ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)最新文献

Horizontal Mergers in the Presence of Vertical Relationships 纵向关系下的横向合并

ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-11-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2529687

A. Ghosh, H. Morita, Chengsi Wang

引用次数: 8

Systemic Risk and Bank Consolidation: International Evidence 系统性风险与银行合并:国际证据

ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-11-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1914352

Gregor N. F. Weiß, S. Neumann, Denefa Bostandzic

引用次数: 109

On the Welfare Effects of Exclusive Distribution Arrangements 论排他性分配安排的福利效应

ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-05-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2069860

J. Eichberger, Frank Mueller‐Langer

引用次数: 0

Vertical Integration, Separation and Non-Price Discrimination: An Empirical Analysis of German Electricity Markets for Residential Customers 纵向整合、分离与非价格歧视:德国居民用电市场的实证分析

ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1991819

V. Nikogosian, Tobias Veith

{"title":"Vertical Integration, Separation and Non-Price Discrimination: An Empirical Analysis of German Electricity Markets for Residential Customers","authors":"V. Nikogosian, Tobias Veith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1991819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1991819","url":null,"abstract":"The literature on vertical integration in markets with regulated upstream prices suggests that the integrated upstream firm might engage in non-price discrimination. Several studies provide policy recommendations derived either from case study approaches or based on theoretical modeling which addresses the unbundling issue. In this study we analyze the impact of vertical integration of retail incumbent and network operator on retail prices and upstream charges. As the vertical structure is heterogeneous across the 850 German electricity submarkets for residential customers (there exist legally unbundled, vertically integrated or fully separated firms), we use firm level data to analyze the effects of different vertical structures and regulation schemes on retail electricity prices. We find significantly higher prices in markets with vertically integrated firms compared to markets with fully separated firms. This finding could indicate non-price discrimination. Furthermore, we find no evidence that legal unbundling eliminates the incentives for non-price discrimination because the prices do not differ from prices in markets under vertical integration.","PeriodicalId":249710,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130253082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Acquiring Labor 获得劳动

ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1571891

P. Ouimet, Rebecca Zarutskie

引用次数: 35

Cross-Border Takeovers and Efficiency of Acquired Banks in Transition Economies: An Observational Study on Ukraine 转型经济体中被收购银行的跨境收购与效率:基于乌克兰的观察研究

ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-09-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1935497

Muzaffarjon Ahunov, L. Van Hove, M. Jegers

引用次数: 0

Foreign Acquisition, Wages and Productivity 外国收购、工资和生产率

ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-06-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01345.x

R. Bandick

{"title":"Foreign Acquisition, Wages and Productivity","authors":"R. Bandick","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01345.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01345.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effect of foreign acquisition on wages and total factor productivity (TFP) in the years following a takeover by using unique detailed firm-level data for Sweden for the period 1993-2002. The paper takes particular account of the potential endogeneity of the acquisition decision (for example due to “cherry picking”) by implementing an instrumental variable approach and propensity score matching with difference-in-difference estimation technique. Moreover, in line with recent literature on firm heterogeneity in international trade, this paper allows for the acquisition effect to differ depending on whether the targeted firms were domestic multinational or non-multinationals before the foreign takeover. This paper also allows for the acquisition effect to differ depending on whether the acquisition is horizontal or vertical. The result shows that foreign acquisition has no effects on overall, skilled or less-skilled wage growth neither in targeted Swedish MNEs nor in targeted Swedish non-MNEs and neither if the acquisition was motivated by vertical or horizontal motives. However, the results indicate that both targeted Swedish MNEs and non- MNEs have better growth in TFP after vertical foreign acquisition only but no such impact from horizontal foreign acquisition","PeriodicalId":249710,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129216898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 38

Regulatory Arbitrage: Evidence from Bank Cross-Border M&As 监管套利:来自银行跨境并购的证据

ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-05-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1849723

Huiyan Dong, F. Song, Libin Tao

{"title":"Regulatory Arbitrage: Evidence from Bank Cross-Border M&As","authors":"Huiyan Dong, F. Song, Libin Tao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1849723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1849723","url":null,"abstract":"Using a database of more than 2,000 international bank M&A deals completed between 1990 and 2007 and the unique bank regulation data collected by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006), we analyze the effects of bank regulations on bank's cross-border M&As around the world. Results suggest that banks have strong incentives to expand into lightly regulated countries, indicating that banks' international footing provides them a natural way of regulatory arbitrage. Also we find that the takeover premium is increasing if the target bank is located in a country with less stringent capital requirement, more independence of supervisory authority, and lower standards of disclosure requirement. Given that regulators are concerned about the shareholders of their domestic banks, they may lower their bank regulation standards in order to provide domestic banks with an advantage over foreign banks and increase their profitability. Therefore, our paper provides an explanation of \"competition in laxity\" of bank regulations in individual countries. Further, we provide evidence that there is no significant increase in the financial performance in the combined banks, partly due to the motivation of regulatory arbitrage of bank managers in cross-board M&As.","PeriodicalId":249710,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133707535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Cash Acquirers: Can Free Cash Flow, Debt and Institutional Ownership Explain Long Run Performance? 现金收购者:自由现金流、债务和机构所有权能解释长期业绩吗?

ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-03-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1793094

A. Gregory, Yuan-Hsin Wang

{"title":"Cash Acquirers: Can Free Cash Flow, Debt and Institutional Ownership Explain Long Run Performance?","authors":"A. Gregory, Yuan-Hsin Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1793094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1793094","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose - This paper investigates the Jensen's free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis in the context of UK cash acquisitions. Under this hypothesis, financial slack induces mangers to acquire targets for cash if such behaviour generates either pecuniary or non-pecuniary rewards for them, giving rise to a potential agency problem around cash takeovers. We argue that the stronger position of shareholders, as opposed to firm managers, in the UK should help in constraining such potential agency problems around such mergers. Compared to the USA, position, this should make the FCF hypothesis less relevant in the UK. Design/methodology/approach - This paper uses short-run announcement period returns and long-run calendar-time returns in testing our hypotheses. Findings - This paper shows that low leverage and high FCF may be advantageous provided shareholder monitoring is adequate. By analysing both announcement period and long-term returns, we show that acquirers with high levels of FCF are superior performers, and that any long-run under-performance of cash acquirers appears to be associated with low cash resources and low institutional ownership. Research limitations/implications - Inevitably, long-run returns measurement is contentious, although we present results from alternative models to mitigate this. Limitations are necessarily imposed by the sample size, meaning that multi-way partitioning of the data is not feasible. Practical implications - The practical implications are that the UK regulatory and institutional ownership regime may actually protect the interests of shareholders and mitigate agency problems. Originality/value - As far as we are aware, this is the first paper to systematically test FCF, leverage and institutional ownership effects in the context of UK cash acquisitions.","PeriodicalId":249710,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126130214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 15

Vertical Restraints in Health Care Markets 医疗保健市场的垂直限制

ERN: Theory & Evidence on Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-01-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1748519

R. Halbersma, K. Katona

引用次数: 5