European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series最新文献

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Developments in Singapore Company Law in 2020 2020年新加坡公司法的发展
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2021-07-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4179163
Alan K. Koh, Dan W. Puchniak, C. Tan
{"title":"Developments in Singapore Company Law in 2020","authors":"Alan K. Koh, Dan W. Puchniak, C. Tan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4179163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4179163","url":null,"abstract":"Singapore’s common law-origin corporate law regime ranks highly on corporate law and governance indices and is administered in part by superior courts served by judges with significant commercial expertise. As part of the Singapore Academy of Law’s Annual Review of Cases, this Paper reviews decisions of the Singapore superior courts (comprising the High Court and the Court of Appeal) decided in 2020. The cases reviewed feature a wide range of issues with domestic and international significance, including private enforcement of directors’ duties, corporate attribution, corporate veil piercing and shareholder disputes. This Annual Review will be useful for academics and lawyers who wish to stay up to date on legal developments in a leading Asian, common law jurisdiction, and on the reception of landmark common law cases in a leading Anglo-Commonwealth jurisdiction.","PeriodicalId":254384,"journal":{"name":"European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134589402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Governance of Corporate Purpose 公司宗旨的治理
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2021-05-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3928613
C. Mayer
{"title":"The Governance of Corporate Purpose","authors":"C. Mayer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3928613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3928613","url":null,"abstract":"This paper was written for a Festschrift in honour of Rolf Skog. Concepts of corporate purpose which have risen to the fore recently emphasize a point which Rolf Skog highlights in his writings about the importance of profits for the success and continuity of business. But they also question conventional notions of profits where they are earned at the expense of other parties and the methods by which we both measure profits and incentivize people to pursue them. That leads to issues about the governance of corporate purpose which recognizes profit as being derivative of solving, not producing problems, and measurement that needs to account for the costs of rectifying and avoiding producing problems. In this context, governance moves away from a focus on the agency problem of aligning managerial interests with those of their shareholders to one that seeks to promote the identification and implementation of corporate purposes. The role of the board is then predominantly to oversee the determination of the corporate purpose, ensure that it is the overarching framework within which strategy is formulated, and establish an internal culture, measurement and incentive system that aligns corporate values and metrics with the delivery of purpose. The measurement and incentive systems relate not just to inputs and outputs of the firm in a conventional sense but the outcomes and impacts that they have on those whom the company both affects and depends. The transition of governance and measurement described in this paper is well underway at both national and international levels. There is much work to be done before a new governance and measurement framework emerges but there is little doubt that we are now witnessing a profound shift in the nature of the corporate system.","PeriodicalId":254384,"journal":{"name":"European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122382162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
The Federal Reserve and the Crisis of 2020 美联储与2020年危机
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2021-03-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3602740
Lev Menand
{"title":"The Federal Reserve and the Crisis of 2020","authors":"Lev Menand","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3602740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3602740","url":null,"abstract":"This Article provides a comprehensive legal analysis of the Federal Reserve’s response to the 2020 economic and financial crisis. First, it examines sixteen ad hoc lending facilities established by the Fed to fight the crisis and sorts them into two categories. Six advance the Fed’s monetary mission and were designed to halt a run on financial institutions. Ten go beyond the Fed’s traditional role and are designed to directly support financial markets and the real economy. Second, it maps these programs onto the statutory framework for money and banking. It shows that Congress’s signature crisis legislation, the CARES Act, suspended several existing restrictions on Fed lending sub silentio. And it reveals how the Fed’s lending to securities dealers and foreign central banks, a practice dating back more than fifty years, has never been expressly authorized by Congress. Third, it argues that these tensions reflect deficiencies in our contemporary economic and financial architecture. Finally, it suggests statutory reforms targeted at improving the government’s response to future economic and financial emergencies.","PeriodicalId":254384,"journal":{"name":"European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series","volume":"332 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115458596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Shareholderism Versus Stakeholderism – a Misconceived Contradiction. A Comment on 'The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance' by Lucian Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita 股东主义与利益相关者主义——一个误解的矛盾。评Lucian Bebchuk和Roberto Tallarita的《利益相关者治理的虚幻承诺》
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2020-06-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3617847
C. Mayer
{"title":"Shareholderism Versus Stakeholderism – a Misconceived Contradiction. A Comment on 'The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance' by Lucian Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita","authors":"C. Mayer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3617847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3617847","url":null,"abstract":"This paper critiques an assessment by Bebchuk and Tallarita (BT) of the relative merits of shareholder and stakeholder governance. BT’s paper argues that stakeholder governance is either nothing more than enlightened shareholder value, or it imposes unmanageable tradeoffs on directors of companies. But trade-offs are ubiquitous not just in stakeholder but also in shareholder governance, and the resulting judgments that are required of directors should not be viewed as an anathema but a fundamental function of a board, without which untenable outcomes result. The complexity that BT see in implementing a stakeholder system reflects a failure to recognize the way in which business routinely makes judgments based on its purposes and values. Purpose and values hold management to account to a degree that enlightened long-term shareholder value cannot. In seeking to demonstrate that directors are not motivated or able to promote anything other than shareholder value in a shareholder-oriented system, BT merely describe the system that they see rather than analyse what it could or should be. The paper therefore fails to provide a benchmark against which it is possible to evaluate either the comparative merits of shareholder and stakeholder systems, or alternative proposals for reform.","PeriodicalId":254384,"journal":{"name":"European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116514745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Shareholder Stewardship in the Netherlands: The Role of Institutional Investors in a Stakeholder Oriented Jurisdiction 荷兰的股东管理:机构投资者在利益相关者导向管辖中的作用
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2020-02-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3539820
Christoph van der Elst, Anne Lafarre
{"title":"Shareholder Stewardship in the Netherlands: The Role of Institutional Investors in a Stakeholder Oriented Jurisdiction","authors":"Christoph van der Elst, Anne Lafarre","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3539820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3539820","url":null,"abstract":"We study institutional investors’ voice in the Netherlands, focusing on shareholder voting in particular. The Dutch Stewardship Code, developed by institutional investor platform Eumedion, came into force in January 2019, emphasises engagement and responsibilities of institutional investors in Dutch listed companies and should further boost the engagement with the investees. With a new dataset, we observe that institutional investors critically consider (non) current voting items which could negatively affect shareholder rights, like some of the amendments of the articles of association as well as remuneration packages of directors that contain insufficient or inappropriate incentives. Compared to other investors, institutional investors show significantly higher opposition rates. Particularly, Eumedion members show even higher opposition rates than other institutional investors. However, there may still be room for a stronger focus on the activities and outcomes of stewardship, including changing the behaviour of companies, and not just policy statements. \u0000 \u0000An edited version of the paper will be published as a chapter in “Global Shareholder Stewardship: Complexities, Challenges and Possibilities (Dionysia Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming)","PeriodicalId":254384,"journal":{"name":"European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131988484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds 指数基金不确定的管理潜力
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3525355
Jill E. Fisch
{"title":"The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds","authors":"Jill E. Fisch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3525355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3525355","url":null,"abstract":"Regulators and commentators around the world are increasingly demanding that institutional investors engage in stewardship with respect to their portfolio companies. Further, the demand for stewardship has broadened from an expectation that investors engage to reduce agency costs and promote economic value to a call for investors to demand that companies serve a broader range of societal interests and objectives. This chapter considers calls for stewardship in the context of the U.S. capital markets specifically as applied to index funds. It argues that, irrespective of the merits of institutional stewardship generally, the structure of index funds and the business environment in which they operate limits their ability to engage in effective stewardship. Although index fund sponsors have had a powerful influence on their portfolio companies, well-intentioned calls for them to play a more significant role and, in particular, claims that they should incorporate non-economic objectives more broadly into their engagement strategy, are in tension with the valuable role that index funds serve in the U.S. markets by providing a low-cost diversified investment option for an increasing segment of ordinary citizens. The chapter concludes by considering the possibility of using pass-through voting to enhance the stewardship potential of index funds.","PeriodicalId":254384,"journal":{"name":"European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133243442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance 股东价值:指数基金、ESG行动主义与新千年公司治理
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2019-08-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3439516
Michal Barzuza, Quinn D. Curtis, David H. Webber
{"title":"Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance","authors":"Michal Barzuza, Quinn D. Curtis, David H. Webber","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3439516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3439516","url":null,"abstract":"Major index fund operators have been criticized as ineffective stewards of the firms in which they are now the largest shareholders. While scholars debate whether this passivity is a serious problem, index funds’ generally docile approach to ownership is broadly acknowledged. However, this Article argues that the notion that index funds are passive owners overlooks an important dimension in which index funds have demonstrated outspoken, confrontational, and effective stewardship. Specifically, we document that index funds have taken a leading role in challenging management and voting against directors in order to advance board diversity and corporate sustainability. We show that index funds have engaged in a pattern of competitive escalation in their policies on ESG issues. Index funds’ confrontational and competitive activism on ESG is hard to square with their passive approach to more conventional corporate governance questions. \u0000 \u0000To explain this dichotomy in approaches, we argue that index funds are locked in a fierce contest to win the soon-to-accumulate assets of the millennial generation, who place a significant premium on social issues in their economic lives. With fee competition exhausted and returns irrelevant for index investors, signaling a commitment to social issues is one of the few dimensions on which index funds can differentiate themselves and avoid commoditization. For index funds, the threat of millennial migration to another fund is more significant than the threat of management retaliation. Furthermore, managers themselves, we argue, face intense pressure from their millennial employees and customers to respond to their social preferences. This three dimensional millennial effect—as investors, customers and employees—we argue, is an important development with the potential to provide a counterweight to the wealth-maximization paradigm of corporate governance. \u0000 \u0000We marshal evidence for this new dynamic, situate it within the existing literature, and consider the implications for the debate over index funds as shareholders and corporate law generally.","PeriodicalId":254384,"journal":{"name":"European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127673114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 36
Shareholder Activism in Germany 德国的股东维权主义
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2019-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3433337
A. Engert
{"title":"Shareholder Activism in Germany","authors":"A. Engert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3433337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3433337","url":null,"abstract":"Shareholder activism by hedge funds has taken hold in Germany in spite of large ownership concentration. This essay uses the example of Stada Arzneimittel AG to highlight features of activism, German style. It goes on to discuss the legal issues raised by activist campaigns at the two stages of acquiring a shareholding in the target company and, subsequently, of interacting with its management and pressuring for strategic or corporate governance changes. In light of the theory and evidence on the short-term and long-term effects of shareholder activism, the essay concludes that German and European law has rightly refrained from intervening in this most recent corporate governance development. The law lacks a reliable filter to sort desirable from undesirable forms of activism. The essay is forthcoming in Holger Fleischer, Hideki Kanda, Kon Sik Kim, and Peter O. Mulbert (eds.), German and East Asian Perspectives on Corporate and Capital Market Law: Investors versus Companies.","PeriodicalId":254384,"journal":{"name":"European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128539453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers 小股东的风险
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2019-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3128375
L. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel
{"title":"The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers","authors":"L. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3128375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3128375","url":null,"abstract":"This Article contributes to the long-standing and heated debate over dual-class companies by placing a spotlight on a significant set of dual-class companies whose structures raise especially severe governance concerns: those with controllers holding a small minority of the company’s equity capital. Such small-minority controllers dominate some of the country’s largest companies, and we show that their numbers can be expected to grow. \u0000 \u0000We begin by analyzing the perils of small-minority controllers, explaining how they generate considerable governance costs and risks and showing how these costs can be expected to escalate as the controller’s stake decreases. We then identify the mechanisms that enable such controllers to retain their power despite holding a small or even a tiny minority of the company’s equity capital. Using a hand-collected analysis of governance documents of these companies, we present novel empirical evidence of the current incidence and potential growth of small-minority and tiny-minority controllers. Among other things, we show that governance arrangements at a substantial majority of dual-class companies enable the controllers to reduce their equity stake to below 10% and still retain a lock on control, and that a sizable fraction of such companies enable retaining control with less than a 5% stake. \u0000 \u0000Finally, we examine the considerable policy implications that arise from recognizing the perils of small-minority controllers. We first discuss disclosures necessary to make transparent to investors the extent to which arrangements enable controllers to reduce their stake without forgoing control. We then identify and examine measures that public officials or institutional investors could take to ensure that controllers maintain a minimum fraction of equity capital; to provide public investors with extra protections in the presence of small-minority controllers; or to screen midstream changes that can introduce or increase the costs of small-minority controllers.","PeriodicalId":254384,"journal":{"name":"European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128892052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23
Initial Crypto-Asset Offerings (ICOs), Tokenization and Corporate Governance 初始加密资产产品(ico),代币化和公司治理
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2019-01-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3350771
Stéphane Blemus, Dominique Guegan
{"title":"Initial Crypto-Asset Offerings (ICOs), Tokenization and Corporate Governance","authors":"Stéphane Blemus, Dominique Guegan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3350771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3350771","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the potential impacts of the so-called `initial coin offerings', and of several developments based on distributed ledger technology (`DLT'), on corporate governance. While many academic papers focus mainly on the legal qualification of DLT and crypto-assets, and most notably in relation to the potential definition of the latter as securities/financial instruments, the authors analyze some of the use cases based on DLT technology and their potential for significant changes of the corporate governance analyses. This article studies the consequences due to the emergence of new kinds of firm stakeholders, i.e. the crypto-assets holders, on the governance of small and medium-sized enterprises (`SMEs') as well as of publicly traded companies. Since early 2016, a new way of raising funds has rapidly emerged as a major issue for FinTech founders and financial regulators. Frequently referred to as initial coin offerings, Initial Token Offerings (`ITO'), Token Generation Events (`TGE') or simply `token sales', we use in our paper the terminology Initial Crypto-asset Offerings (`ICO'), as it describes more effectively than `initial coin offerings' the vast diversity of assets that could be created and which goes far beyond the payment instrument issue.","PeriodicalId":254384,"journal":{"name":"European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper Series","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116426066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
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