{"title":"Simple Veritism","authors":"C. Cowie","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"In modelling epistemic judgements on normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law—as has been done in earlier chapters it has been assumed that the final or basic epistemic value is true belief. This chapter considers objections to this from knowledge-first and anti-consequentialist conceptions of epistemic norms. It presents reasons for scepticism about these views and claims that these alternatives are still compatible with the basic view in the book of the contrast between epistemic norms and moral norms and so with its rejection of the parity premise.","PeriodicalId":256838,"journal":{"name":"Morality and Epistemic Judgement","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125391394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Conventionalism Criticism","authors":"C. Cowie","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"It is sometimes claimed that ‘belief aims at truth’ in a sense that explains the existence and nature of epistemic norms. Furthermore it is sometimes claimed that there is no analogous explanation of moral norms. In this chapter it is asked whether these claims represent an alternative means of rejecting the parity premise to the basic rationale—comparing epistemic judgements to normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—offered in chapters 3 and 5. It is argued that they do not. Three different readings of ‘belief aims at truth’ are identified. None are found to be plausible as an alternative route to rejection of the parity premise.","PeriodicalId":256838,"journal":{"name":"Morality and Epistemic Judgement","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130731880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Normativity of Evidence","authors":"C. Cowie","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Any case against the argument from analogy appears to rely on the assumption that the evidential-support relation is not itself a normative relation. This chapter identifies three ways in which one might challenge this assumption and responds to each. In doing so it claims that existing responses to this problem in the literature are insufficient: they rely on objective conceptions of probability that are ill-suited to account for epistemic probabilities. It claims that epistemic error theorists may be forced to deny that there are any evidential-support relations but that, surprisingly, this is less of a concession than it may at first appear.","PeriodicalId":256838,"journal":{"name":"Morality and Epistemic Judgement","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126814007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"C. Cowie","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"The views outlined in earlier chapters are systematically presented. These include: the truth of epistemic institutionalism and falsity of analogous institutionalist views in morality; the challenges facing categorical reasons for action that do not apply to categorial reasons for belief; the reducible nature of epistemic properties and relations—including the defensibility of this view in light of concerns with the normativity of probability and the falsity of both veritism and epistemic consequentialism—in contrast to the irreducible nature of moral properties and relations, and the possibility of ‘the puzzling combination’. It is concluded that the argument from analogy fails and that the moral error theory may yet be true, but that it would be illegitimate to conclude that it is true.","PeriodicalId":256838,"journal":{"name":"Morality and Epistemic Judgement","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124858010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against Irreducibility-Parity","authors":"C. Cowie","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"It is argued that the second version of the parity premise—irreducibility-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements, unlike moral judgements, are committed to merely reducibly normative properties. The argument for this is based on the same basic rationale outlined in chapter 3: epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law. A ‘back-up’ view is introduced: even if irreducibility-parity is true, the analogy between epistemic judgements and normative or evaluative judgements within institutions can yet be used to render the epistemic error theory less implausible than it may at first appear.","PeriodicalId":256838,"journal":{"name":"Morality and Epistemic Judgement","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126985380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against Internalism-Parity","authors":"C. Cowie","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"It is argued that the first version of the parity premise—internalism-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements are committed to the existence of ‘merely institutional’ reasons. Moral judgements, by contrast, are committed to the existence of genuinely normative reasons. This claim is defended by appeal to the basic rationale that epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law, but moral judgements are not. It is argued that this does not render epistemic norms merely conventional in an objectionable sense.","PeriodicalId":256838,"journal":{"name":"Morality and Epistemic Judgement","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127467126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Error Theory","authors":"C. Cowie","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Two varieties of moral error theory are identified. According to the first—the internalism-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of categorical normative reasons for action. These are incompatible with plausible constraints on the relationship between one’s reasons and one’s psychology. So they do not exist. According to the second—the irreducibility-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of irreducibly normative properties and relations. These are incompatible with plausible assumptions about the constituents of the world. So they do not exist. The differences and commonalities between these two varieties of moral error theory are identified.","PeriodicalId":256838,"journal":{"name":"Morality and Epistemic Judgement","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129482433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Error Theory and Thought","authors":"C. Cowie","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"It has been argued that the epistemic error theory is incompatible with the ‘essentially normative’ nature of belief itself. Two versions of this objection to the epistemic error theory are presented. Neither is found to be plausible. The most plausible is based on the view that the concept of belief is essentially normative. It is claimed that this view is under-motivated and would, in any case, be unlikely to cause the problems for epistemic error theorists that it is sometimes claimed to. Some alternative objections to the epistemic error theory based on the nature of thought and deliberation are briefly considered.","PeriodicalId":256838,"journal":{"name":"Morality and Epistemic Judgement","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127066274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Analogy","authors":"C. Cowie","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The argument from analogy is presented in a favourable light in order to properly assess it. It is comprised of two premises. According to the parity premise, the arguments for a moral error theory would entail an epistemic error theory. According to the epistemic existence premise an epistemic error theory is false. It is argued that the parity premise can be given two readings. The first reading—internalism-parity—targets the internalism-based moral error theory. The second reading—irreducibility-parity—targets the irreducibility-based moral error theory. Both readings are motivated. It is claimed that they are plausible and that the argument from analogy represents a strong case against the moral error theory.","PeriodicalId":256838,"journal":{"name":"Morality and Epistemic Judgement","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129262460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Puzzling Combination","authors":"C. Cowie","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter it is supposed that the arguments of all previous chapters have failed. It is supposed that epistemic reasons are genuinely and irreducibly normative, and that the epistemic error theory is false. It is argued that this could still be compatible with the moral error theory. This is referred to as ‘the puzzling combination’. The puzzling combination will be possible in the event that moral error theorists argue for their view by appeal to ‘debunking and dispensability’ arguments. Some basic objections to these arguments are discussed. The moves that would need to be made if ‘debunking and dispensability’ arguments were to be successful in defence of the puzzling combination are articulated.","PeriodicalId":256838,"journal":{"name":"Morality and Epistemic Judgement","volume":"33 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124377875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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