, Java, PHP, and C#) covering about 5.5 million LoCs, intending to determine the implemented defenses and their exposure to the identified threats. We also quantify the quality of web frameworks’ documentation, looking for incomplete, misleading, or insufficient information required by developers to use the implemented CSRF defenses correctly. Our study uncovers a rather complex landscape, suggesting that while implementations of CSRF defenses exist, their correct and secure use depends on developers’ awareness and expertise about CSRF attacks. More than a third of the frameworks require developers to write code to use the defense, modify the configuration to enable CSRF defenses, or look for an external library as CSRF defenses are not built-in. Even when using defenses, developers need to be aware and address a diversity of additional security risks. In total, we identified 157 security risks in 37 frameworks, of which 17 are directly exploitable to mount a CSRF attack, leveraging implementation mistakes, cryptography-related flaws, cookie integrity, and leakage of CSRF tokens—including three critical vulnerabilities in CakePHP, Vert.x-Web, and Play. The developers’ feedback indicate that, for a significant fraction of risks, frameworks have divergent expectations about who is responsible for addressing them. Finally, the documentation analysis reveals several inadequacies, including not mentioning the implemented defense, and not showing code examples for correct use.","PeriodicalId":257330,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123955793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aolin Ding, P. Murthy, Luis Garcia, Pengfei Sun, Matthew Chan, S. Zonouz
{"title":"Mini-Me, You Complete Me! Data-Driven Drone Security via DNN-based Approximate Computing","authors":"Aolin Ding, P. Murthy, Luis Garcia, Pengfei Sun, Matthew Chan, S. Zonouz","doi":"10.1145/3471621.3471869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471869","url":null,"abstract":"The safe operation of robotic aerial vehicles (RAV) requires effective security protection of their controllers against cyber-physical attacks. The frequency and sophistication of past attacks against such embedded platforms highlight the need for better defense mechanisms. Existing estimation-based control monitors have tradeoffs, with lightweight linear state estimators lacking sufficient coverage, and heavier data-driven learned models facing implementation and accuracy issues on a constrained real-time RAV. We present Mini-Me, a data-driven online monitoring framework that models the program-level control state dynamics to detect runtime data-oriented attacks against RAVs. Mini-Me leverages the internal dataflow information and control variable dependencies of RAV controller functions to train a neural network-based approximate model as the lightweight replica of the original controller programs. Mini-Me runs the minimal approximate model and detects malicious control state deviation by comparing the estimated outputs with those outputs calculated by the original controller program. We demonstrate Mini-Me on a widely adopted RAV physical model as well as popular RAV virtual models based on open-source firmware, ArduPilot and PX4, and show its effectiveness in detecting five types of attack cases with an average 0.34% space overhead and 2.6% runtime overhead.","PeriodicalId":257330,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128510278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mohamed Nabeel, Enes Altinisik, Haipei Sun, Issa M. Khalil, Wendy Hui Wang, Ting Yu
{"title":"CADUE: Content-Agnostic Detection of Unwanted Emails for Enterprise Security","authors":"Mohamed Nabeel, Enes Altinisik, Haipei Sun, Issa M. Khalil, Wendy Hui Wang, Ting Yu","doi":"10.1145/3471621.3471862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471862","url":null,"abstract":"End-to-end email encryption (E2EE) ensures that an email could only be decrypted and read by its intended recipients. E2EE’s strong security guarantee is particularly desirable for the enterprises in the event of breaches: even if attackers break into an email server, under E2EE no contents of emails are leaked. Meanwhile, E2EE brings significant challenges for an enterprise to detect and filter unwanted emails (spams and phishing emails). Most existing solutions rely heavily on email contents (i.e., email body and attachments), which would be difficult when email contents are encrypted. In this paper, we investigate how to detect unwanted emails in a content-agnostic manner, that is, without access to the contents of emails at all. Our key observation is that the communication patterns and relationships among internal users of an enterprise contain rich and reliable information about benign email communications. Combining such information with other metadata of emails (headers and subjects when available), unwanted emails can be accurately distinguished from legitimate ones without access to email contents. Specifically, we propose two types of novel enterprise features from enterprise email logs: sender profiling features, which capture the patterns of past emails from external senders to internal recipients; and enterprise graph features, which capture the co-recipient and the sender-recipient relationships between internal users. We design a classifier utilizing the above features along with existing meta-data features. We run extensive experiments over a real-world enterprise email dataset, and show that our approach, even without any content-based features, achieves high true positive rate of 95.2% and low false positive rate of 0.3% with such stringent constraints.","PeriodicalId":257330,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132201436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xianya Mi, Sanjay Rawat, Cristiano Giuffrida, H. Bos
{"title":"LeanSym: Efficient Hybrid Fuzzing Through Conservative Constraint Debloating","authors":"Xianya Mi, Sanjay Rawat, Cristiano Giuffrida, H. Bos","doi":"10.1145/3471621.3471852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471852","url":null,"abstract":"To improve code coverage and flip complex program branches, hybrid fuzzers couple fuzzing with concolic execution. Despite its benefits, this strategy inherits the inherent slowness and memory bloat of concolic execution, due to path explosion and constraint solving. While path explosion has received much attention, constraint bloat (having to solve complex and unnecessary constraints) is much less studied. In this paper, we present LeanSym (LSym), an efficient hybrid fuzzer. LSym focuses on optimizing the core concolic component of hybrid fuzzing by conservatively eliminating constraint bloat without sacrificing concolic execution soundness. The key idea is to partially symbolize the input and the program in order to remove unnecessary constraints accumulated during execution and significantly speed up the fuzzing process. In particular, we use taint analysis to identify the bytes that may influence the branches that we want to flip and symbolize only those bytes to minimize the constraints to collect. Furthermore, we eliminate non-trivial constraints introduced by environment modelling for system I/O. This is done by targeting the concolic analysis solely to library function-level tracing. We show this simple approach is effective and can be implemented in a modular fashion on top of off-the-shelf binary analysis tools. In particular, with only 1k LOC to implement simple branch/seed selection policies for hybrid fuzzing on top of unmodified Triton, libdft, and AFL, LSym outperforms state-of-the-art hybrid fuzzers with much less memory bloat, including those with advanced branch/seed selection policies or heavily optimized concolic execution engines such as QSYM and derivatives. On average, LSym outperforms QSYM by 7.61% in coverage, while finding bugs 4.79x faster in 18 applications of Google Fuzzer Test Suite. In real-world application testing, LSym reported 17 new bugs in 5 applications.","PeriodicalId":257330,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses","volume":"74 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131012307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Talha Ongun, J. W. Stokes, Jonathan Bar Or, K. Tian, Farid Tajaddodianfar, Joshua Neil, C. Seifert, Alina Oprea, John C. Platt
{"title":"Living-Off-The-Land Command Detection Using Active Learning","authors":"Talha Ongun, J. W. Stokes, Jonathan Bar Or, K. Tian, Farid Tajaddodianfar, Joshua Neil, C. Seifert, Alina Oprea, John C. Platt","doi":"10.1145/3471621.3471858","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471858","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, enterprises have been targeted by advanced adversaries who leverage creative ways to infiltrate their systems and move laterally to gain access to critical data. One increasingly common evasive method is to hide the malicious activity behind a benign program by using tools that are already installed on user computers. These programs are usually part of the operating system distribution or another user-installed binary, therefore this type of attack is called “Living-Off-The-Land”. Detecting these attacks is challenging, as adversaries may not create malicious files on the victim computers and anti-virus scans fail to detect them. We propose the design of an Active Learning framework called LOLAL for detecting Living-Off-the-Land attacks that iteratively selects a set of uncertain and anomalous samples for labeling by a human analyst. LOLAL is specifically designed to work well when a limited number of labeled samples are available for training machine learning models to detect attacks. We investigate methods to represent command-line text using word-embedding techniques, and design ensemble boosting classifiers to distinguish malicious and benign samples based on the embedding representation. We leverage a large, anonymized dataset collected by an endpoint security product and demonstrate that our ensemble classifiers achieve an average F1 score of 96% at classifying different attack classes. We show that our active learning method consistently improves the classifier performance, as more training data is labeled, and converges in less than 30 iterations when starting with a small number of labeled instances.","PeriodicalId":257330,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130229160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. SriShaila, Ahmad Darki, M. Faloutsos, N. Abu-Ghazaleh, Manu Sridharan
{"title":"DisCo: Combining Disassemblers for Improved Performance","authors":"G. SriShaila, Ahmad Darki, M. Faloutsos, N. Abu-Ghazaleh, Manu Sridharan","doi":"10.1145/3471621.3471851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471851","url":null,"abstract":"Malware infects thousands of systems globally each day causing millions of dollars in damages. Which disassembler should a malware analyst choose in order to get the most accurate disassembly and be able to detect, analyze and defuse malware quickly? There is no clear answer to this question: (a) the performance of disassemblers varies across configurations, and (b) most prior work on disassemblers focuses on benign software and the x86 CPU architecture. In this work, we take a different approach and ask: why not use all the disassemblers instead of picking one? We present DisCo, a novel and effective approach to harness the collective capability of a group of disassemblers combining their output into an ensemble consensus. We develop and evaluate our approach using 1760 IoT malware binaries compiled with different compilers and compiler options for the ARM and MIPS architectures. First, we show that DisCo can combine the collective wisdom of disassemblers effectively. For example, our approach outperforms the best contributing disassembler by as much as 17.8% in the F1 score for function start identification for MIPS binaries compiled using GCC with O3 option. Second, the collective wisdom of the disassemblers can be brought back to improve each disassembler. As a proof of concept, we show that byte-level signatures identified by DisCo can improve the performance of Ghidra by as much as 13.6% in terms of the F1 score. Third, we quantify the effect of the architecture, the compiler, and the compiler options on the performance of disassemblers. Finally, the systematic evaluation within our approach led to a bug discovery in Ghidra v9.1, which was acknowledged by the Ghidra team.","PeriodicalId":257330,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134143036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dario Nisi, Mariano Graziano, Y. Fratantonio, D. Balzarotti
{"title":"Lost in the Loader:The Many Faces of the Windows PE File Format","authors":"Dario Nisi, Mariano Graziano, Y. Fratantonio, D. Balzarotti","doi":"10.1145/3471621.3471848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471848","url":null,"abstract":"A known problem in the security industry is that programs that deal with executable file formats, such as OS loaders, reverse-engineering tools, and antivirus software, often have little discrepancies in the way they interpret an input file. These differences can be abused by attackers to evade detection or complicate reverse engineering, and are often found by researchers through a manual, trial-and-error process. In this paper, we present the first systematic analysis and exploration of PE parsers. To this end, we developed a framework to easily capture the details on how different software parses, checks, and validates whether a file is compliant with a set of specifications. We then used this framework to create models for the loaders of three versions of Windows (XP, 7, and 10) and for several reverse-engineering and antivirus tools. Finally, we used this framework to automatically compare different models, generate new samples from a model, or validate an executable according to a chosen model. Our system also supports more complex tasks, such as “generating samples that would load on Windows 10 but not on Windows 7.” The results of our analysis have consequences on several aspects of system security. We show that popular analysis tools can be completely bypassed, that the information extracted by these analysis tools can be easily manipulated, and that it is trivial for malware authors to fingerprint and “target” only specific versions of an operating system in ways that are not obvious to someone analyzing the executable. But, more importantly, we show that there is not one correct way to parse PE files, and therefore that it is not sufficient for security tools to fix the many inconsistencies we found in our experiments. Instead, to tackle the problem at its roots, tools should allow the analyst to select which of the several loader models they should emulate.","PeriodicalId":257330,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134359368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}