{"title":"Physician-Induced Demand: Evidence from China’s Drug Price Zero-Markup Policy","authors":"Hanming Fang, Xiaoyan Lei, Julie Shi, Xuejie Yi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3881973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3881973","url":null,"abstract":"We use a natural experiment in China’s health care reform, in which the government mandated zero markups for drugs sold in public hospitals, to study physician-induced demand for medical care. We develop a theoretical model that robustly predicts that the drug price zero markup policy (ZMP) will lead to a reduction in the demand for drugs but an increase in the demand for non-drug services, only when the demands for drugs and non-drug services are at least partially physician induced. Our model also yields testable predictions of the impact of the ZMP regarding the equilibrium number of treated patients. Exploiting the staggered rollout of the ZMP and a unique claims data set, we find that, at the admission level, the reform decreases drug expenses by 63.4 log points (47.0 percent), but the reduction in drug expenses is almost fully substituted by the increases in expenses for non-drug services. Quantitatively similar results are also obtained at the physician and at the hospital levels. We also show that the ZMP reduces the number of patients in the treated hospitals, as predicted by the model, and that the reform has little impact on the quality of health care proxied by the readmission rate.","PeriodicalId":256044,"journal":{"name":"Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) Working Paper Series","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123865742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fighting COVID-19: Patterns in International Data, Expanded","authors":"R. Mariano, Suleyman Ozmucur","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3861714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3861714","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an empirical evaluation of countries’ performance in fighting COVID-19, utilizing a performance index (which we call the Disaster Index) based on four health and economic indicators: deaths per population size, deaths per confirmed cases, and quarterly real GDP and monthly unemployment rate relative to pre-pandemic values. International data patterns are studied for these four indicators and the Disaster index to analyze trends and basic empirical relationships. The approach is descriptive and primarily based on graphs, scatter diagrams, and correlation analysis. The ten best performers based on the Disaster Index for the first half of 2020 were (best #1 to #10): Singapore, Taiwan, Belarus, Korea, New Zealand, Japan, Norway, Israel, Czechia, and Lithuania. The worst twelve performers were (bad to worst): Sweden, US, Canada, Philippines, France, Columbia, Spain, Belgium, United Kingdom, Ecuador, Italy, and Peru. Thus, high-income Asian countries performed relatively better than low-income Asian countries, European, and American countries in the first half of 2020. Reasons for this geographical divide are very important and must be studied more carefully and closely, as successful methods in better performing countries will provide some lessons for other countries. It also would be interesting to see how this Disaster Index profile shifts in 2021 as vaccination and economic relief accelerate in countries like the United States. The pandemic exhibited the vulnerabilities in the world and reemphasized the vital significance of international coordination and cooperation in a globalized world. Recent trends show that most countries still have a long way to go to control the virus. Vaccination is a reassuring fresh hope, a potential game-changer, though requiring careful, painstaking, and timely implementation.","PeriodicalId":256044,"journal":{"name":"Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) Working Paper Series","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130387231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Stochastic Impatience and the Separation of Time and Risk Preferences","authors":"David Dillenberger, D. Gottlieb, Pietro Ortoleva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3252503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3252503","url":null,"abstract":"We study how the separation between time and risk preferences relates to a new behavioral property that generalizes impatience to stochastic environments: Stochastic Impatience. We show that Stochastic Impatience holds if and only if risk aversion is not too high\" relative to the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This result has implications for many known models. For example, in the models of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Hansen and Sargent (1995), Stochastic Impatience is violated for all commonly used parameters. If Stochastic Impatience is taken normatively, this suggests a limit on the amount of separation between time and risk preference; otherwise, it provides a simple one-question test for it.","PeriodicalId":256044,"journal":{"name":"Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) Working Paper Series","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123322614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lock-In in Dynamic Health Insurance Contracts: Evidence from Chile","authors":"J. Atal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3485007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3485007","url":null,"abstract":"Long-term health insurance contracts have the potential to efficiently insure against reclassification risk, but at the expense of other limitations like provider lock-in. This paper empirically investigates the workings of long-term contracts which are subject to this trade-off. Individuals are shielded against premium increases and coverage denial as long as they stay with their initial contract, but those that become higher risk are subject to premium increases or coverage denials upon switching, potentially leaving them locked-in with their original network of providers. I provide the first empirical evidence on the importance of this phenomenon using administrative panel data from the universe of the private health insurance market in Chile, where competing insurers o?er long term contracts. I fit a structural model to yearly plan choices, and am able to jointly estimate evolving preferences for different insurance companies and supply-side underwriting in the form of premium risk-rating and coverage denial. To quantify the welfare effects of lock-in, I compare simulated choices under the current rules to those in a counterfactual scenario with no underwriting. The results show that consumers would be willing to pay around 13 percent more in yearly premiums to avoid lock-in. Finally, I study a counterfactual scenario where long-term contracts are replaced with community-rated spot contracts, and I find only minor general-equilibrium effects on premiums and on the allocation of individuals across insurers. I argue that these small effects are the result of large levels of preference heterogeneity uncorrelated to risk.","PeriodicalId":256044,"journal":{"name":"Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) Working Paper Series","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125573876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games","authors":"Takuo Sugaya, Y. Yamamoto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3385516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3385516","url":null,"abstract":"We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy \u0000 private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex post equilibria. In our equilibria, players \u0000 commonly learn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge.\u0000","PeriodicalId":256044,"journal":{"name":"Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) Working Paper Series","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121917304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Higher Order Information Complementarities and Polarization","authors":"C. Segura-Rodríguez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3385507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3385507","url":null,"abstract":"I study endogenous network formation in an environment in which individuals want to forecast a stochastic state and it is costly for them to communicate with others to exchange some exogenously observed information. Due to the existence of information complementarities, individuals’ preferences for networks in which they have multiple neighbors cannot be characterized by a linear ranking of the pairwise correlations between their signals. Instead, these complementarities generate a counterintuitive result: for a fixed number of individuals, information structures exist in which all signals are conditionally positively correlated, and these are preferred to a structure in which all signals are conditionally independent. Therefore, it may be that the only strongly stable network consists of two cliques with signals that are highly positively correlated within each clique that generate different beliefs across cliques, even when there are opportunities to exchange information with individuals sharing less correlated signals. Thus, this model exemplifies how homophily and belief polarization can coexist in a rational environment.","PeriodicalId":256044,"journal":{"name":"Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) Working Paper Series","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114659215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Marriage Market Dynamics, Gender, and the Age Gap","authors":"A. Shephard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3357693","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3357693","url":null,"abstract":"We present a general discrete choice framework for analyzing household formation and dissolution decisions in an equilibrium limited-commitment collective framework that allows for marriage both within and across birth cohorts. Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics and American Community Survey data, we apply our framework to empirically implement a time allocation model with labor market earnings risk, human capital accumulation, home production activities, fertility, and both within- and across-cohort marital matching. Our model replicates the bivariate marriage distribution by age, and explains some of the most salient life-cycle patterns of marriage, divorce, remarriage, and time allocation behavior. We use our estimated model to quantify the impact of the significant reduction in the gender wage gap since the 1980s on marriage outcomes.","PeriodicalId":256044,"journal":{"name":"Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) Working Paper Series","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131083229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dynamic Mechanisms with Verification","authors":"Markos Epitropou, R. Vohra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3337074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3337074","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a principal who allocates an indivisible object among a finite number of agents who arrive on-line, each of whom prefers to have the object than not. Each agent has access to private information about the principal's payoff if he receives the object. The decision to allocate the object to an agent must be made upon arrival of an agent and is irreversible. There are no monetary transfers but he principal can inspect agents' reports at a cost and punish them. A novelty of this paper is a reformulation of this dynamic problem as a compact linear program. Using the formulation we characterize the form of the optimal mechanism and reduce the dynamic version of the inspection problem with identical distributions to an instance of the secretary problem with one fewer secretary and a modified value distribution. This reduction also allows us to derive a prophet inequality for the dynamic version of the inspection problem.","PeriodicalId":256044,"journal":{"name":"Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) Working Paper Series","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131909289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Cerreia-Vioglio, David Dillenberger, Pietro Ortoleva
{"title":"An Explicit Representation for Disappointment Aversion and Other Betweenness Preferences","authors":"S. Cerreia-Vioglio, David Dillenberger, Pietro Ortoleva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3252009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3252009","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most well known models of non‐expected utility is Gul's (1991) model of disappointment aversion. This model, however, is defined implicitly, as the solution to a functional equation; its explicit utility representation is unknown, which may limit its applicability. We show that an explicit representation can be easily constructed, using solely the components of the implicit representation. We also provide a more general result: an explicit representation for preferences in the betweenness class that also satisfy negative certainty independence (Dillenberger 2010) or its counterpart. We show how our approach gives a simple way to identify the parameters of the representation behaviorally and to study the consequences of disappointment aversion in a variety of applications.","PeriodicalId":256044,"journal":{"name":"Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) Working Paper Series","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123364637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Lack of European Productivity Growth: Causes and Lessons for the U.S.","authors":"Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, L. Ohanian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3253254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3253254","url":null,"abstract":"This paper draws lessons from post-World War II Western European economic performance for the current U.S. economy. We document that much of Western Europe grew very quickly from the end of World War II up to the mid-1970s, reflecting policies that incentivized technology adoption and investment in physical and human capital. But since then, European policies have changed considerably, with higher tax rates and increased regulatory barriers that have reduced competition and new business formation. We discuss how the U.S. has shown signs of becoming like Europe over the last decade, and argue why policy reforms are key to restoring U.S. growth.","PeriodicalId":256044,"journal":{"name":"Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) Working Paper Series","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117115210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}